This transcript is from a CSIS podcast published on 10/31. Listen to the podcast.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Welcome to Into Africa. My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. I'm a senior fellow and the director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This is a podcast where we talk everything Africa, politics, economics, security, and culture. Welcome.
Rwanda, a small country landlocked in East Africa, has risen from infamous and very tragic events going back to 1994, which came to be known as the Rwandan Genocide. This took a lot of energy from the people of Rwanda, from the leadership to rebuild the country to get it to where it is. Rwanda has traveled a long road. Today, despite its size, it's a small country, as I said, a population of nearly 14 million, Rwanda continues to punch way above its weight. Rwanda has also faced a lot of challenges, particularly it's on the front of security. It has to struggle with the relationship with its neighbors. It's a highly functional country that contributes quite a bit to peace, security, peace and security around the world, particularly through the United Nations, sending peacekeepers and other security programs across Africa and sometime beyond.
Some issues still remain. The country is building its national cohesion, issues of human rights that often the country grapple with, particularly with its partners in the West and sometime international organization. The country is also, as I said, is multidimensional. Uh, issue of technology, where the country is on the cutting edge. Uh, different platforms that they've created. Joining me today to discuss some of those issues is, uh, General James Kabarebe, who is Minister of S... for State for Foreign Affairs and in charge of regional cooperation. General Kabarebe, welcome to Into Africa.
James Kabarebe: Thank you.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Your country, Rwanda, has traveled a long way and you have been part of that journey from the beginning. As a young man, you were part of the group that, uh, had launched the offensive to, to come back to Rwanda, bringing the various refugees, Rwandan refugees who were scattered around the region and beyond. You also eventually become, uh... Became the, uh, Chief of Defense of the DRC after Rwanda had invaded, or joined the coalition that came to be known as FDL. Uh, you serve as CDS of your country here. Now you are in this new position, dealing particularly with the regional cooperation. Can you talk a little bit about your own assessment of the role that your country has traveled today?
James Kabarebe: Yeah, thank you so much. Uh, uh, Rwanda has struggled a long way. Long way, gone through a lot. Confronted a lot. But also have the... Were and remained consistent, uh, to its, uh, main objective of, uh, now developing, um, m- moving ahead. Uh, you mentioned it, Rwanda has gone through a lot of, uh, episodes, historical episodes. There's the colonial aspect, the postcolonial aspect, and the post, uh, 1994, uh, genocide against the Tutsi. All these episodes, they left landmarks, some ramifications to our country.
Uh, the colonial perspective of course, as you mentioned it, left Rwanda small, landlocked. Most of its, uh, territories, uh, taken away and, uh, uh, weakened a bit. And the same history, colonial history, left Rwanda a divided society. Made Rwanda a divided society, bipolar society that, uh, culminated into the 1959 genocide. You can call it genocide, it was that. So many Rwandans...
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Mm-hmm.
James Kabarebe: Tutsi, uh, ethnic group persecuted. Free all over this, uh, region. And, uh, m- m... Uh, the post-colonial Rwanda, the elitist leaders who came into power, they influenced the same genocide ideology. Continued to divide our society. And this culminated into the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. By 1990, there was this momentum by many Rwandan youths that had been scattered all over the region because of these historical peoples that had been condemned to refugee status for almost 30 years. They were grouped and, uh, sought to come back to Rwanda to liberate the country from that elitist, genocidal, uh, group that, uh, was mismanaging our country through many s... Genocicidic killings, harassments of our people. Rwanda was not a country to no... Talk about.
So after 1994, when Rwanda embarked on, uh, the journey of reconstruction, plus the genocide reconstruction, building, uh, institutions, s- strong institutions. Building a system that works. Govern a system that works. Reuniting our people. And then embarking on the economic path, economic development path. I think after 30 years now, we have registered some progress. Some progress, but of course as you said, we have challenges also. Challenges that do not only concern Rwanda, but m- many even other regional and African countries. There are certain challenges that we all share. But, uh, we have seen Rwanda pave a way through and registering some progress.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: This journey of rebuilding the country after the genocide, uh, took a lot of strength. It will take a lot of leadership. But it's also costly.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: What in your mind, um, having served in the various capacities that you have, have been some of those key challenges and how have you tackled those as a country?
James Kabarebe: Well, the challenges were many and varied. Uh, but you can pick some of the most important ones. Uh, first and foremost, after the 1994 genocide against Tutsi, the first challenge was to reunite our people. Uh, I may say it is... It was a challenge, but it was workable, and it was successful, and it was done. It was easily done. And this, uh, worked out to be the base for our strength for our today. After reuni- reuniting our people, uh, reuniting Rwandans, this became the basis for, for our strength. We have another challenge that we still grapple with, mainly that I personally see as a challenge, is the attitude of the international community and some of the responses.
