A Summit of Equals

The one thing that was entirely predictable about the recently concluded U.S.-China summit was that Trump would declare it a great success, regardless of the facts. That prediction turned out to be accurate, but the absence of actual facts coming out of the summit makes it difficult to judge whether claims of success were an exaggeration. There was no joint statement, which seems to have become the norm in recent years, and, not unexpectedly, the comments from the two sides mostly talked past each other.

On the trade front, anticipated progress on the “three B’s”—beans, beef, and Boeing—is so far unclear. Trump told reporters there would be significant agriculture purchases but provided no details; however, it appears that the United States expects China to fulfill its purchase commitment from last October. The Chinese delegation did not reveal its plans. After the summit, China did renew licenses for U.S. beef exports that it allowed to lapse last year, but that simply restores the previous status quo. The commitment to buy more Boeing planes Trump announced has not yet been confirmed by Beijing. In any event, at 200 planes, it was less than expected. Discussions about a Board of Trade and Board of Investment and a possible agreement on artificial intelligence safety protocols seem to have begun but have not concluded with any agreements. Ambassador Jamieson Greer subsequently announced that proposals for the two boards would be put out for public comment—a good idea, but also an acknowledgment that actually standing them up is some distance away.

More noteworthy is what does not appear to have been discussed: any of the traditional complaints the United States has regularly brought up—overcapacity, subsidies, intellectual property theft, barriers to U.S. market access. Hopefully, some of the participating company executives made progress on their particular market access issues, but that, too, remains to be seen. These issues are intractable, and nobody expected breakthroughs on any of them, but the United States has been diligent in keeping them on the table. The signal coming out of this summit is that we have largely given up on them and are focusing on the specific transactional goals that characterize both Trump administrations. Since there have not yet been many results confirmed on the transaction front, the obvious conclusion is that the Chinese officials successfully dodged the usual American bullets and gave up very little in return. To be fair, the idea that trying to change China is a futile exercise dates from the Biden administration, although that did not stop Biden from pressing China on a variety of human rights issues, something Trump has largely ignored.

The more important discussions were on larger geopolitical issues, particularly Taiwan and Iran.

Taiwan, by Trump’s own admission, took up a substantial part of the discussion. The immediate result appeared to be no change by either side. Indeed, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that U.S. policy had not changed. But there were differences of tone. The Chinese delegation clearly pressed harder on Taiwan, making clear that it was its most important issue and that failure to handle it properly could lead to conflict. Trump acknowledged discussing the pending U.S. arms sale to Taiwan—something presidents as far back as Ronald Reagan had promised not to do—but said he had not made a decision. Not a remark that would make the Taiwan government breathe easier.

On Iran, it does not appear that Xi Jinping said anything that he has not said before. According to Trump, Xi agreed Iran should not have a nuclear weapon, agreed the Strait of Hormuz should be open, and opposed the imposition of tolls on transit through the strait. Nothing remarkable there. The Chinese government subsequently issued a statement saying the war should come to an end, but it was unclear whether China was willing to actually do anything in pursuit of those goals—though any pressure it ultimately puts on Iran would likely be private.

There also does not appear to have been any discussion of Chinese aggressive actions in the South China Sea or its continuing use of economic coercion (probably because Trump is guilty of the same thing).

The geopolitical discussions produced the summit’s slogan: constructive strategic stability, a phrase which might best be interpreted as “don’t rock the boat.” At the present time, it is in both countries’ interests to buy time while they face significant internal and external challenges. Beijing clearly believes time is on its side, and Xi’s reference to the Thucydides Trap was a pointed reminder that he regards China’s rise as inexorable, and that it is the United States’ job to adjust to it. Trump’s pivot away from challenging China’s policies, particularly the overcapacity and export-orientation that is undermining manufacturing in many countries in addition to the United States, is an implicit acknowledgment of the United States’ limited leverage to force the changes it would like to see. That suggests “constructive strategic stability” means accepting a relationship of equals, a realistic outcome but doubtless not something Trump will acknowledge.

Author’s Note: I retired from CSIS on March 29, 2026. I plan to continue writing this column and participating in the Trade Guys podcast, so please continue to read and listen. However, my CSIS email address will no longer be working, so if readers or podcast listeners want to contact me directly, they should do so at [email protected].

William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.