Since Donald Trump took office, Russia has changed its position on arms control at least five times. After years of rejecting U.S. overtures for dialogue, during Trump’s first week in office, the Kremlin indicated it was interested in dialogue “as soon as possible,” but two weeks later, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said prospects for extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), did “not look very promising.” A month later, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov said arms control dialogues were “crucial,” but a month later, on April 8, Peskov was dismissive of the idea of engaging in such dialogue because of enduring distrust. The most recent turn was on April 24, when Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu told TASS, “The administration of Donald Trump is currently demonstrating willingness to resume dialogue on strategic stability issues. . . . We are ready for this dialogue.” While Russia has been inconsistent in its messaging about arms control over the past three months, Moscow has remained consistent in insisting that European nuclear powers be part of any future agreement—both messages present challenges, but also opportunities for the future of arms control.
On the one hand, Moscow’s prevarication on arms control and position on European involvement could all be a stalling tactic meant to avoid dialogue on arms control and risk reduction, essentially arms control business as usual. On the other hand, the changing strategic landscape, along with Russia’s consistent focus on French and British involvement, suggest European involvement could unlock new opportunities for arms control with Moscow. Ultimately, European states will have to navigate challenges of balancing deterrence and arms control, relationships with Washington and potential greater strategic autonomy, along with maintaining NATO unity. Just as Europe has stepped up on deterrence, it now also needs to step up on arms control.
Why Bother with Arms Control Now?
Now might seem a strange time for European states to consider engaging in arms control. Arms control is somewhat deservedly a source of skepticism at present. New START will expire in February 2026. Putin has violated at least nine arms control agreements since coming to power. Russia rejected overtures by the Biden administration on numerous occasions to engage in arms control dialogue. Moscow explained its position as a response to U.S. support for Ukraine and a belief that the United States seeks to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia.
Russia’s inconsistent messaging about arms control should also be kept in context. Russia has relied on nuclear rhetoric and threats since it began its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This has included changing its nuclear doctrine to expand the potential scenarios in which Russia would consider nuclear use, such as attacks on Russia by a nonnuclear state with the support of a nuclear state. The arrival of Trump on the scene should not suggest Moscow will suddenly be a more trustworthy arms control partner, or that its wider interests have changed.
Arms control is often misperceived as purely treaty-based bilateral reductions in nuclear forces. Based on this definition, nuclear arms control would be a challenge in the current environment for the reasons outlined above, given Russia’s track record and increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. From the U.S. perspective, any reductions in nuclear forces, especially in a bilateral agreement that leaves out China, could undermine U.S. security, as highlighted in the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission which recommended potentially expanding the United States’ nuclear capabilities, not making cuts, in response to a two-peer environment.
But, of course, arms control is much more than just New START–style agreements. It can focus on responsible and restraining behaviors (rather than making quantitative cuts to nuclear or conventional arsenals), such as the Hague Code of Conduct, which promotes transparency in delivery systems. It can also be multilateral, such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is based on the pillars of disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It can include informal cooperation, such as the P5 process, which is unique because it includes all five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the NPT.
Historically, France and the United Kingdom have struck a delicate balance of shaping strategic arms control without fully participating in strategic arms control efforts such as START I and reducing their forces. In 1983, for example, French President Mitterand spoke to the “disarmament-development link” and observed, “We cannot reject the idea that the five nuclear powers will discuss together, when the day comes, a lasting limitation of their strategic systems,” and outlined conditions for France to participate in such dialogues. The challenge for Europe now is to find a balance between deterrence and arms control, along with competition and cooperation, not only in the worsening security environment but also amid questions about the credibility of U.S. security commitments over the long term and potential divergence in interests.
European Interests in Strategic Arms Control
But why should European states like France, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, or Germany even be interested in arms control? European security and defense are moving toward enhancing deterrence with a conventional buildup. Germany has paved the way for billions of additional defense spending in the coming years, and Poland is in the process of building the largest army in the European Union. If arms control simply meant reductions in nuclear or conventional forces, then it would seemingly be anathema to Europe. But taking a broader approach to arms control suggests European states would have at least four main interests in arms control, some of which are shared with the United States, and others that are unique to European interests and actors
First, there is a near-universal shared interest in reducing the likelihood of nuclear use. The war in Ukraine highlighted the potential for conventional regional crises to escalate and lead to potential nuclear use. According to the New York Times, the CIA assessed in the fall of 2022 that the risk of Russian nuclear use could rise to 50 percent or higher. Additionally, Russia has set numerous redlines throughout the war in Ukraine, such as not supplying weapons to launch attacks inside Russia, which Ukraine and the West have subsequently crossed. While thus far Moscow has failed to uphold those redlines, it would be a mistake to assume that trend will continue in perpetuity. Instead, the war in Ukraine offers important lessons learned on risks of misperception and misunderstanding, changes in nuclear doctrine, and reliance on nuclear weapons in regional conflicts, which should inform new and modern risk reduction strategies. Europe would seem to have an obvious interest in this, since any nuclear use by Russia would likely occur on European soil with severe humanitarian and environmental consequences.