There are some positives. There are some good aspects. Of course we would not have, uh, developed without the support of the international community in general. Uh, through good collaborations with international community, we have achieved something. But on the other aspect of the international community, some attitudes and responses, uh, uh, has been pulling back, uh, our, our energy. Uh, especially whereas you said about, uh, you know, uh, some allegations, accusations, you know. Negative reporting, projecting Rwanda the way it is not. You know, it brings some energy under, uh, in a way. Uh, it does not help our, our development.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But then sometime, uh, uh, general, Rwanda is reportedly considered as a darling of the West, of the international community.
James Kabarebe: (laughs)
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele:
You don’t see that way?
James Kabarebe: (laughs) I don't see it that way. Um, it, it, it depends on m... Who says it. But, uh, darling of the West in a way that maybe we have mastered, uh, the way to deal with it. To deal with it without, you know, allowing it to be a problem, but instead, you know, looking forward and, uh, getting the best out of it. But, uh, I don't think Rwanda is a darling of the West and, uh...
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: It doesn't feel that way for you?
James Kabarebe: No. That's not our feeling. W- we strive t-to work with everyone. Hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Speaking of working with everyone, Rwanda is in a tough neighborhood. A neighborhood with tremendous potential, that the neighborhood... And I'm speaking of the Great Lakes in this case, not Africa at large. That has been prone to conflict beyond history of Rwanda, as you just described, uh, the diaspora, the refugees, of course in, in the case of part of the diaspora o- of Rwanda taking over... Taking matters in their own hands to try to change their circumstances. But you still have to grapple with your neighbors.
So Rhonda has that friction pretty much with all the neighbors. Uh, with Burundi, with Tanzania, with DRC, uh, and then with Uganda, where you closed the borders for a long time. W- what is that about? Why is a country that is building its own national unity, its own national citizenship, so to speak, and national cohesion, and projecting everything that you just mentioned, is still struggling to strike the right balance with the neighbors?
James Kabarebe: Uh, I don't think it is true that we are struggling to strike a balance with our neighbors. We have had good relationships with our neighbors. We have not had any problem with Tanzania, for example. With Uganda, it has been on and off, but we have a very long history of, uh... And a very strong relationship, historical relations w- with Uganda. Even with a few skirmishes that have taken place, they have been easily overcome and easily... Because, uh, the- the- uh, uh, they are not... There's nothing fundamental, uh, that, uh, is difficult to deal with between us and Uganda. So with Uganda, we are, we are okay and we have, we have been fine.
Even with Burundi, it has not been very difficult for a very long time. M... Burundi, we only had the recent skirmishes, uh, originating from their own internal, uh, problems, then, uh, 2015 coup d'état. Where most of their people fled here and we disarmed them, controlled them, and we still have them. And, uh, so there is nothing deep, nothing difficult with Burundi that cannot be settled. So it's not true, uh, it's maybe, uh, a perception that Rwanda, you know, struggles to live with their neighbors. But it's not, uh, it's not true. Generally we have had very good relationship with our neighbors. Except with our neighbor to the West, the DRC.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And general, we'll come to the DRC, I just-
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... want to...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... uh, beg your indulgence to stay a little bit on Burundi and Uganda. So e... Both of these countries, um, in many ways, sister countries to Rwanda.
James Kabarebe: Sure.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Uh, the long history that exists between Uganda and, uh, and Rwanda. Uh, you go up there, a lot of the, uh, the leaders in this country grew up there.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Um, so it's, it's home for many of you. Uganda is home for many of you.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So how home becomes such a challenge where you close the door to home, so there have to have been some challenges...
James Kabarebe: (laughs)
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... (laughs) when you close the door to your other home.
James Kabarebe: E... With brothers (laughs) in the same family, sometimes they have, uh, their own squabbles. The most important thing is, uh, what is the basis for that and how do you overcome it? So with Uganda, there's nothing deep. There's nothing fundamental. There's nothing very difficult. We... You may have a quarrel today and, uh, tomorrow you overcome it. And based on that, uh, relationship, historical ties, culture, everything, uh, that is a good basis for you to, you know, to overcome-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So today, where is that relationship?
James Kabarebe: Today, the relationship with Uganda is perfect. It's quite excellent.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And Burundi is literally your twin.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: You know, the culture makeup.
James Kabarebe: Language.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: History, language.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Traditions.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So how do we go from that to these skirmishes that, uh, that you're referring to?
