The Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

The U.S. has learned many lessons in its wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—most of them the hard way. It has had to adapt the strategies, tactics, and force structures designed to fight regular wars to conflicts dominated by non-state actors. It has had to deal with threats shaped by ideological extremism far more radical than the communist movements it struggled against in countries like Vietnam. It has found that the kind of “Revolution in Military Affairs,” or RMA, that helped the U.S. deter and encourage the collapses of the former Soviet Union does not win such conflicts against non-state actors, and that it faces a different mix of threats in each such war—such as in cases like Libya, Yemen, Somalia and a number of states in West Africa.

The U.S. does have other strategic priorities: competition with China and Russia, and direct military threats from states like Iran and North Korea. At the same time, the U.S. is still seeking to find some form of stable civil solution to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—as well as the conflicts Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and West Africa. Reporting by the UN, IMF, and World Bank also shows that the mix of demographic, political governance, and economic forces that created the extremist threats the U.S. and its strategic partners are now fighting have increased in much of the entire developing world since the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001, and the political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a working paper that suggests the U.S. needs to build on the military lessons it has learned from its "long wars" in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries in order to carry out a new and different kind of “Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs,” or RCMA. This revolution involves very different kinds of warfighting and military efforts from the RMA. The U.S. must take full advantage of what it is learning about the need for different kinds of train and assist missions, the use of airpower, strategic communications, and ideological warfare.

At the same time, the U.S. must integrate these military efforts with new civilian efforts that address the rise of extremist ideologies and internal civil conflicts. It must accept the reality that it is fighting "failed state" wars, where population pressures and unemployment, ethnic and sectarian differences, critical problems in politics and governance, and failures to meet basic economic needs are a key element of the conflict. In these elements of conflict, progress must be made in wartime to achieve any kind of victory, and that progress must continue if any stable form of resolution is to be successful.

This analysis is entitled21st Century Conflict: From “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) to a “Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs” (RCMA), and it is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180215_RCMA_Report_cordesman.pdf.

Its contents include:

It is being circulated for comment at a time when the U.S. has not yet described any long-term strategy for resolving its wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; when the U.S. has so far failed to deal with the necessary aspects of nation building; and when it has failed to come to grips with the civil dimensions of war. It raises serious question about plans to cut the foreign aid budget, and capabilities of the State Department and USAID, and it suggests that the U.S. cannot win its wars without a new form of "whole of government approach" and integrated civil-military effort.

The need for such efforts—and an RCMA—is further supported by previous Burke Chair case studies. PDF versions of these studies can be downloaded at:

• The Civil Half of the Afghan War: Dealing with the Political, Governance, Economics, Corruption, and Drug Threats, December 6, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/civil-half-afghan-war
• Iraq After ISIS: The Other Half of Victory, January 9, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iraq-after-isis-other-half-victory.
• Instability in the MENA Region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Key Conflict States: A Comparative Score Card, November 13, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/instability-mena-region-afghanistan-pakistan-and-key-conflict-states-comparative-score-card.
• Aid Stability and Recovery in Counterterrorism and Warfighting, June 1, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/aid-stability-and-recovery-counterterrorism-and-warfighting.
• If the Fighting Ever Stops: Stabilization, Recovery, and Development in Syria, May 16, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/if-fighting-ever-stops-stabilization-recovery-and-
• The War in Yemen: Hard Choices in a Hard War, May 9, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-yemen-hard-choices-hard-war
• Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Part One: Regional Trends, April 21, 2016.
• Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Part Two: Country-by-Country Trends, April 11, 2016.