Shaping Afghan National Security Forces
December 9, 2009
President Obama has announced a new strategy for Afghanistan whose success is dependent upon beginning the transfer of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghani national security forces (ANSF) in mid-2011. The Burke Chair is issuing a new report that suggests this is a far more difficult challenge than many realize.
This report is entitled “Shaping Afghan National Security Forces: What It Will Take To Implement President Obama’s New Strategy”, and is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/091208_ANSF.pdf. It shows that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have made significant advances during the last few years, but that their development still suffers badly from the fact that they had low to moderate priority for nearly half a decade. It was not until 2006-2007 that the ANSF began to have meaningful force goals, and to have adequate NATO/ISAF and US aid in developing its “force quantity.”
The present ANSF goals are probably still only about half the level that will eventually be needed to work with NATO/ISAF forces; implement the ISAF/Afghan strategy of shape, clear, hold, and build, and defeat the insurgency. Critical problems still exist in “force quality” because of a long-standing lack of mentors and partners, equipment, and a lack of the financial support the ANSF needs to grow and become effective.
The following key shortcomings still cripple the ANSF, and must now be corrected:
- The ongoing problems growing out of past failures to set the proper goals for ANSF expansion provide adequate numbers of mentors and partners, and to fund the level of effort required.
- A lack of sufficient capacity and capability of all types of ANSF, across the theater;
- A lack of clear near-term priorities and timelines for developing the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF required for the current fight extend beyond the ‘near-term’ of 12-24 months;
- A lack of longer term plans to expand and sustain the ANSF for the length of the entire campaign, and help Afghanistan achieve lasting security and stability.
- A NATO/ISAF effort that has lacked unity of command, and the ability to flexibly apportion both ANSF and ISAF forces across the battlespace;
- A failure to make the ANSF a full partner with the ISAF and to lay the ground work for transfer of lead security responsibility; and
- A lack of effective coordination among the elements of the ANSF.
The US Cripples ANSF Development Through FY2007-CY2009 Through Massive Failures to Properly Resource the Force Development Effort
At the same time, the report shows that the US bears a large share of the responsibility for many of these failures. The US took more than half a decade to fund ANSF development seriously and then funded it erratically and failed to provide the proper numbers of trainers, mentors, and partners.
One of the most critical problems was chronic underresourcing. Critics of today’s ANSF and the training effort should look carefully at the data in Figure One. The US failed to make creating effective Afghan forces a serious goal until FY2007, and this funding must be put in the context that funding can take 12-18 months to have an impact in the field – which meant it only began to have a significant impact in mid to late CY2008.
The US then failed to fund the level of post-2007 effort necessary to sustain a major force expansion. According to the Department of Defense, (FY) 2008 funding levels totaled $2.75 billion, including $1.7 billion for the ANA, $964 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations. It then dropped to $2 billion in FY2009, although the ANA force goal was being raised to 134,000. 1
It is only since that time that the US has found itself making massive expenditures it might well have avoided if it had ever taken ANSF development seriously in the first place. As is noted by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR),2
Since FY 2005, almost $18.67 billion has been made available to the ASFF.13 This accounts for approximately 47.5% of total U.S. reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. This amount includes the nearly $3.61 billion provided in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act signed by the U.S. President on June 24, 2009.14 As of September 30, 2009, over $17.30 billion has been obligated, with nearly $16.58 billion of that amount disbursed...
As of September 30, 2009, a total of $16.58 billion has been disbursed. Of this amount, $10.75 billion (64.85%) was disbursed for the ANA, $5.76 billion (34.73%) for the ANP, and the remaining $0.07 billion (0.42%) focused on related activities...the majority of funds for the ANA have been disbursed for Equipment and Transportation ($4.43 billion), followed by Sustainment efforts ($2.81 billion). The majority of funds for the ANP have been disbursed for Infrastructure ($1.59 billion), followed by sustainment efforts ($1.55 billion)...