James Kabarebe: Yeah, with Burundi, uh, I tho... As I s- I said earlier, uh, Burundi, uh, historically we have not had any problems with Burundi. It only started recently in 2015 when they had a coup d'état and th- their people fled to, to Rwanda. And, uh, the situa- the situation was also aggravated by Burundi's choice recently to join the DRC government to fight, uh, in the eastern DRC to fight against th- the M23. And to join the DRC, that also incorporates or integrates the former genocidal forces, the FDLR, within their forces. So for us, uh, we, we saw that as a, a betrayal on the part of Burundi. Burundi joining the forces of the DRC that incorporate the genocidal forces, i-it brought up a-an ideological connotation to the conflict.
I mean, how does a neighbor like Burundi, that knows what happened here in 1994, that knows that the DRC government incorporates or includes the, the, uh, the FDLR, the genocide of forces amongst their, their military, and they joined them? So to us that, uh, caused, uh, some frost. But, uh, uh, with Burundi, we can still talk. We are even talking today. We can talk and we know at a time we are going to iron it out.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: How are those talks going?
James Kabarebe: The talks are bilateral, at different levels. At least we meet, we talk.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yeah.
James Kabarebe: And, uh, we believe that Burundi has, uh, interest in opening the borders. Rwanda did not close the borders, Burundi closed the borders. So we believe that they have an interest in, uh, opening the borders. And, uh, you know, had a good co- good collaboration with us. Rwanda has been open, open to them. And, uh, we believe... I think it, it will, it will not take so long.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But the Burundians allege that you are holding some of the people who tried the coup in 2015. Uh, you've given them shelter. They also think you are supporting, you meaning Rwanda, supporting the dissident on their part.
James Kabarebe: No. That's not true. Uh, uh, at least as of recent, Burundi has not brought up that allegation again us, about supporting anybody against them. For holding the, uh, the, the, the cooperators, where would we put them? We have them. We could hand them over to Burundi. They know we have... Even discussed about it and even modalities o- of how to handle them over. But you, you cannot just hand over people without any guarantees. Without any guarantees that, you know, whatever happens to them will not, uh, be, uh, used against you. So that is where we are. I- if we can get guarantees, the third party or whoever, handing over the cooperators is a simple thing. Something we agree to in principle with them.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And what is missing at this point is the guarantee for the safety of those people, is that what I hear?
James Kabarebe: I think it's for Burundi to take the lead and say, "Okay, these are the guarantors," and, uh, then we can hand over the people
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, are all members, Tanzania, member of the East Africa community.
James Kabarebe: True.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Which means these countries have reached some agreement to live in peace, cohabitate in the region, uh, collaborate. You are the Minister of, uh, of State for, uh, Foreign Affairs, but in charge of regional integration. Why is that integration not working as well in this regard?
James Kabarebe: Integration multilateralism i- is a process. It's not something that you achi- you achieve overnight. Uh, w- we have what is working in terms of, uh, integration. We have the Common Market. We have the Customs Union. We have, uh... So these mechanisms are working. We are moving to monetary union, we are moving to a political federation. The discussions and the process is still going. So building multilateralism is, uh, not, not something, uh, you, you can do overnight. It's, it's a, it's a, it's a whole process. But definitely there are so many benefits accrued out of the integration of the, the East African community. The, the... At least, uh, all members, and you can say, uh, the membership has increased. Because from three originally to four or five, now we are seven, including Somalia, and South Sudan, Burundi, and, and DRC.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In that, in that process, security continues to be the biggest challenge, if I may say so. So just from what we just discussed with Burundi, the closing the border of Uganda, and now we go to, uh, the DRC, which you intimately were involved with. What is the state of your relations with the DRC beyond the FDLR issue? I understand the DRC, uh, issue is a cynical known for Rwanda, but the relationship is much bigger than that. How do you assess the state of this relationship?
James Kabarebe: Uh, with the DRC normally... We have a history together. And we should be, we should be friends. And, uh, there's nothing difficult for us to be friends. Uh, there is a basis for, for us to be really friends. W- w... In history, uh, history will provide you with what you will pick on to make friendship or even destroy friendship. It's a matter of choice.
Let me take you back to the history w... Of Rwanda and the DRC. In the 1923, after the defeat of the Germans during the first World War, the then Rwandan Army that was allied to the German Army, that fought the British and the Belgians that were coming from the West. That army in 1923, the Rwandan Army, was disbanded by the Belgians, totally disbanded. And who took over? It was the Belgian Army and the Congolese Army.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Force Publique.
James Kabarebe: The, the Force Publique. The Force Publique of the Congolese and the Belgians, they took over from 1923 in Rwanda and in fact, in Burundi. They called the Belgian co- co- uh, commander, Colonel Rogist, who was in, uh, Kisangani, deployed in Rumangabo and deployed in Rwanda and also in Burundi. So Rwanda lived under the Congolese Army, the Force Publique, from 1923 up to 1963, when the first Rwandan military officers graduated. S... That is how many years? 40 years.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: -that what you called that?
