Rethinking a Resource-Based Strategy

The United States faces a wide range of resource pressures in shaping its national security strategy. The Burke Chair has developed a new briefing that provides an overview of both the trends in defense spending, and how they interact with such resource constraints, entitled Shaping a Budget and Resource-Oriented Strategy for US National Security. This briefing is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/100323_US-Rethinking_Resource_Based_Strategy.pdf.

Nine Key Resource Based Challenges

The brief identifies nine resource-based challenges the US must deal with in shaping its future strategy and defense spending:

1. Dealing with the immediate budget and financial crisis.
2. Bringing entitlements, defense discretionary spending, other discretionary spending – and revenues – into a stable, affordable balance.
3. Creating a functional system for tying strategic planning to a working PPBS (Program-Planning-Budgeting System) and force planning system actually executed on time, at the promised level, and at the promised cost.
4. Structuring US strategy to create an affordable, evolving, civil-military, national security posture that meets critical needs.
5. Facing the declining capability and will of traditional allies.
6. Strengthening non-traditional alliances.
7. Dealing with emerging powers with regional economic -- and eventually technological and military – parity.
8. Finding the balance between irregular/asymmetric, conventional, and WMD warfare in a period of constant technological change.
9. Coping with ideological and non-state actors at the political and civil as well as the combat and counterterrorism levels.

Dealing with the Immediate Pressures on the US Budget

The US does face critical problems in its deficit and debt that threated the economy and economic growth of the United States. Defense spending –like all federal spending – will be under intense pressure for at least the near term. At the same time, it is important to understand how unrealistic much of the present budget and resource debate really is:

• Focused almost exclusively on federal deficit and debt, not strategies for federal spending.
• Effort to exempt entitlements, revenues, and military that cannot achieve either desired results or a meaningful strategy for federal spending.
• Defense is under pressure, but far less than other discretionary spending.
  • The civil side of national security spending remains extremely vulnerable to budget cuts.
• The emphasis on cuts is driven as much by political pressure recession and unemployment as substance.
• Caught up in bitter partisan fights and run up to 2012 election, and politicizes all efforts: Each party tries to position the other as the cause of blame and failure.
• FY2012 defense budget follows up recent major procurement cuts with emphasis on efficiency, cutting softer programs, procurement reforms. No real emphasis on strategy or viable force posture.

Bringing Entitlements, Defense Discretionary Spending, Other Discretionary Spending – and revenues – into a stable, affordable balance

The briefing shows that no resource strategy for defense can deal with the critical problems in federal spending. The size of the defense share of present and future federal spending relative to the US GDP is simply too low. A meaningful solution to the deficit and debt must focus on other areas of expenditure, must increase federal revenues, and must fully address the underlying social and economic pressures that drive mandatory spending.

This is the only way to create a sustainable balance between mandatory programs like Social Security and Medicare and discretionary civil and military spending. Defense costs need to be kept under control, but no defense resource strategy that meets vital US national security needs can have more than the most marginal impact in creating a far better and sustainable balance between federal spending and revenues, and making key changes in the overall patterns in US spending and saving inside and outside government that can deal with an aging population and a rising medical costs that put an unacceptable burden on the US gross domestic product. 

In practice, shaping a defense resource-based strategy must take the following broader realities into consideration:

• Discretionary spending can be cut at the margin, but such cuts cannot come close to solving the US budget problem.
  • Defense is too small a part of the total for any realistic cuts to deal with balancing the budget, the debt, or pressure from entitlements.
• The real burden that defense now places on the US economy is not high enough to be a driving factor in historical terms or relative to other federal expenditures. But,
  • Wars are unpopular and projections assume Afghan “victory” in 2013.
  • Perceptions of waste and mismanagement are critical pressures.
  • Projected defense spending assumes present, a one major regional contingency force structure is enough.
• Finding a proper level of resources for defense relative to other needs requires hard social choices about mandatory spending
  • Options like raising age limits, forcing efficiency and triage, and increasing revenues (taxes).
  • The cost of dealing with an aging population, and the massive rises in the economic burden imposed by rising real medical costs, poses a threat to the national economy.
  • The US cannot solve its federal spending problems by assuming perfect and sustained recovery from the recession indefinitely into the future, and by not allowing for for any failures in economic growth. Real world planning cannot be based on a “triumph of hope over experience.”

