Shaping a "Conditions-Based Strategy and Plan for Staying in Iraq"

The progress report that Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus have just delivered has had a polarizing effect. Republicans and those who believe the war is winnable could find enough evidence to support their position, and see Iran as a rising threat, and many reasons to stay. Democrats, and those who argue for withdrawal, could see new internal risks and conflicts, and many reasons to leave.

Unfortunately, a progress report is a progress report; it is not plan or case for future action. Further, neither the President’s speech or any of the testimony by senior officials, laid out a path for future US involvement in Iraq. “Conditions-based” became an excuse for an undefined and open-ended commitment. The Administration effectively wasted what may be its last opportunity to provide a plan and case for sustained US involvement in the war, and failed to define the conditions for staying or leaving. The end result was even more partisanship, and a more polarized Presidential campaign.

There is both a strategic and a moral case for staying in Iraq as long as Iraq moves forward at realistic rates of progress, as long as Iraq does not plunge into serious communal conflict, and as long as Iraq has a government that wants and benefits from US support and is not linked to Iran.

There should be a US strategy, plan, and five-year program budget for the Iraq War, just as there should be one for Afghanistan. This plan should not consist of rigid milestones, and it should be based as soon as possible on Iraqi plans rather than US ones.

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Anthony H. Cordesman

Anthony H. Cordesman

Former Emeritus Chair in Strategy