The Situation in Iraq

February 13, 2008

No one can spend some 10 days visiting the battlefields in Iraq without seeing major progress in  every  area. A combination of the surge, improved win  and hold tactics, the tribal uprising in Anbar and other provinces, the Sadr ceasefire, and major advances in the use of IS&R have transformed the  battle against Al Qaida in Iraq. If the US provides sustained support to the Iraqi government -- in security, governance, and development -- there is now a very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state.

The attached briefing provides detailed graphs and maps taken from material  provided to me during my visit to Iraq.  The briefing is an update on the situation throughout Iraq, and shows the trends over the past year. These graphs and maps measure major acts of violence, ethno-sectarian violence, and trends in IED and other forms of attack. These same trends emerge from a detailed examination of what is happening in Baghdad, Anbar, and Central Iraq. They show the war is far from over, but the violence has been sharply reduced, and perhaps to the minimum levels possible until Iraq improves its governance and development and moves much further towards political accommodation.

At the same time, this progress is  dependent on major additional Iraqi government action well beyond the passing of the Iraqi FY2008 budget, the provincial powers act, and the laws easing de-Baathification. Major improvements are still required in the Iraqi government and in governance at the national, provincial, and local levels. Budgets need to be spent effectively and without corruption. Counterinsurgency must be followed by creation of the rule of law.  Major moves are still needed to establish political accommodation in an enduring form, and to conduct elections that have true political legitimacy at every level.

The briefing describes these challenges in depth, and it is clear that Iraq can only succeed with years of additional US support in security, governance, and development. The progress in 2008  and 2009 cannot be decisive or irreversible. It will take strong US involvement throughout the life of the next Administration to succeed, and it may well take US aid through 2016. There is a strong case for limiting troop reductions beyond a force of 15 brigade equivalents to patient conditions-based steps that ensure there will be no need to rush back US forces or see Iraqi forces become vulnerable. There is an even stronger case for sustained  aid in governance and development until the Iraqi central government learns how to spend  effectively and do so with limits to waste, corruption, and ethno-sectarian bias.

Serious threats can still bring defeat or paralysis over the coming years, although this seems significantly less likely than during the fall of 2007:

• A central government failure to move funds to key provinces, improve services, fund development, and employ young men.
  
• A central government failure to reach out to the Sunni and Shi'ite Sons of Iraq and incorporate many into the Iraq security services.
  
• Potential Arab-Kurdish-minority divisions over Kurdish autonomy in the north, and creating some form of Kurdish federal zone.
  
• The risk of Shi'ite divisions and infighting in the south, particularly between the Hakim and Sadr factions, and Sunni-Shi'ite tensions over some form of Shi'ite federalism.
  
• Continued Iranian support of militias and divisions and growing Iranian influence in Basra and the south.
  
• The need for local legitimacy through provincial and local elections in 2008, and open lists and local representation in the COR election in 2009.
  
• Moving towards full development and sustained employment, and for a fair sharing of petroleum wealth a resources.

It may well be possible to help Iraq deal with all of these challenges and the others in the attached briefing, but this will require a US commitment at least through the term of the next President, far better long term planning of our aid efforts and funding, great care  in further force reductions beyond 15 brigades, and  much more careful attention to dealing with the above challenges rather than simply providing unfocused aid. It also will take significant aid funding in spite of Iraq's apparent "oil wealth."