The “Haircut Approach” to Managing Defense Resources: “Take A Little Off the Top”

The FY2012 defense budget submission tries to avoid broad cuts in defense spending by repeating all the past promises of increase efficiency, cutting or delaying marginal programs by service without regard to any strategic justification, and promising  financial “victory” in the Afghan and Iraq Wars in FY2013. This is coupled to a promise of $100 billion in total savings over the coming five years.

This is excellent politics. As a defense resource strategy, it borders on the ridiculous.

Creating a Functional System for Tying Strategic Planning to a Working PPBS and Force Planning System Actually Executed on Time, at the Promised Level, and at the Promised Cost
 
The CBO’s long-term estimates of the burden defense spending will place on the US gross domestic product indicate that the real cost of the forces needed to implement current US plans will likely to be significantly higher than the Department of Defense is budgeting for. They also indicate that personnel and O&M costs could seriously limit modernization without the projected spending levels.

This highlights the need to examine future options in terms of some credible way of linking US strategy and force plans to resources and suggests that one way to do this would be to replace the current vague categories in the defense planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) with categories that tie spending to each of the major US commands.

This require an approach to a defense resource strategy that will:

• Force the entire defense planning and budgeting system to actually execute plans at projected cost.
• High cost programs have to work. Must stop confusing force multipliers with force degraders.
• Enforce top Down Accountability: “Fish rot from the head down.”
• Provide real strategies and not concepts: Force plans, personnel plans, modernization plans, timescales, and costs.
• Make hard trade-offs, and by mission – not by service.
• Plan annually in rolling five-year (ten? fifteen?) periods.
• Shift PPBS system away from services to major commands

Conceptual strategies and concept papers with no real links to reality, such as the QDR and the concept papers that are called strategies by the CJCS and service chiefs, are little more than a monumental waste of staff time and energy. A strategy either define clear plans, mission capabilities, resource requirements, and steps to achieve well-defined goals with clear measures of effectiveness, or it is not a strategy in any meaningful sense.
Moreover, the entire PPBS system needs to be restructured to deal in tangible force plans, personnel and procurement plans that are affordable within realistic cost estimates and planned and budget over at least a five year period – rather than simply one fiscal year into the future. The inherent absurdity of a PPBS focused on categories like “general purpose forces” that are so broad that they become “no purpose forces” cripples planning rather than aids it, as does a focus on budgeting line item costs by individual military services.
Real world US mission planning and “jointness” have centered on the major combat commands for more than twenty years. It is time to build the national strategy and PPBS effort around them as well.

Structuring US Strategy to Create an Affordable, Evolving, Civil-Military, National Security Posture that Meets Critical Needs

Any analysis of US national security efforts over the last ten years of war also shows that there is a need for a far better integration of civil and military planning, and joint efforts to develop integrated civil-military strategies, PPBS efforts, and campaign plans by both State and Defense. The State Department’s recent QDDR failed as dismally to address these issues as every other substantive issue affecting the use of civil aid and advisory services.

Even a brief review of the civil-military spending efforts and programs in the Afghan conflict shows that an effective effort to link US strategy to credible levels of US resources requires the US government to address the following issues:

• After ten years of war, the US still does not have meaningful integrated civil-military efforts and plans, or a clear definition of the civil-military programs necessary to implement “hold, build, and transition.”
• The US must integrate civil-military plans and operations more effectively to meet the challenge of withdrawal from Iraq and to transition to a lead by State, and to succeed in the Afghanistan conflict.
• The current turmoil in Middle East shows the risk of overdependence on security sector.
• The failure of QDDR illustrates the challenge on the civil side. So does delay in civilian “surge” in Afghanistan. (1,100 military in 2009 vs. several hundred civilians now.)
• There is a clear need for and integrated civil-military strategy and to shape a D0D-State PPBS for OCOS and regional/national operations.
• Finding the right balance is not simply a matter of on integrating State, USAID, and civilian partners abroad into a resource-based strategy for defense. Some key trade offs must be made to make better use of the $77 billion now allocated to homeland security.

