Seizing Greenland Is Worse Than a Bad Deal

Remote Visualization

As President Donald Trump begins his second term in the White House, he has made his position on Greenland perfectly clear. In recent statements, Trump has refused to rule out taking Greenland by force and has stated that U.S. ownership and control of the territory is “an absolute necessity” for national security reasons. While he made similar overtures about acquiring Greenland in 2019, Trump’s recent comments should not be discarded as mere bluster. Trump’s sentiments were quickly echoed by his incoming national security advisor Mike Waltz while Trump’s allies in the House of Representatives floated a bill authorizing talks for the purchase of Greenland from Denmark.

But trying to seize Greenland, by force or coercion, would be an unforced error for the Trump administration. It is unnecessary on national security grounds, as Washington can already achieve its objectives through working with Greenland and Denmark. Moreover, Trump’s rhetoric could backfire and revive Chinese overtures toward the territory, activate EU trade defense instruments, and accelerate the ongoing militarization of the Arctic.

Greenland’s Delicate Status

Trump’s statements have sparked outrage across Europe and highlighted fissures in the delicate relationship between Greenland and Denmark. As a semiautonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland has been part of Denmark for hundreds of years. The territory was previously a Danish colony but has been ruled by a self-government arrangement since the 2009 Greenland Self-Government Act, which granted Greenlanders the right to declare independence from Denmark through a referendum. As a result of the act, the Greenlandic government in Nuuk also gained control of most policy areas pertaining to the territory except for citizenship, monetary policy, and foreign affairs, including defense policy which Denmark controls. The relationship between Copenhagen and Nuuk is quite strained; the most recent opinion poll from 2019 showed that 67.7 percent of adults in Greenland wanted independence from Denmark at some point in the future. However, Greenlanders remain divided on the exact timing and the impact on living standards that a break from Denmark would entail. Denmark contributes over half of Greenland’s budget revenue to cover employment, health care, and education, with the annual cost of administrative support and direct financial transfers amounting to at least $700 million per year.

One thing is abundantly clear: the people of Greenland have little interest in being acquired by anyone. Nor does the Danish government in Copenhagen have any appetite for negotiating about a sale of Greenland, since it would likely violate international law and Greenland’s right to self-determination. At a joint press conference with Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in Copenhagen, the Greenlandic leader Múte B. Egede cemented that “Greenland is for the Greenlandic people. We do not want to be Danish, we do not want to be American. We want to be Greenlandic.” The Danish government has echoed these statements, with Frederiksen reiterating that it is up to Greenland to decide its future. Ahead of an April general election for Greenland’s 31-seat parliament, Egede has hinted that a new independence push is coming, stating that “it is now time to take the next step for our country” to remove “the shackles of the colonial era.”

Setting aside the issue of “ownership and control,” Trump’s assertion that Greenland is critical to U.S. national security is not without merit and likely boils down to three factors.

The first is Greenland’s strategic location between Russia and North America. The shortest route for a Russian ballistic missile to reach the continental United States would be via Greenland and the North Pole. To mitigate this threat, the United States and Denmark maintain decades-old defense agreements enabling a U.S. presence at the Pituffik Space Base (formerly the Thule Air Base) in northwestern Greenland, which performs critical missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions. Greenland’s location is also critical to monitoring the so-called Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) gap, a naval choke point that represents a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean for Russia’s Northern Fleet. While the war in Ukraine has depleted Russia’s ground forces and strained its military-industrial base, the Kremlin has continued to prioritize investments in new naval offensive capabilities, such as ongoing efforts to modernize its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

Moreover, Greenland straddles two potential shipping routes through the Arctic: the Northwest Passage hugging the northern coastline of North America and the Transpolar Sea Route traversing the middle of the Arctic Ocean. Melting Arctic sea ice will increase the commercial viability of these routes, which could reduce transit time and provide alternatives to traditional maritime chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. Arctic shipping has already increased by 37 percent between 2013 and 2023, according to the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum.

Second, Greenland has plentiful deposits of critical raw materials and unexplored oil and natural gas fields. The territory contains 39 of the 50 minerals deemed critical to U.S. national security and economic stability, including rare earth elements, graphite, platinum group metals, and niobium. Successive U.S. governments have sought to strengthen ties with strategic allies to diversify mineral supply chains to counter China’s dominance. Moreover, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates upward of 17.5 billion undiscovered barrels of oil and 148 trillion cubic feet of natural gas off Greenland. However, the economic feasibility of resource exploration has been hampered by the territory’s remoteness and harsh weather, poor infrastructure, and a 2021 political decision to suspend the issuance of new licenses for oil and gas exploration due to environmental impact concerns. However, melting ice and more accessible seaways are increasing the viability of exploring some of these resources, catching the eye of foreign investors and governments. The development of large-scale mining has long been considered a promising way to lessen Greenland’s economic dependence on Denmark, thus improving conditions for the territory’s eventual independence.