James Kabarebe: Yeah, so... But Rwanda has nothing to complain about that, because its history. It's our history, it's our... It's the colonial history. That's what it had for us. And, uh, but we had the Force Publique of the Congolese Army here. Most of the clerks...
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In this case, we call the Belgian Colonial Army.
James Kabarebe: The Belgian Colonial Army, but we had the Congolese...
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Exactly.
James Kabarebe: ... as part of it. Most of th- the clerks, the administrators, the clerks, uh, you may call, uh, civil service or whoever, most of them were Co- Congolese here. They were Congolese. From Kasaï, from Katanga, from where. So we have a history together. In 1959 when there was that first genocide against the Tutsi, the exodus of the Tutsis and the refugee problems within the region, most Rwanda fled to Zaire, to Congo. Others to Tanzania, others to, Burundi, others to Uganda. So Congo, the DRC, hosted our people. They benefited from education, they benefited from... Well, they grew up, no? There was no, no problem.
So that is the history together. There's what you can pick in history that will, you know, create some bondage between you and you live together apart from being the natural neighbors. So even that history, if you used it well, it is good basis for people to, to live together.
In 1990, when the RPF, the Rwandese Patriotic Front and its military wing, the Rwandese Patriotic Army, attacked Rwanda from Uganda, we were part of the Ugandan Army. When we broke out and attacked Rwanda to regain our house, our people who had been refuge for 30 years to come back, to change the course of history here, to change the g... So many things, governance and others, to liberate our country. Mobutu, we attacked on the 1st of October 1990. By the 5th of October 1990, Mobutu intervened to fight us. To fight refugees who were returning to their own country. Intervened with, a, a whole division, the Division S- Spéciale Présidentielle, the DSP. It was commanded by Colonel Maire and another, Ma- Major Nagura. So-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Still alive now, general?
James Kabarebe: Nagura?
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yes.
James Kabarebe: Nagura is alive. Ma- Maire died in 1996, 5, '96, 7. Hmm. So Mobutu intervened and fought on the side of the genocidal government. On the side of the government that was persecuting us. In other words, he fought on the side of the Habyarimana regime, the genocidal regime, to stop us from liberating our own country. And I think this also forms part of the, the strains, the, the, the quarrel we have today, that's where it starts from. So the whole of October, we were fighting the Congolese Army in the eastern part of, of our country. At that time, maybe Mobutu was intervening or intervened on the side of the genocidal force, because he was very close to the, the, the leadership here. And, uh, yeah, s... At that point, the DRC government clearly identified itself with the genocidal regime.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In 1990...
James Kabarebe: 1990.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... will you s... Already speak of the genocide in 1990?
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In 1990...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... that is four years before the big event, the climax. But will you use that term...
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... retroactively to 1990?
James Kabarebe: Yeah, for now we use the term from 1959. Because from 1959, the Tutsis were targeted. They were systematically killed. 1963, they were killed. 1973, they were killed. 1990, they were killed. 1994 was just a climax. So genocide was not overnight. It, it was a build up from, uh, the events of ni- 1959. So, so now we prefer to use it. To call that regime that committed genocide in 1994 as the genocidal regime, that Mobutu supported in 1990.
So after 1994, when the genocide was stopped by the Rwandese Patriotic Army here and the RPF, of course the genocidal force, all of it equipped government military migrated to the DRC, to eastern DRC. The Zairan government today, Mobutu government, they settled them. Settled them along our border. Just a few kilometers, sometimes less than a kilometer from the border, established the camps. But even before 1994 or during the genocide, Mobutu had also, uh, given access and way to the French intervention force known as Zone Turquoise. It was based in Kindu. It was based in Bukavu. And it used Zaire as an entry point into Rwanda to support the genocidal regime. So you can see how Zaire or DRC comes into play in all, uh, in all this history of genocide.
So from 1994 to 1996, the genocidal forces, militias, and their government forces that had been received by Mobutu along our border, the whole stretch, Western stretch, very close to the border. 1994, '95, they had started incursions into Rwanda. They had started entering Rwanda, killing our people again. Selectively killing the Tutsis that had, that had been, that had been saved or had, had survived the 1994 genocide. But at the same time, the genocidal forces that crossed into Zaire in 1994, on reaching there, they found other people, Congolese, similar to Tutsis that they had killed here in Rwanda. So they embarked on them and also persecuted them and killed them.