A comparison of Figure One and Figure Two shows that the US and its allies failed to tie ANSF force levels and force goals to funding through early CY2009 – although the following analysis shows that significant improvements took place after early CY2008. Figure Three shows that these mistakes were coupled to similar delays in deploying adequate trainers and mentors through early CY2009. As a Department of Defense report noted at the beginning of 2009: 3
As of November 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned (50 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP though Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Sourcing solutions, including encouraging Allies to increase training and mentoring personnel, are being pursued to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements.
The U.S. is actively encouraging allies to provide more OMLTs and ANSF mentoring and training personnel. The U.S. is also examining the possibility of transitioning international training teams from Iraq to Afghanistan. In addition, U.S. National Army Guard personnel are supplementing OMLTs and other international deployments. For example, Illinois Army National Guardsmen support a Polish battle group, a Latvian OMLT will deploy with 11 members from the Michigan Army National Guard, and Ohio Army National Guardsmen are deploying with a Hungarian OMLT.
... The eventual ANP training and mentoring objective is to send a PMT to each AUP police district, each provincial and regional headquarters, each ABP company and battalion, and each ANCOP company and battalion. Currently, the broad geographic scope of the ANP necessitates additional mentoring forces and equipment to meet this objective. With 365 districts, 46 city police precincts, 34 provinces, 5 regions, 20 ANCOP battalions, 33 ABP battalions, and 135 ABP companies, CSTC-A is currently able to provide PMTs to no more than one-fourth of all ANP organizations and units. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned (37 percent fill). The shortage of PMTs affects CSTC-A’s ability to increase and improve ANP training and mentoring.
These fundamental failures to properly resource ANSF development for more than half a decade, and to provide proper numbers of trainers and mentors, were compounded further mistakes that still haunt ANSF force development:
- A failure to try to seriously create Afghan forces that could be real partners to the US and NATO/ISAF, and eventually replace the US and NATO/ISAF in an extended insurgency that would require strong national security forces for a decade or more. The US waited some six years to take the force development effort seriously, and then focused on rushing newly created small combat units – Kandaks of battalion size – into the field. It was not until the summer of 2009 that the US seriously addressed what partnering really meant, began to set goals for creating the kind of higher level joint headquarters and operations that could truly make Afghan military and police forces real partners, and lay the ground work for the eventual transfer of most military and paramilitary functions to Afghan forces.
- Lack of entire unit training: These problems have been compounded by a failure to provide adequate training for the entire newly formed Kandak or unit. The trained parts are assembled without adequate training of the entire force element -- a direct contrast to the key lessons of the importance of full unit training – even for mature forces – in places like the National Training Center at Fort Irwin.
- Failure to see that mentoring and partnering was the critical phase. It has only been in the course of 2009 that the US has focused on the fact that newly created, entire units, get their primary training and combat capability after they leave the formal training center and go into the field. The tacit assumption – or at least de facto experience -- has been that the Afghans are already “fighters” and that newly formed units can be treated as something close to mature, functioning units, rather than units that require at least a year of embedded mentoring and close partnering to develop the proven leadership and core competence needed. This approach often proved to under resource mentoring and partnering, create major problems for new units, and encourage serious and rapid attrition.
- A failure to understand the linkage between police development and the combined needs of a society dependent on an informal justice system capable of promptly resolving civil disputes and preventing local and tribal violence, and the need for police forces that had sufficient paramilitary capability to survive in an insurgency. The police and rule of law efforts remained largely decoupled through early CY2009.
- The US did not take the police training effort seriously for at least five critical years during the rise of the insurgency. It attempted to export responsibility. The training effort was turned over to an underresourced and terribly managed German effort that focused on training European-style police officers for a country that that had very different needs and resources. When the US finally did react, the program was effectively transferred to an underresourced, US-run, State Department system that was over-dependent on contract support and also sought to create conventional police that could not survive in the emerging insurgency. It was not until 2007 that that police began to get effective paramilitary training from the US military, and the training effort remained underresourced and secondary to the Afghan Army effort through early 2009.