Second, arms control and risk reduction efforts offer important contributions to the wider nuclear order, particularly the NPT. Nonnuclear weapon states have been attempting to increase pressure on the NWS for decades to demonstrate more meaningful progress toward disarmament, which is a requirement under Article VI of the NPT. After two failed Review Conferences in 2015 and 2022, the nuclear order and the NPT are at their weakest point in history. Arms control between the NWS—whether formal or informal, reductions or behaviors—cannot save the NPT on its own. But it could demonstrate U.S. and European commitment to the treaty, even if Moscow or Beijing do not reciprocate. France and the United Kingdom have a particular interest in upholding the nuclear order so as to avoid further nuclear proliferation that could complicate their nuclear postures with smaller arsenals. Additionally, as a depository state of the NPT and initiator of the P5 process, the United Kingdom has a special interest in strengthening and maintaining the nuclear order.
The third European interest diverges somewhat from the United States: a greater interest in transparency. U.S.-Russia arms control has provided Washington with unprecedented information and insights into Moscow’s capabilities and strategic thinking. Europeans may not have had the same opportunities or specific data about Russian capabilities. As Europe enhances its deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, this information aspect of arms control may prove particularly valuable for understanding Russian doctrine, to inform force planning and posture within Europe. According to Mike Albertson at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, “Information, not limits or reductions, is the most valuable commodity in arms control. This is particularly true of information derived from arms control, where data is tracked over time and confirmed by onsite inspections.” Information could include transparency about capabilities based on inspections, as suggested by Albertson. New START, for example, allowed for 18 on-site inspections per year for each party. But information could also be insight into an adversary’s threat perceptions, how this shapes their nuclear doctrine, how they would respond in a crisis, and what assumptions they are making about the United States and its allies.
A final reason why European states might want to lean in on arms control is to avoid being sidelined by future arms control efforts and have their interests undermined, such as a Trump-Putin agreement that dismisses allies’ concerns. While President Trump’s ambitions for arms control with Moscow and Beijing may be stymied by geopolitical reality, the administration seems undecided thus far on its position toward allies, particularly in Europe. Were Trump to pursue an arms control deal, particularly with Moscow, it would have implications for European security and for British and French nuclear forces. Engaging on arms control could preempt some of these risks for Europe and help the continent avoid being a bystander in discussions about its own security.
“Player Europe” and Arms Control
As Europe takes on greater responsibility for strategic stability, therefore, it is logical that it would also play a bigger role in arms control. Mark Newton from the UK Ministry of Defence said at a CSIS event on April 25, “Europe can’t expect the United States to care more about Europe than Europe does.” A recent report from CSIS’s Project on Nuclear Issues noted that if U.S. and European strategic objectives with Russia diverge, European strategic autonomy will only grow, potentially increasing Europe’s importance and agency in future arms control arrangements.
One of the biggest challenges with this approach, however, will be maintaining NATO unity. To manage this and other challenges, such as maintaining a close relationship with Washington and engaging Moscow, European NATO members can take steps to develop a new arms control strategy, lead within the NPT, and coordinate with Washington on any future arms control endeavors. Arms control needs to be tied to a broader strategy and obviously does not happen in vacuum. The first step for NATO, therefore, is to develop a new approach to arms control in conjunction with its military planning and posture. A new arms control strategy might emphasize how it can work in tandem with deterrence, drawing on the principles of the 1967 Harmel Report which described arms control and risk reduction as one of the two key “pillars” of security for NATO members, the first being “the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression.” The strategy could apply the principles of behavioral arms control by focusing on specific risky behaviors by Russia that might be curbed through cooperative, reciprocal restraint mechanisms. A 2025 RAND report suggested that options along these lines could be mutual rhetorical restraint and doctrinal transparency.
Building on the theme of risk reduction, France and the United Kingdom are in a unique position as the only two nuclear possessors in Europe, and as permanent members of the UN Security Council and the P5 process within the NPT. The United Kingdom is due to take over presidency of the process this summer and France leads the group’s work on strategic risk reduction. The P5 process is a unique opportunity for advancing risk reduction and transparency, and, frankly, it is the only game in town right now. The P5 explicitly affirmed the importance of avoiding nuclear war in a joint statement in 2022, and in the lead-up to the 2026 NPT Review Conference, the group can take on an ambitious risk reduction agenda. Specific topics for dialogue and collaboration might include exercise notifications and crisis communication channels. A specific opportunity would be for France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and a wider group of NPT members to emphasize the need for consistency and accountability in the common reporting form, given notable asymmetries in transparency and lack of information on the part of Russia and China. A more ambitious option is for the P5 process to launch a Crisis Stability Initiative, working toward a final report that would identify the greatest risks of nuclear use during crises, threat perceptions amongst the P5, and the role of nuclear weapons in their national doctrines.
Finally, European states should engage with the Trump administration often and early about arms control. The president has repeatedly stated a desire to engage Russia and China in arms control, pushing for “denuclearization” with those adversaries. Mixed with concerns about Trump’s commitment to European security, arms control with Putin could come at their expense. Therefore, leaders in Paris, London, and other European capitals should not only offer a clear explanation about why certain arms control “deals” might damage their security and have potential proliferation consequences, but also offer a vision for how the United States and Europe can work together to advance arms control.
The challenge for any arms control efforts, of course, will be incentivizing Moscow and identifying agreements based on shared interests. European interests in arms control may not always align with those of Washington, nor will Europe necessarily act as a monolith on arms control. But arms control is hardly static, and as it moves forward Europe will need to be in the game.
Heather Williams is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