Some of them made their way and came to Rwanda, went to Burundi, went to Uganda for refuge. That was 1994. All of those are still refugees since then in these countries. Since then. Those who survived, these are Congolese of Tutsi culture and origin. So this also... There is... This is for the current conflict.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So-
James Kabarebe: This conflict has a, a history. If you go back to the roots of what really transpired, what happened, that's how you clear it.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: That's how we got here.
James Kabarebe: That, uh, uh... The, the true figure of, of what happened.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But on that, general, so come '96, '97, within the event that you just described, providing the context, eventually Rwanda is part of the coalition of armies that march all the way to Kinshasa.
James Kabarebe: Yes.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: You become the CDS, so to speak, of-
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... the Congolese Army.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: They new... I mean, the Congolese Army had collapsed. The Zairan...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... Army had collapsed.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And there's the new force that come.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So Rwanda has been involved in Congo for... In different for- f- different forms f... Because of different issue that you, you saw.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Well, uh, highlighted. Those issues, that involvement, uh, on some front, it helped. In some front, it did not help. It created its own dynamics. You're men of, of security, you're men of war, so you know war itself has its own dynamics.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: It's, uh... You cannot always control where it leads.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Taken where... You remember from '96, uh, '97, '98, uh, the RCDs, the MLC, all the breakup that we saw in, in the DRC. Today, uh, uh, Rwanda is accused, uh, the UN, the USA, Rwanda is behind the M23. The M23 say they are addressing the issue you highlighted. The root causes, uh, as you call. How are those process working if they are working? Why achieving peace between the two country is so difficult? You said these are brothers, these are community, there should be sometime the difference, it should help. What is missing?
James Kabarebe: For me, achieving peace between the DRC, and Rwanda, and, and the region itself, even the eastern DRC itself, is not a difficult thing. It is the easiest thing that can be fixed. That can be dealt with if there was good political will on the part of the government of Kinshasa. It, it, it would not be, be, be very difficult. You are talking of, uh, Rwanda intervening in 1996, but I already talked of DRC intervening in Rwanda in 1923 up to '63 and 1990. So we should also put this correct, that it's not Rwanda that intervened in the DRC before. It's DRC that intervened in, in, uh, i- in, i- in, i- in Rwanda before.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yes, but general, who s- who said the-
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... Belgian did? Right? So-
James Kabarebe: Yeah, but in 1990- 94, nin-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In 1990, Zaire.
James Kabarebe: In 1990, it wasn't-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yes.
James Kabarebe: ... it was not-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Right.
James Kabarebe: ... the Belgians.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: '23 to '60, that's Belgium. That's colonial, the same way the Akaris from different countries...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... go in different countries.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But yes, from-
James Kabarebe: But, but-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... 1990, yes.
James Kabarebe: ... but also 1994, receiving, receiving, settling, rearming, giving birth to the genocidal forces, the FDLR , ALiR, and then the FDLR. This was done by the Congolese government. And this led to Rwanda's intervention in the DRC in 1996. If for example, the genocidal forces that crossed into Zaire in 1994 were disarmed, were separated from the refugees. Were not allowed to, uh, reenter Rwanda and to kill our people, there would not have been any intervention into Zaire in 1996. No.
Genocidal groups, genocidal forces, military, and, uh, militias, they crossed into Tanzania in 1994. All those that crossed into Tanzania were disarmed at our border with Tanzania, the Rusumo. The arms were handed over back to us. The, the fighters and the, the, the, the refugees were separated. The refugees were taken several kilometers away from our border. We had no problem with Tanzania over the refugees and over the militia groups.
So why didn't the similar situation happen with Zaire? It has that background, that background of 1990, that background of the Zone Turquoise, that background of the Zairan Army having been close and allied to the genocidal army here. That's why in 1994, they were received in the camps, crossed our border, stayed with their arms. In fact, rearmed, trained, recruited within camps, and helped by the Zairan Army to reinfiltrate into Rwanda, to ki... To continue the genocide.
So Rwanda was left with no choice except to move into the DRC and to dismantle the camps. To return the refugees and to separate them from, from the FDLR, the, the m... The, the genocidal, the genocidal forces. And in the process of course, Mobutu intervened on the side of the genocidal forces. If we had left to Rwanda to deal with its own people, the, the, the, the camps and the mi- the, the, the militias, Mobutu would not have had any problem with us. But his intervention and also bringing in the mercenaries to attack Rwanda, remember the B- the Bosnian mercenaries? He escalated the war and he ended up losing the war in the process.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But on that point, general, Turquoise, ALiR, Xvar, ex-FAR; true. All those are factual.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: It's also factual that there was an international layer, international failure, right? So the camps were not disarmed, refugees were not dis... Settled 12 miles within the country as opposed to the border. Uh, at the time, UNHCR did not take a strong stance. The French were behind Opération Turquoise. But you've made-up with the French. It took a long time, but you have strong relationship now, at least the way it's seen from outside. You are better positioned to know if it's strong or not. If that can happen, why can't Rwanda and DRC, given all the fact that you just laid out, still get to the peaceful point that will benefit both countries?