Finally, Greenland’s strategic importance warrants U.S. efforts to prevent the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia from establishing a presence on or around the island. Russia has grown its military presence in the Arctic writ large through the past decades. For example, the Kremlin has been reopening old Soviet bases, building new military infrastructure such as landing strips and radar facilities, and upgrading its submarine fleet with more capable vessels. Since declaring itself a “near-Arctic” state in 2018, China has been moving to assert itself in the Arctic, including attempts to connect Europe and East Asia through a “Polar Silk Road” traversing the Arctic Ocean. As of 2022, the PRC’s investments above the Arctic Circle amounted to more than $90 billion, including research and infrastructure projects in Iceland, Finland, and Norway.

Deal or No Deal?

However, acquiring Greenland from Denmark is a suboptimal strategy for the United States for several reasons. Regarding all three factors identified above, the United States can make progress on its national security objectives by continuing its existing engagement strategy with Greenland and Denmark. First, the Danish government has expressed a strong interest in working with the United States to “ensure legitimate American interests” in the Arctic. Greenland’s 2024 foreign, security, and defense strategy acknowledges that the territory “plays a key role in the defense of the United States against external threats, especially from the Arctic region.” The document also articulates “a desire for Greenlanders to take a more active role in Danish sovereignty enforcement through participating in the Joint Arctic Command and the Sirius Patrol, establishing an administrative unit at the U.S. Pituffik Space Base, and eventually creating a nonmilitary coast guard of its own.” Denmark is also working to expand its own military presence in Greenland to address U.S. and NATO needs, exemplified by a recent $1.2 billion defense agreement to invest in long-range drones, inspection ships, and dogsled teams. Plans have also been made to include an “Arctic package” in the next defense budget, to ramp up investments in drones, radars, and satellites.

Second, ownership of Greenland is not a prerequisite for the United States to gain access to Greenland’s critical minerals. In the aftermath of Trump’s recent comments, Egede reiterated Greenland’s long-standing willingness to strengthen mining ties with the United States. In 2019, the United States and Greenland struck an agreement to strengthen cooperation in the development of key energy and mineral sectors. Greenland’s 2024 foreign, security, and defense strategy also emphasizes a willingness to remove barriers to trade for the United States and expand its relations with individual U.S. states, particularly Alaska and northeastern U.S. states. Moreover, U.S. control will not mitigate the economic and logistical challenges that have rendered Greenland’s mining sector dormant. Regardless of Trump’s actions, opportunities for large-scale mining and trans-Arctic shipping will likely remain commercially unviable in the short term.

Third, shared strategic interests and skillful diplomatic efforts between the United States, Greenland, and Denmark have already boxed out Russia and China from the territory. Greenland sought to attract investments from Chinese mining companies during the 2010s, but those projects have mostly stalled or failed to materialize. In 2018, U.S. diplomatic pressure and coordination between Washington and Copenhagen also fended off Chinese bids to build airports and acquire an abandoned Danish naval base. As Beijing’s attempts to increase investments and research projects across the Arctic writ large have mostly faltered, China has not made any significant overtures toward Greenland in recent years. Greenland’s 2024 foreign, security, and defense strategy also emphasizes the risk of foreign control of critical infrastructure, stating that “we cannot and shall now allow this infrastructure to be owned by foreign entities. This is essential for the safety of our people and our society.”

In sum, seizing Greenland would thus be unnecessary on national security grounds. By leaving the question of Greenland’s sovereignty aside and continuing its current engagement strategy, the United States can reap significant benefits while passing the hefty bill of running the island on to Denmark. In other words, the status quo allows the United States to have its cake and eat it too. In doing so, the United States can also avoid paying an eye-watering sum to acquire the territory and having to offer a similar level of political representation and rights currently offered by Denmark. Even the more sophisticated proposals floated among U.S. commentators, such as suggestions that the U.S. should pursue a Compact of Free Association agreement with an independent Greenland, would likely be a costly mistake. Many, including Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen from the Royal Danish Defence College, have already presented this argument in terms that are familiar to Trump and his inner circle: it’s unnecessary and simply a bad deal.