Dealing with Emerging powers With Regional Economic -- and Eventually Technological and Military – Parity

At the same time, this civil-military effort must come to grips with fundamental changes in the overall size of the US economy and population relative to that of the result of the world, and the impact of America’s declining industrial base and the real world limits to its lead in technology:

• The shrinking US share of global population and economy is not necessarily decline, but is a reality.
• US dependence on global economy is growing steadily, and with it dependence on key economic peer competitors. E.G. China
• The US cannot define for itself what a post-industrial America really means, but we do see growing industrial dependence.
• Civil technology transfers, and diminishing returns other areas, are steadily eroding the US and “Western” (Japan and South Korea) lead.
• China already illustrates the case where any major conflict, and sustained military competition, would pose a massive national security burden. India, ????, will follow.
• The US must rethink and prioritize its regional interests: Central and South Asia? West Africa? Latin America? North America? Gulf?

Facing the Declining Capability and Will of Traditional Allies

The end of the Cold War and social/economic changes force further changes in Us strategy that require it to face the following issues:

• The end of the Cold War removed key motives for countries with the same budget and social dynamics as the US.
• The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have had a major impact of allied will, trust, and national caveats.
• The new NATO strategy is “hollow” and in direct contradiction to spending, force size, and probable willingness to execute.
• Key military threats now in Asia, Middle East, and “out of area” for many traditional allies
• Current threats are often complex mixes of irregular forces, non-state actors, failed governance, and deep internal tensions few traditional allies want to deal with.
• The US needs allies as a critical part of any resource strategy, but must rethink the role of European allies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Canada in terms of “alliances of the credible and effective.” Re-evaluate Taiwan.

 
Strengthening Non-Traditional Alliances

This requires the US to put the same emphasis on strengthen its ties to non –traditional allies as it does on integrating its civil-military national security efforts. In practice, this means an effective US strategy must:

• Focus on Greater Middle East, most of Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Pacific.
• Learns from the fact that Afghanistan and Iraq show the critical role of local forces; role of US advisory and aid efforts.
• Requires a new dimension of strategic communications, and expertise in dealing with different cultures, faiths, and complex national sensitivities.
• It is far cheaper and a far better use of US capabilities to help our allies do it, that do it ourselves, when our strategic interests coincide.
  • FMS, MAP/FMF, IMET, USMTM/SANG, SOF trainers key military force multipliers.
  • State, INL, USAID, counterterrorism agencies key civil partners.
• It is easier for traditional allies to play a key supporting role than take the lead or play a role in combat.
• Working with non-traditional allies is a key means to prevent, preempt, and contain, and avoid conflicts.

Finding the Balance Between Irregular/Asymmetric, Conventional, and WMD Warfare in a Period of Constant Technological Change

The US must also look beyond arms control and preventive action in dealing with a complex mix of new and emerging threats, and find ways to decisive what kind of efforts to resource and at what level. These efforts cannot be conceptual; they require real world plans, programs, and budgets to deal with the following changes in the strategic environment.

•  “Hybrid Warfare” is mindless if not tied to force posture and resource choices.
• Nuclear, cyber, biotechnology, weapons of mass effectiveness, increases in strike range, and unconventional delivery all change the map and nature of military power.
  • Counterproliferation can simply shift the activity to covert and/or alternative means.
  • Same with missile defense, preemptive/ preventive strikes.
• Every key US and allied capability, resource dependence, and critical facility redefines the target mix.
• If you can’t ban the crossbow, you have to find an affordable way to live with it.

Coping with Ideological and Non-State Actors at the Political and Civil as Well as the Combat and Counterterrorism levels

Finally, the US must do a far better job of tying its national strategy, and every part of its civil-military efforts to supporting efforts in politics, diplomacy and strategic communications,

• Middle East crises are a warning that no population is passive or can be continuously repressed.
• Face at least two decades of demographic pressure, inadequate governance, religious and ideological challenges to come.
• Struggle for the future of Islam is internal, not a clash between civilizations, but shows the scale of the spillover effect.
• Impacts on key imports of resources, global economy (which steadily equals our economy.)
• Immigration, travel, speed and complexity of global transport, communications/Internet, financial training systems, and IT add to the problem.
• Steadily increases need to see through other’s eyes, define security to meet their interests and values.

Shaping a Resource Strategy by Mission
Given this mix of challenges, the US must face the critical problems in its current approach to strategy, planning, and resources. It must face the following issues and needs: 

• Face limits to US national resources and explicitly account for role of traditional & nontraditional allies, friendly states.
• No national security strategy can make stable force planning and resource decisions until the US address the balance between revenues and expenditures, discretionary and mandatory spending, and the underlying domestic political and economic forces at work.
• Annual, line item planning is ridiculous. So are line item budgeting, and vacuous conceptual strategy and QDR/QDDR documents.
• Need to shape both strategy and budgeting around the functional organization of US forces.
• Allocate personnel, procurement by mission and not by service.
• Force explicit resource trade-offs by mission on joint basis.