James Kabarebe: That's a very good question. If it can happen with the French, with all that they did to us, why can't it happen with the DRC? Yes, the French is a nation state, fully functional, so governance structures and everything, leadership. They know what they want. They know the importance of peace. This has not happened with the DRC. The biggest problem with the DRC today is not even the issue of M23. M23 is the repercussion of or a ramification of all that, all that history. The DRC has made one strategic mistake, especially the leadership, the various leaderships of DRC after 1994, '96. For them to have chosen and constructed and anti-Rwanda, particularly anti-Tutsi, uh, sentiment and used it as a political tool to gain legitimacy of the Congolese population so that they have chosen to, to, to label everything, all their failures, or their problems of the DRC as being caused by Rwanda.
So this anti-Rwanda, particularly anti-Tutsi narrative construct they h- they have adopted as a political tool to win the hearts and the minds of the population is totally wrong on the part of the Congolese government. It is totally wrong. Rwanda would equally have the same reasons to, to create and construct an anti-Congolese narrative here, given all of this that I have mentioned, given their interventions, what they have done to us. We were supporting genocide, we, we would have the same results. But we have not. W- w- we do not demonize the Congolese. We do not point fingers at Congolese. We'll not incite Rwandans against the Congolese.
And the Congolese today will come, s- single-handedly move from border to any part of Rwanda. If he's attending the school, if he's trading, w- walk alone, identify himself as Congolese or herself as Congolese, no Rwandan will touch him or her, nowhere. But this cannot happen to any Rwandese, no. A Rwandese moving anywhere in the DRC, if you were identified, especially as a Tutsi, what? You will be arrested. You will be killed. You will even be hacked and, and lynched, and even eaten, cannibalized on. This has happened. It is a result of the whole of this phenomenon of demonization of anti-Tutsi construc- construct as a tool to manage the Congolese opinion, the Congolese opinion.
Yeah, for us, the opinion we, we, we, we shape of the Congolese is that w- we need the Congolese people. We provide security for everyone. Congolese move here from border through Rwanda. If you check all the hotels around in Kigali, you will find they are full packed with Congolese moving through here to Dubai, to East Africa countries. Nobody is touching them. They get all the facilitation or the security. But the anti-Rwanda, particularly anti-Tutsi, uh, phenomenon co- co- constructed by Congolese politicians is a very dangerous strategy. And once this is not uprooted, of course whether M23 exists or F- uh, FDLR is radi- eradicated, we cannot move on. And who will change this? It must be the leadership. It's the Congolese leadership that must understand the importance of living together, of living together.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: On that point, general, the... Yes, the lynching and some of the, uh, point that you mentioned have happened. But it's also true the population at large, Congo is a big place, Congo is the size of Western Europe, the larger population of Congo has been ready to have peace with Rwanda. We've seen President Kagame go to... There was a good rapprochement between President Kagame and President Tshisekedi.
James Kabarebe: Yes.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: The president, uh, President Tshisekedi invited President Kagame to his father's funeral. You remember the president, uh, came to Kinshasa...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... at the sta- the stadium? He was applauded when he come when you look at the images and the videos. So there's always a large reservoir of goodwill.
James Kabarebe: Yes.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: And that goodwill has been true. Even as some of the issues that you raise happen, there was still this large reservoir of goodwill. There was goodwill when you showed up in 1996. There was goodwill even when Laurent Kabila left. The goodwill has always been a reservoir. It... The reservoir of goodwill has always been there. So the question is really, everything notwithstanding, how do we go from here to the peace point? Because Congo is a country of 100 million people. The average Congolese does not have... The politician have used this, as you correctly pointed, especially in the last election process.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: With the average Congolese living in Kasaï, who's living in, uh Bandundu, or elsewhere, he's not blaming his problem or her problem on Rwanda. It may be something that politician use. A- as you rightly pointed, they come here. If they were blaming everything on Rwanda, they will not come here. They will... And it's also interesting, there's conflict between the two countries, but the borders are open. The embassies are open. So it's a very strange conflict.
James Kabarebe: It's a very strange conflict. The borders are open, even with the current, uh, situation. I think at the m- g... Rwanda w... Goma/Gisenyi border, not less than 100... Uh, 10,000 people, not less than 10,000 people cross every day, even with the current situation. When the solution is normal, is peaceful, we have had good episodes of, of peace, the average has been 60,000. I- it is the, the, the, the most busy crossing point in the world next to the, the Mexican/U.S. border. 60,000 people crossing at the Goma/Gisenyi border.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: I was just there-
James Kabarebe: So-
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ...two days ago.