- The US continued to treat ANSF development as if the key goal was the tactical defeat of the insurgency rather than securing population centers, and denying the enemy control and influence over the Afghan population. Even today, American commanders and strategists talk about “clear, hold, build, and transfer” without a real definition of what this means, much less any public and credible plan for shaping ANSF development to perform the necessary civil-military functions in the “hold” and “build” phases.
- Unrealistic emphasis on border security efforts. As was the case in Iraq, far too much emphasis was placed on trying to create border and port of entry forces that could not credibly cover the areas required, did not have the firepower and mobility required, and were subject to constant Taliban and hostile threats and pressure, and vulnerable to bribes and corruption. These problems were further compounded by the fact that Pakistan was often treated as if it would be a reliable partner in such efforts when US experts clearly knew this was not, and would not, be the case.
- The US never effectively exercised its de facto leadership role in the alliance to develop a coordinated NATO/ISAF/PRT effort. In practice, much of the ANSF development and deployment effort has put Afghan military and police forces in the field under conditions where each leading country uses Afghan forces somewhat differently, and where the lack of any standard for the operation of national NATO/ISAF forces – coupled to a lack of any standard for coordination of such forces with related PRTs – has left deployed ANSF forces without an effective NATO/ISAF partner.
- Failure to ensure proper continuity and management of the partnering effort. These problems were compounded in the field at every level by the rapid rotation of US and ISAF forces and aid workers, a lack of continuity of effort, a failure to prepare and rate commanders properly on partnering, and erratic handoff or transfer of this function during the rotation of field commanders and combat units.
- Having trainers rate their own success, and inadequate and inaccurate rating systems. The US should have learned from the battle of Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith, that trainers should not be allowed to rate those they train without independent verification. Unit readiness and performance need to independently validated. More broadly, however, the US has developed a statistically-based rating system in both Iraq and Afghanistan that is useful in providing some key indicators, but not in measuring actual levels of combat performance, loyalty, quality of leadership, and the impact of key problems like attrition. This had led to the sharp over rating of army units as being truly “in the lead.”
- Failing to deal with the reality of corruption and power brokering: The US was extremely slow to make serious efforts to deal with the complex impact of corruption and power brokering that affects ANSF development, operations, and force allocation at many levels – particularly the police. It often complained, but rarely acted decisively. It did not set a clear and predictable set of ground rules and behavior as to outing the incompetent and corrupt, dealing with powerbroker interference, and making anti-corruption efforts effective. It was only in the summer of 2009 that the US really began to address these issues, and how to allocate resources in ways that reward honest and effective performance and deny aid, contracts, and US support to the ineffective and corrupt. It is still unclear if this will lead to effective and sustained US action that will support ANSF development.
- Delays in realistic assessment of manning, quality of facilities, adequacy of pay and privileges, and other key factors affecting attrition and combat performance. The US has been remarkably slow to act on past lessons and constantly evaluate the reasons for attrition, actual levels of Afghan morale and motivation, and the real world adequacy of key factors like pay, privileges, facilities, medical care, leave, retirement, and death and disability benefits. Efforts to establish effective systems are still a work in progress.
- Uncertain selection and career paths for US trainers and mentors: The US was slow to properly train the trainers, mentors, and partners; and it is still not clear whether playing this role will put the US officers involved on the kind of competitive career track they deserve.
Facing the US Threat to the ANSF
These problems do not mean that the Afghan’s do not have equal or greater responsibility for their current problems, or that they can be excused from taking full responsibility for ANSF development over time. They do mean that the US must now take responsibility for years in which it failed to act as if Afghanistan faced a serious and growing insurgency; and for its past underresourcing of every aspect of the war in ways that allowed the insurgents to take the initiative. Far too many of the failures in today’s ANSF are the product of a critical half-decade in which the White House, OMB, and OSD cut back on requests from US commanders and ambassadors, and essentially had no meaningful strategy for Afghanistan.
It is not enough for President Obama to announce a new strategy, and call for transfer of security responsibilities to the ANSF. The US will lose the war in Afghanistan unless it makes far more effective efforts to correct these problems, and fully resources an effort to accelerate reaching current force goals. Such action is only a part of the strategy needed to win in Afghanistan, but no other effort towards victory will matter if the Afghan people cannot be given enough security and stability to allow successful governance, the opportunity for development, and an established civil society and rule of law that meets Afghan needs and expectations.