As has been suggested earlier, this means shaping US strategy, and the US PPBS and annual budget submission around the fact that the US shapes its real world commitments and resource allocations around six regional and global commands. In practice, this requires an approach to strategy and resource allocation that is explicitly organized by command, and deals with the following types of issues:

• Northern Command
  • Emerging role of Artic
  • Creating the proper balance of military civil Homeland defense capabilities.
  • Rebalancing and modernizing roles of reserves and Guard.

• Pacific Command
  • Competition, not confrontation with China.
  • Expanding perimeter of Chinese operations (Outer Island chain), Chinese nuclear modernization; asymmetric warfare.
  • US forces and missions for Northeast Asia: Changing North Korean threat and role of South Korea and Japan as partners. Deal with nuclear and missile, missile defense challenges.
  • Reexamining future role of Taiwan; US strategy.
  •  Creating effective partnerships with Southeast Asian states.
  • Strengthening partnership with Australia.
  •  Clearly demarcating PACOM role in Indian Ocean, coordination US strategy for Pakistan and Central Asia with strategy for India/South Asia/China.

• European Command
  • Shaping a real world strategy around NATO, EU, and role of traditional allies.
  • Building power projection partnership with Britain and France in face of ongoing cuts..
  • Reassessing role and importance of Turkey.
  •  Partnership versus confrontation or containment with FSU.
  • Updating counterterrorism, missile defense, and other regional plans.

• Southern  Command
  • Refocus US priorities on partnership with Mexico, friendly Latin American and Caribbean States.
  • Dealing with Venezuela, Cuba, other hostile states.
  • Helping region adjust to ethnic shifts.
  • Creating a clear civil-military strategy for narcotics.
  • Restructuring US security policies to deal with emergence of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile as major regional powers.
  •  Meeting counterinsurgency challenges like Columbia.

• Africa Command
  • Defining role is advising, training, equipping African forces; creating non-traditional partners and alliances.
  • Security role in stability of states in horn, West Africa (critical oil resource), and East Africa.
  • Finding right mix of counter-terrorism, counter-trafficking efforts.
  •  Handling links to NATO over drugs and migration.

• Central  Command
  • Pursuing combat and post-combat (transition) posture in Afghanistan, Pakistan.
  • Reshaping US posture in Gulf and MENA after withdrawal from Iraq and upheavals in Egypt and other Arab states.
  • Future role and ties to Israel, support of Arab-Israeli peace.
  • Deciding on hard trade-offs over future posture in Central Asia.
  • Dealing with proliferation, missiles, weapons of mass effectiveness.
  •  Reshaping training, advisory, and military sales to support non-traditional alliances.
  • Reshaping counterterrorism to focus on partnerships, deal with civil-military issues.

• Strategic Command
  • Reshaping US nuclear, missile, and delivery platform mix: Nuclear modernization, biodefense, missile defense, SSBN/ICBM/CM/new bomber mix.
  • Dealing with counterproliferation, providing regional commands with means for extended regional deterrence, missile defense.
  • Creating proper mix of offensive and defensive weapons for conventional weapons of mass effectiveness.
  •  Handling links to NATO over drugs and migration.

• Transportation Command
  • Making the tanker decision real.
  • Reshaping the airlift/sealift/prepositioning/allied basing and force mix.
  • Rebalancing active and reserve component.
  • Creating cost-effective civilian air and sealift options.
  • Working with other commands to create a global, long-term approach to BRAC.

• Special Operations Command
  • Creating a post-Iraq, Afghan transition posture.
  • Finding the right force mix to support commands in hybrid warfare.
  • Expanding capability to train and partner non-traditional allies on sustain and quick reaction basis.
  • Reshaping mix of area specialists, ranger, Marine, and SOF forces.
  • Acting on lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan to create civil-military approaches to project support to friendly states.
  • Shaping a counterproliferation/CBRN mission.
  • Rebalancing SOF/Intel mix.
  • Rebalancing national vs. regional SOF deployments.
  • Finding an affordable, real world approach to modernization.