James Kabarebe: Yeah, you saw the crossing.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: I, I think-
James Kabarebe: You saw people cross.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Beyond that, general, we saw Rwandan immigration officers working side by side with Congolese immigration.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: In the same center.
James Kabarebe: So I agree with you, there is this, uh... The Congolese population is only held hostage by the politicians. The politicians who have decided to pick the anti-Rwanda sentiment as a political tool for them to cling on power and to have explanation for their failures, governance failures. So for every failure, they will say it's Rwanda. W... And it has, it has also degenerated and gone even back that such conflict has been exploited by politicians and high level military officers even for their personal gains. Some people are benefiting financially from the conflict. So it's a…
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: There's a war economy.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: There's a war economy.
James Kabarebe: Yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: But...
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... where you stand today, they've been three, at least f... Or three or four processes of peace. Where, where, where do you need help, the two countries? Sometimes when brothers fight, they need somebody else to come. Is that happening?
James Kabarebe: For me, I think this problem could be solved without even a third party. Because earlier before, it has been solved without a third party. During Kabila's regime, the relations were not good. The same anti-Rwanda, anti-Tutsi sentiments played in, uh, 1998. They played in 2000 and, uh, and, and, and, and 1. But by the time Kabila left power, the situation was getting, getting better. Kabila, I remember he crossed over to Gisenyi, he met, uh, our president. So e- The solution was not, was not that bad.
But the current leadership has worsened the situation, that it will require much more effort to repair. This war of M23 was not created by Rwanda. No, it was not started by Rwanda. Not at all. Far from that. So whoever engineered this war instigated this war and for whatever reasons, I think he stands to, to blame and to take responsibility for that. Before President Tshisekedi came to power, he was talking with M23. They were exchanging. They were allies. Because according to them, the obstacle to both of them was the one who was in power, who was Kabila. So they were talking, this one I know very well, that Felix Tshisekedi and the M23 people were on good talking terms.
When President Tshisekedi came to power in 2018, President Kagame was the chair of the African Union. He was in a good position to support President Tshisekedi and he indeed supported President Tshisekedi. He supported him, demonstrated f- full support, as you said, by attending the funeral of his father in Kinshasa. That was a good gesture. But he also supported him worldwide, because President Tshisekedi was coming as a new person into power in the scene, nobody knew him. Western capitals do not know him. The national organizations, nobody knew him. So as a neighbor, as somebody that will seem to be close to President Kagame, he gave good recommendation everywhere, introduced him. So things were working very well. Even bilaterally, uh, here, there were so many vis... At different levels, defense, security. There were so many errands between Kigali and Kinshasa. RwandAir started operating in Kinshasa.
So... But we don't know where some bad undercurrent came from to pull the carpets and turn everything upside down. Rwanda did not play any role in starting this conflict with the DRC. What people forget is that Rwanda stands so much to gain from a peaceful n... A peaceful environment between us and, uh, and the DRC. Our trade, volumes of trade, directions of people, they, they, they spike so high whenever there is a peaceful environment.
So, uh, if I take you back a bit, in 2013. 2013, there was this war between M- M23 and the DRC in eastern DRC. There was an international consensus that M23 and FDLR be defeated militarily by the UN force. It was called the Force Intervention Brigade. Composed of Malawians, Tanzanians, South Africans, supported by MONUSCO. Rwanda was party to that. We agreed. We endorsed it. We endorsed it on the condition that the Force Intervention Brigade after defeating M23, would embark on FDLR. That was the arrangement. Immediately after M23, the Force Intervention Brigade would attack FDLR. For us, attacking FDLR next of of M23 was what we were waiting to see.
Okay, then M23 gets defeated in 2013. It gets split into two groups. One group goes to Uganda, that is under Makenga, the current leader of M23. The other M23 comes to Rwanda, led by Bosco Ntaganda. We t- we told Bosco Ntaganda that he would not be welcome to Rwanda, because he was indicted by ICC and we will not accommodate him. So given that ultimatum, he chose to hand himself over to the U.S. Embassy and was transferred through Kanombe, through Kigali, to The Hague. The rest of the M23s, we disarmed them. We took them to the Far East, close to Tanzania and turned them there. We even made them des... Denounce war. They stand with, uh, the, uh, UNHCR, that they have d- denounced war. We also took their arms that we disarmed them of, we took the arms and handed them over to the DRC government through MONUSCO. We handed them over. In other words, we have... We had an M23 here by 2018 that was totally disarmed, that had totally denounced war. So there was no problem.