The US and other NATO/ISAF nations do need to act immediately begin to correct the remaining problems and resource shortfalls in the training, mentoring, and partnering effort. At a minimum, they must be ready by the start of 2010 to support and resource NTM-A/ CSTC-A plans to accelerate current ANSF force expansion plans. At the same time, they need to establish the groundwork for further major expansions of the ANA and ANP by 2014-2016. Recent planning efforts indicate that such an effort might need to double the ANA and ANP, although early success could make full implementation of such plans unnecessary. Making a fully resourced start will ensure that adequate ANSF forces will be available over time, and greatly ease the strain of maintaining and increasing NATO/ISAF forces. Funding such expansion to the ANSF will also be far cheaper than maintaining or increasing NATO/ISAF forces.
At the same time, such force expansion efforts must not race beyond either Afghan or US/NATO/ISAF capabilities. Quality will often be far more important than quantity, and enduring ANSF capability far more important than generating large initial force strengths. US/NATO/ISAF expediency cannot be allowed to put half-ready and unstable units in the field. It cannot be allowed to push force expansion efforts faster than ANSF elements can absorb them or the US/NATO/ISAF can provide fully qualified trainers, mentors, and partner units and the proper mix of equipment, facilities, enablers, and sustainability.
The beginning of US withdrawals in mid-2011 is a goal that must be earned, not a deadline to be imposed regardless of actual progress. The US and NATO/ISAF cannot afford to ignore the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real world “friction” that affects force development. Slogans and rhetoric about ideological goals, leadership, and morale cannot be allowed to lead the force development effort to ignore Afghan material realities: problems in pay, corruption, problems in promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment, poor medical care, overstretching or over committing force elements, problems in supporting families, vulnerability to insurgent infiltration and threats, and a lack of meaningful compensation for death and disability The US military and NATO/ISAF have systematically ignored such problems in the past, and understated or lied about their impact.
One needs to be equally careful about how much the US and its allies can save by moving too fast. It may be conceptually attractive to compare the price of creating Afghan forces to those of deploying US and NATO/ISAF forces. It is certainly clear that the US and NATO/ISAF cannot or will not deploy and sustain the forces necessary to compensate for any failure to expand Afghan forces. It will be a disaster, however, if the real world problems in creating truly effective ANSF partners are not fully addressed and equal attention is not given to correcting these problems. Each problem is a way to lose, and force expansion that fails to solve them cannot be a way to win.
Improvements in the training base are needed that emphasize training at the Kandak, integrated, and entire unit level before new units go out into the field. These improvements proved to be very beneficial in Iraq, and while they could make the training effort longer – not shorter – they pay off the moment units become active in the field. At the same time, no element of the ANSF can simply be trained and thrust into operations. Moreover, the key to success is not the quality of the training in training centers, but the quality of the partnering, mentoring, support, and enablers once a unit enters service. This requires ongoing, expert effort for 6 to 12 months a minimum, and the CMM definition of a “in the lead” is little more than a joke.
Realistic efforts to shake out new units, give them continuity of effective leadership, deal with internal tensions and retention problems, and help them overcome the pressures of corruption and power brokers take time and require careful attention to continuity at the embedded training/mentoring effort. Partnering and the creation of effective units in the field is an exercise in sustained human relationships, and short tours and rapid changes in US and NATO/ISAF trainers can be as crippling as the assumption that training is more critical than mentoring and partnering.
Developing a Force for “Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer
Major shifts will be needed in the structure of training and partnering as ANSF forces move into populated areas and take on the full range of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” tasks. Every aspect of clear, hold, and build requires help in preparing ANSF elements to go from a combat ethos to one of effective civil-military relations.
At this point in time, it is unclear that even the most dedicated advocates of a population centric strategy within the US military and NATO/ISAF can really define how to implement clear, hold, and build in terms of tangible ways to execute and manage the tasks involved and chose truly valid measures of effectiveness. The moment such efforts become operational on a large-scale basis, however, they must be ready to partner ANSF forces and help them find the best way to deal with such problems.
