Stumbling Out of the Middle East Is No Better Than Stumbling In

Twenty years into a global war on terror that largely has been fought in the Middle East, it is no wonder that many Americans are long past ready to declare victory and move on. Strategists used to describe counterterrorism as “the long war”; now they are more apt to describe it as an endless one, draining resources and degrading military readiness for no lasting benefit. President Donald Trump long has seen the Middle East as a morass. As recently as last month, he lamented that “the decision to go to the Middle East and get into the Middle East was the single biggest mistake made in the history of our country.”

A debate has begun over the optimal U.S. force structure in the Middle East to secure enduring U.S. interests. Yet, in many ways, the force structure is a secondary concern. Even more important is understanding what the U.S. strategy toward the Middle East should be. How U.S. partners and adversaries understand U.S. intentions will shape their actions, because one thing is clear: When the United States changes its approach to the Middle East, friends and enemies, inside and outside the region, will change the way they act toward the region, to the United States, and toward each other.