The Strategic Implications of the Palestinian Crisis

The conflict between Hamas and Fatah (and in reality the Palestinian Authority) seems to have effectively divided Gaza and the West Bank into two separate bodies where any political compromise will be hollow and at best cloak a somewhat less overt level of struggle.  Arafat’s divide and rule tactics, Israel’s shattering of the Palestinian security forces, the failure of the peace process at every level, Islamist extremism, and Israeli walls and settlements have all helped to create a divide that is far more polarized than even the most pessimistic Israeli and Palestinian government officials expected even a few short weeks ago.

Hamas turned out to be far better organized and far more effective than was expected, and clearly had planned at least many elements of the campaign in Gaza. The Palestinian security forces, on the other hand, were even weaker, more divided, more corrupt, and more unpopular. It is still unclear why Fatah was so ineffective and so badly prepared, and why intelligence on Hamas’s planning and capabilities was so bad. Even in May, some US advisors and Israeli officials were still counting on the training of the Presidential Guard and Hamas’s "weakness" to force Hamas to compromise.  At least some IDF officers were saying that Israel could, in a dire emergency, intervene in support of the Palestinian Authority.