So when President Tshisekedi came to power, among other things that we discussed that also was part of the discussion... And on the 19th of, uh, October 2019, the DRC delegation came here. They signed an agreement with the M23 that was here, disarmed. And they agreed that they would take them back to Congo and to resettle them, to resettle, that was the agreement. So in other words, for us there has not been any problem of M23 with the DRC government. So... But later, we waited for them to come and take them. They said that they had no budget to do so. No, we said, "No, you can pack them in the, in the buses, drive them up to Goma." W... And they had no demands. No political demands, no military demands. All they needed was to go back. So we thought that was a very simple thing to, to do on the part of the DRC government. These are facts. These are facts.
At the same time, they were also engaging Uganda over the M23 that was in Uganda. The M23 that was in Uganda had not been disarmed. They had kept their arms. So... But they also signed with the DRC government. In fact, for them, they also sent a delegation out of them to Kinshasa to go and discuss on the modalities of how they go back. S... When the delegation that left Uganda, of M23, to Kinshasa, they stayed... We understand they stayed in a hotel for five months and nobody talked to them until they escaped back to Kampala, to Uganda.
So when they escaped back to Kampala, they moved from the camp where they had been camped in Uganda with their arms and positioned themselves in the Virunga Mountains, in the Virunga Mountains, not on the Rwandan side, on the Ugandan side adjacent to the DRC border. So we had nothing to do with the M23. Now, all of a sudden with that, the relationship that was very smooth and going on very well between us and the DRC, some undercurrent comes up, we don't know where it came from. Some opinion, anti-Rwanda opinion takes precedence, and we see everything that we had been achieving with, uh, Tshisekedi is moving backwards, is in the reverse, yeah.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: So that's where we today?
James Kabarebe: That's how we are today.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Yeah.
James Kabarebe: So now, President Tshisekedi decides to launch the state of emergency in the Kivus, Kivu and Ituri. We thought maybe the state of emergency was to fight FDLR, because there was nothing else to fight. When he launches a state of emergency, he deploys military officers. You, you, you, you said I ha- I had been the, the CDS of, uh, o- of DRC, so I know who is who. When we saw the officers that he deployed towards our border, we knew things were getting bad, because the officers he deployed were particularly former Mobutist officers who have deep-seated hatred for Rwanda.
In fact, the first... The one he made the governor for Goma was, uh, General Ndima, who had been the head of Maire when they attacked us in 1990. So these are the people who harbor that vengeance attitude towards Rwanda. So the, the, the, the, the, the state of emergency took precedence, deployed all anti-Rwanda military officers. They took over from the civilian administration. The civilian administrators were working very well with Rwanda before. There was no interlocutor now, so that new military team immediately embarked on working with FDLR, integrated with FDLR. Now we are going back to square one, things went back. That's how things are folded.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: We, we actually have about, uh, two minutes, general-
James Kabarebe: Two minutes. So Kin- uh, Kinshasa announced the Nairobi talks. The Nairobi talks were supposed to include all these rebel militia groups in eastern DRC. Incidentally, there are around 250. M- d... There are so many. They were not created by Rwanda, no. They are created by ineffective governance assistance. That's how those militia groups mushroomed. And now... So in the Nairobi peace talks, what does the DRC government do out of the room? They ejected out the M23. Yet the M23, what was the only credible, uh, rebel group that needed to discuss to... Through the eta... Congolese dialogue.
So they, they l... Ejected them out of the room. When they were ejected out of the room, then the fighting started in Bunagana. Bunagana is not at the border with Rwanda. It's at the border with Uganda. So in, in response, in responding to that fight with M23 that did not come from Rwanda at all, that was not positioned anywhere near Rwanda, the DRC government decided to fire rocket bombs into Rwanda. Into the northern part of Rwanda. They fired. They fired in March. They fired in May. They fired in June. Consecutively. So it was a direct provocation to Rwanda.
So what Rwanda did was to take defensive measures that protect our border. Until now, we have no interest at all in having war with DRC, except protecting our border, and not allowing FDLR to come next to our border after all that that had happened.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: General, this sounds like a very complex issue.
James Kabarebe: It's complex.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: We, we thank you for joining us today and sharing your perspective. This is all the time we have today.
James Kabarebe: Mm-hmm.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: We will have to continue this conversation when we have-
James Kabarebe: It's a long one.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... another opportunity.
James Kabarebe: It's a long one.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Thank you very much-
James Kabarebe: Thank you.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... for joining us on-
James Kabarebe: Thank you.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: ... Into Africa.
James Kabarebe: Thank you.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele: Thank you for listening. We want to have more conversations about Africa. Tell your friends, subscribe to our podcast at Apple Podcasts. You can also read our analysis and report at csis.org/africa. So long.
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