Worse, both the President and his advisors have claimed that the US is not involved in “nation building” in Afghanistan. This is true only in the sense that the US has not made a commitment to the impossible goals set in ambitious concepts and plans like the Afghan National compact and Afghan Development Plans. The fact is that counterinsurgency must involve armed nation building and the ANSF must play a critical role in the civil and rule of law aspects of “hold” and “build” and in providing enduring security and stability once “transfer” takes place. This will require enduring US and outside aid that funds most ANSF development and operations as long as a major threat remains, as well as similar US aid in developing Afghan governance and enough economic activity and growth to bring suitable levels of employment and economic security. This is “nation building” and efforts to deny it are exercises in the semantics of obfuscation and dishonesty.
Furthermore, the ANSF cannot function as an effective institution unless the US and its allies help develop the capacity of the Afghan government at the central, provincial, district and local levels to use the ANSF effectively, and tie the police development effort to the creation of a functional mix of formal and informal justice systems. The US must help the Afghan government both develop the necessary capabilities to plan and manage security within the Defense, Interior, and Finance Ministries. It must help the leadership of every element of the ANSF deal with the problems of corruption, powerbrokers, narco-traffickers, and Taliban infiltration – as well as with the problems of ethnic and sectarian pressures and tensions, and tribalism. No ANSF effort can succeed that does not address the problem of nation building within the Afghan security structure.
The US and NATO/ISAF need to address these issues at every level of command and operations. They need to take the warning from junior and mid-level officers, and in far too much media reporting, fully seriously. They must not downplay the number of times that “optimism” and exaggerated declarations of success have hurt US efforts in the past, or the continuing impact of problems documented by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the General Accountability Office, and sensitive field reporting on the performance and retention problems in Afghan units in the field. 4
Making NATO/ISAF A Real Partner
The report also shows that NATO/ISAF and the US must follow several “iron laws” for force development in carrying out all these efforts. First, they must pay as much attention to ANSF force quality as to increasing force quantity. They must not create units where there are inadequate mentors, partner units, facilities, equipment, and training capacity. Pay close attention to performance in the field versus formal training and quantified readiness measures. Second, they must properly equip and support ANSF forces or not put them into harm’s way.
Every increase in ANSF force quantity must be accompanied by suitable improvements in force quality and in the size and capability of NATO/ISAF mentoring and partnering capabilities. As ISAF and USFOR-A adjust their command structures, regardless of the specific decisions about command structure, it will be critical to retain both the mentoring and partnering components of ANSF development.
NATO/ISAF cannot win if it pursues the fragmented, stovepiped, and under resourced efforts -- and real world lack of integrated civil-military efforts -- that have helped cripple ANSF development in past years. “Unity of effort” has been an awkward cross between a lie and an oxymoron. Far too many national efforts have acted as if the ANSF was not involved in a real war. This cannot continue if a very real war is to be won.
Third, NATO/ISAF and the US must act to give to “partnership” real meaning. All the elements of NATO/ISAF must begin to work together with all of the elements of the ANSF to create equivalent forces that can conduct combined operations together. This will take time, resources, and patience. NATO/ISAF regional command Task force commanders must understand, however, that partnering with ANSF forces does not mean simply using them as they are, but making them effective, and treating operations as key real world aspects of training.
Regardless of What the President Said, It is Armed Nation Building: The Need for Integrated Civil-Military Operations
The US and its allies also need to be honest about the fact that the ANSF can only succeed as part of a broader effort in armed nation building. One can argue the scale of such efforts, but any denial of this reality is simply dishonest. The Obama Administration has made the right decision in rejecting open-ended nation building, but it will also lose the war if it does not accept the reality that it is involved in a major exercise in armed nation building over a period that may easily last for a decade or more after the US begins nominal force cuts in mid-20l1.
