Scandal Engulfs Another of China's Rising Political Stars
September 6, 2012
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced on September 1 that political highflier Ling Jihua had been reassigned from director of the CCP General Office to head of the party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD). He was succeeded at the General Office by former Guizhou Provincial CCP secretary Li Zhanshu. Although nominally a lateral transfer, Ling’s move is effectively a step down in the CCP’s political pecking order. With the political wrangling related to the 18th Party Congress at a fever pitch, the changeover at the General Office—the nerve center of the CCP—has analysts searching for the move’s implications ahead of this fall’s once-in-a-decade leadership transition. Adding to the buzz are what appear to be highly authoritative leaks to Western and overseas Chinese media that Ling’s transfer was the result of a tragic and embarrassing scandal involving his son, which the senior leadership simply could not countenance in the wake of the fiasco that led to the ouster earlier this year of former Politburo member Bo Xilai.
Q1: Who is Ling Jihua, and why is his reassignment important?
A1: As President Hu Jintao’s most trusted lieutenant and a key member of his inner circle, Ling Jihua has been a virtual extension of the president. Always at Hu’s side during inspection tours at home and visits abroad, Ling has served as Hu’s alter ego and gatekeeper. Roughly equivalent to the president’s chief of staff in the U.S. political system, the head of the CCP General Office also plays a critical role in managing the paper flow within the Politburo and oversees the personal security of top leaders. As such, Hu undoubtedly viewed Ling’s rise as an essential part of his succession strategy for protecting his legacy and interests from retirement. Hu had hoped to promote Ling to the Politburo Standing Committee—China’s highest decisionmaking body—at the Party Congress. Although always a long shot, Ling’s apparent downgrading makes that a virtual impossibility now.
Q2: Are the rumors about the scandal involving Ling’s son credible?
A2: With Bo Xilai’s wife admitting in open court to murdering a British national, it seemed difficult to conceive of a more lurid scandal tied to a family member of a senior Chinese official. But the incident involving Ling’s son appears to set a new bar for recklessness. Several press reports allege that he crashed his black Ferrari in mid-March after speeding down a Beijing thoroughfare. His two female passengers—both found in various stages of undress—were seriously injured in the accident. Coming just days after Bo’s removal as party chief of the Chongqing municipality, the incident was quickly hushed up by officials determined to avoid another embarrassment for the top leadership and eager to protect Ling.
The stories differ over some fundamental details, such as whether the younger Ling survived the crash, but photos circulated widely on the Internet following the accident and an article in a party-linked newspaper the next day confirmed the basic details of the story while withholding the victims’ names. Strong parallels also exist between the extensive leaking of details to the media in the Bo case—many of which were later presented as facts by the regime during the trial of Bo’s wife—and the disclosures regarding Ling’s son. As with the Bo scandal, however, the political impact on Ling’s career prospects is far more important than the ultimate veracity of the specific details.
Q3: Is Ling’s new position merely a face-saving gesture, or could he still rise at the Party Congress?
A3: Given the black box of Chinese leadership politics and the intricately layered deal making among senior Chinese leaders related to the succession, it may be too soon to write Ling off completely. He is still relatively young, and all of his predecessors in the General Office during the reform era ultimately rose to the Politburo. The official Ling replaced at the General Office, for example, also stepped down several weeks before the last Party Congress but still was promoted to the Politburo at the conclave.
Nevertheless, the observable facts at this stage suggest Ling’s case may be different, and they do not portend a bright future in the near term. The UFWD is largely a backwater among the CCP’s Central Committee departments, overseeing religious and ethnic minority affairs and the CCP’s relations with the regime’s officially recognized non-Communist parties. Unlike the more influential party departments—such as Organization and Propaganda—whose directors traditionally win seats on the 25-member CCP Politburo, the head of the UFWD usually is relegated to membership in the full Central Committee, composed of several hundred individuals.
In fact, the public announcement of Ling’s UFWD appointment ahead of the Congress may be the clearest sign that his immediate prospects are limited. If he were marked for a Politburo-level assignment, past precedent suggests the official announcement would simply have noted that he would be reassigned to another, unspecified post. It also is worth underscoring that the last three General Office directors who later were elevated to the Politburo first managed to achieve alternate Politburo member status while serving there, which Ling did not. But these are merely speculative benchmarks; Ling’s advancement ultimately will turn on whether Hu is willing—and able—to facilitate his protégé’s continued rise.
Q4: How does all of this affect the balance of power among the key players in the succession?
A4: Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin is probably the most immediate beneficiary. His early support for Bo Xilai risked putting him on his back foot in the succession sweepstakes. But Jiang seems to have seized on the Ling affair to come roaring back. He reportedly criticized Ling for seeking to cover up the crash and even held back a key investigative report for several months to maximize its political impact. If the press leaks are accurate, Jiang’s adroit manipulation of the incident is a political masterstroke on the eve of the handover, in what has become his signature move ahead of the last several Party Congresses. Assuming the fresh rumors positing that Jiang’s allies will easily outnumber Hu’s on the new Politburo Standing Committee hold, it will be a testament to the lingering influence of a leader who has nominally been retired for nearly a decade.
Vice president and heir apparent Xi Jinping also seems to have gained ground. The appointment of Li Zhanshu, a longtime Xi confidant, to head the General Office will give Xi a tremendous leg up when he succeeds Hu as party chief. By contrast, Hu was forced to accept a Jiang crony in the position for the first half of his tenure. The Ling scandal may also loosen Hu’s grip on the chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission, helping Xi avoid a staggered succession like the one from Jiang to Hu, where Jiang held on to the Military Commission chair for two more years before finally stepping aside for Hu.
Hu Jintao appears to have the weakest hand at this critical juncture in the leadership wrangling. Some media accounts have noted that Li Zhanshu’s ascendance through the Communist Youth League (CYL), Hu’s power base, suggests that Li’s appointment is a net neutral for the president, but the relevance of the CYL connection often is overstated, and Li’s ties to Xi probably are paramount. More importantly, the Ling scandal may have tarnished Hu’s chief asset—his reputation for honesty, transparency, and intolerance for corruption. If, however, Hu has sacrificed Ling to pursue other succession priorities, the impact on his political standing would be mitigated. Hu will need a strong showing at the Party Congress, such as Standing Committee seats for allies other than just virtual shoo-in Li Keqiang, to dispel the mounting doubts about his power and influence.
Christopher K. Johnson is a senior adviser and holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2012 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
