The wider Sahel region is facing a crisis of spiraling insecurity and humanitarian need likely to continue well into the tenure of a new U.S. administration. For nearly a decade, the core Sahel region, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, has been caught in a politico-security crisis that has recently accelerated as every country in the region has experienced military coups and spreading jihadist violence. According to the United Nations, the region is now the epicenter of terrorist violence in the world, though at present jihadists’ ability or intention to strike outside this region and project violence into neighboring regions or the U.S. homeland remains limited. During this period, Washington has struggled to define a set of mission objectives for stabilizing the region.
Early on, U.S. forces directly supported and even engaged in kinetic actions resulting in the death of four U.S. service members in Niger in 2017 and prompting the Trump administration to order a full review of the U.S. force posture and mission in the region. Since that review, the United States has focused on supporting partner militaries with training and intelligence. However, as jihadist violence has increased, military coup leaders have displaced civilian leaders across the region and severed ties with French, U.S., and international security forces under the United Nations and European Union. Washington, having seen its ability to partner with and operate inside these countries constrained or altogether eliminated, will need to decide how it responds in the face of increasing jihadist violence and the introduction of Russian private security forces, which have become the new security partner of choice for these military-led governments.
Adding to the complexity, ties between the United States and military governments across the region remain deeply strained, and military-to-military contacts have become even more constrained after Niger ended its status of forces agreement with the United States and instructed all U.S. forces to leave the country and abandon Washington’s largest drone base in Africa. While Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger will not be anxious to reset relations with a new U.S. administration—since all three have subsequently deepened security ties with Moscow—their neighbors will likely lobby Washington for assistance in containing the jihadist violence.
The Pentagon has suggested it will maintain a smaller force presence in the region, with Benin, Chad, and Côte d’Ivoire reported as likely locations. But other countries would likely seek assurances from an incoming Trump administration that the administration will not restart discussions to withdraw all U.S. forces from the region. Conversely, a Harris administration would be expected to show continuity with the Biden administration, including emphasizing security cooperation and a holistic approach to the region involving stabilization efforts through local-level peacebuilding, economic development, and improved service delivery.
Challenging U.S. officials’ ability to sustain and even deepen engagement in the region, the Sahel does not currently present a first-tier national security threat to the U.S. homeland. However, if left unchecked, the region’s challenges could destabilize NATO’s southern flank and undermine security, stability, and prosperity for a much wider range of North and West African littoral states. Any incoming U.S. administration would be wise to reset its relations with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and highlight Russia’s growing malign influence across the region. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should double down on efforts to support frontline states in their efforts to build resiliency and stabilize their internal security.
It is equally important that the United States expand its engagement with civil society organizations in the Sahel and littoral states. The focus on the kinetic dimensions of stability often misses other key indicators of citizen discontent vis-à-vis the government or public institutions. Civil society engagement tends to suffer when relations with military regimes are suspended or strained. However, it is critical to maintain or increase the level of funding and other forms of support, such as nonlethal training and officer education, wherever possible. Robust citizen engagement has no effective substitute in the conditions these countries face, and civil society organizations are best positioned to appreciate the dynamics required to transition to democratic rule. Ignoring these dynamics widens the blind spot in U.S. engagement and accelerates the threats to the United States and its interests.
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the CSIS Africa Program.