The report shows that development of the ANSF must pay as much attention to the civil-military aspects “hold and build” as to clear and transfer.” NATO/ISAF and the ANSF will lose the war unless their military successes are matched by a timely and effective civil-military effort in the field. It is not enough for the ANSF to be able to perform its security missions and develop an effective NATO/ISAF/US/Afghan partnership in security. A mix of NATO/ISAF and ANSF fighting forces can perform the shape and clear missions and part of the hold mission, but if this is all that is accomplished they will still lose the war to an opponent that can win a battle of political attrition against an Afghan government that is perceived as over-centralized, distant, failing to provide basic services, and which is seen as corrupt as well as supporting power brokers rather than the people.
NATO/ISAF, the US, and the ANSF must work together to provide civil-military action programs while security is being established and make this a key aspect of the hold and build missions. A transition should take place in leadership civil aid efforts and to Afghan provincial, district, and local government as soon as this can be made effective at the local level, but NATO/ISAF and the ANSF cannot wait and must establish basic services, encourage local leaders, and provide a functioning justice system immediately.
They must realize that national elections and democracy do not bring any form of political legitimacy or loyalty without tangible actions, only actions count. The grim reality is that the Afghan central government is too corrupt and incapable to take these necessary actions in far too many areas and far too many ways. At the same time, outside civil aid efforts are far too narrow, far too security conscious, and far too oriented towards talk and planning to serve Afghan needs in the field. The ideal is an integrated civil-military effort.
It is also far easier to talk about building the capacity of the civil side of the Afghan government, and reducing corruption and the role of powerbrokers, than to take effective action. If such an effort can be successful, it will probably only begin to have full impact in 2014-2016, In the interim some combination of NATO/ISAF and the ANSF must provide at least enough civil services and support to local governance to offer an alternative that is more attractive than the Taliban and takes at least initial steps to hire young men and underpin security with stability. They must provide at least enough justice and local security, jobs, and progress in areas like roads, electricity, water/irrigation, clinics, and schools to establish lasting security and stability.
The mix and phasing of such efforts will vary as much by region and locality as the need for given kinds of tactics, and range from meeting urban needs to those of scattered rural tribal areas.
In far too many cases, however, this will require dramatically new standards of performance by the US, and other national aid donors. There must be a new degree of transparency that shows what aid efforts actually do produce effective and honest results in the field, actually do win broad local support and loyalty, and move towards a true “build” phase.
At the same time, this does not mean that the ANSF can ever be an effective substitute for Afghan civil governance. There must be a parallel effort to reduce the national caveats and restrictions on aid. Corrupt and incapable US and NATO/ISAF aid organizations and contractors will need to be removed and blacklisted as well as their Afghan counterparts. Projects that cannot be scaled up to have a meaningful impact. Ephemeral good works, fund raising without accountability or validated requirements, and supporting national “branding” rather than meeting Afghan needs, all need to be put to an end. There is little point in fixing the efforts that can win the war, and not fixing the efforts that will win the people.
One key step in this process will again be for the US to look in the mirror rather than simply make complaints about the Afghans and its allies. The US has so far failed dismally to create the kind of truly integrated civil-military plan its needs to implement President Obama’s new strategy. Stovepipes and turf fights, and internal bickering – particularly by elements within the State Department, -- have crippled the effort necessary to create a plan with the depth, detail, and content needed. The Obama Administration needs to force real unity of effort – not simply talk about a whole of government approach – and do so at every level.
Figure One: No Real Funding Until FY2007
Congressional Research Service Estimate
Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 13.
Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the US Congress, October 2009 p. 44.
Figure Two: The Resource vs. Reality Gap: ANASF Force Level, Goals,
and Readiness Failed to Track With Resources Through Early 2008
Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 34, 36, 42, 48.
Figure Three: Trainers and Mentors Fell Far Short of Requirement Through Early 2009:
Estimated Actual versus Required Army Trainers and Mentors:
Estimated Actual versus Required Police Trainers and Mentors:
Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 38. 39, and 44 and pp. 28, 31, and
1 Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, p. 34
2 Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2009, p. 44.
3 Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), January 2009, pp. 38, 39, 44.
4 For a recent example, see Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, Special Plans and Operations, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, Report No. SPO-2009-007, September 30, 2009.