Why Trying to Take Greenland Could Backfire

Trump’s aggressive approach carries additional downside risk for the United States. Trump’s comments have highlighted fissures in the contentious relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen, and likely accelerated Greenland’s independence trajectory. A turbulent and contentious Greenlandic independence push would greatly benefit U.S. adversaries. For example, Russian attempts to circulate a forged letter requesting funds for an independence referendum with U.S. politicians in 2019 indicate that the Kremlin aims to sow discord between Denmark, Greenland, and the United States over the matter. An independent Greenland that remains economically vulnerable may be left in the lurch—squeezed by Trump’s maximalist demands and beginning to reduce its financial ties with Denmark. While Greenland’s strong preference is to remain economically integrated with the West, this outcome may revive Chinese overtures toward the territory.

Trump’s threats to impose economic costs on Denmark to take control of Greenland could also spur the European Union to deploy its trade defense arsenal. Trump has shown no aversion to the prospect of a broader trade war with Europe. But targeting Denmark with economic action likely won’t result in a quick win. Trump could impose tariffs directly targeting Danish exports, but the trade policy response will come from Brussels due to the European Union’s common external trade policy. Among the remedies in the European Commission’s toolbox is an “anti-coercion instrument,” specifically implemented in 2023 to deter and respond to economic coercion against individual member states. The European Union’s response could include targeted retaliatory tariffs and restrictions on foreign direct investment, financial markets, intellectual property rights, export controls, and more.

Finally, by refusing to rule out the use of force against an Arctic NATO ally, Trump is taking a sledgehammer to the last remnants of Arctic exceptionalism—the notion that the Arctic is governed by unwritten rules, beliefs, and history that have protected it from great-power rivalry. Russia and China will be the ultimate benefactors. Beyond causing doubts about Washington’s willingness to stand by its NATO allies, it has given credence to the notion that sovereign borders can be undermined in the name of “national security.” Russia may seize on Trump’s expansionist musings and assert itself militarily in other parts of the European Arctic. One potential flashpoint is the Norwegian archipelago Svalbard, on which Russian nationals and companies have a robust presence and where the Kremlin has refused to comply with Norway’s right to inspect Russian fishing ships in its exclusive economy zone. To a lesser extent, Trump’s comments about Greenland could also undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts urging China to show restraint in the Taiwan Strait.

A Better Path Forward

Instead of pursuing a likely futile effort to acquire Greenland against its will, the United States is better served by staying the course and finding cost-efficient ways to strengthen ties with the territory. Trump can take some well-deserved credit for this. While his 2019 comments were seen as a provocation by many Danes and Greenlanders alike, it led to greater U.S. attention toward Greenland and was a catalyst in the development of the self-government’s diplomatic capacity. Moreover, Trump can legitimately point to Denmark’s slow progress in expanding its military capacity in Greenland, despite a myriad of proposals to enhance Arctic military capabilities during the past decade.

First, the United States can redouble its commitment to forums and mechanisms that promote government-to-government ties with Greenland. For example, the U.S.-Greenland Joint Committee has been a useful forum through which to set goals and strengthen cooperation across four pillars: trade and investment, minerals and energy, education and cultural exchange, and environmental and scientific cooperation. The United States should also support Greenland’s ambition to establish an intergovernmental Arctic North American political forum, where governments and parliaments across the region can discuss the Arctic’s unique challenges, developments, and solutions.

Second, the United States should continue the flow of relatively small aid packages intended to develop Greenland’s mining sector, education, and tourism. These packages could include favorable loans that promote the development of 39 of the 50 minerals deemed critical to U.S. national security and economic stability. As Greenland’s mining industry continues to mature, this could allow U.S. businesses to gain a first-mover advantage when the sector eventually becomes commercially viable.

Third, the United States should work to elevate Greenland’s agency in sovereignty enforcement on the territory. This could be done by aiding the Greenlandic government in its aspirations to take a more active role in Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command, agreeing to establish a Greenlandic administrative unit at Pituffik Space Base, and legitimizing Nuuk’s long-term goal of creating a nonmilitary coast guard.

Regardless of what Trump decides to do about Greenland, his threats have made one thing clear. The European Arctic will not be shielded from the new administration’s disruptive style of diplomacy that has already been applied to the rest of Europe. With regard to Greenland, the United States should proceed carefully before putting an end to Arctic exceptionalism once and for all.

Otto Svendsen is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.