The Ties that Bind: Including Cabo Delgado in Political Dialogue

National protests that erupted after the Mozambique National Electoral Commission (CNE) declared Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) candidate Daniel Chapo the winner of the October 2024 presidential election revealed an unexpected twist to long-standing narratives about the ties that both bind and divide the Mozambican public. Voters, outraged at what observers worldwide considered to be an election marred by irregularities and fraud, took to the streets to protest against the FRELIMO government, accusing the long-time ruling party of ignoring public will. These fundamental frustrations with the social contract echoed the grievances that gave rise to the insurgency in Cabo Delgado province, an area characterized by its cultural and historic isolation from southern Mozambique. Indeed, language barriers, weak transportation links, and general neglect often feature in discourse about two completely different and separated regions destined at minimum to indifference toward each other.

However, these protests showcased how much Mozambican voters have in common despite the factors that may divide them, suggesting that while the immediate goal of political dialogue is to reduce the risk of further unrest, the process and outcome of these talks could serve as a springboard for a more balanced strategy for Cabo Delgado. Such a strategy would need to address not only near-term security issues but also the longer-term socioeconomic and political drivers of instability. Sustaining momentum for political dialogue, therefore, is key not only to maintaining general political stability but also to enabling more substantive, long-term progress in northern Mozambique.

Adapting and Evolving Insurgency Heightening Risk in Cabo Delgado

The quantity and quality of Islamic State–Mozambique (ISM) activity during the first half of 2025 shows a group that is once again striving to assert its role as a destabilizing force in northern Mozambique, undertaking operations designed to disrupt economic activity and cast doubt on Mozambican government claims that security in the province has improved. Insurgent attacks between January and April 2025 increased by roughly 30 percent as compared to the same period the previous year, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). Furthermore, despite some nascent efforts in 2023 and 2024 to cultivate better relations with civilians, civilians have nonetheless been disproportionately impacted by this upward trend in violence. Civilians accounted for 31 percent of fatalities in insurgent attacks in northern Mozambique in 2024, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the highest among African militant Islamist groups.

The insurgency appears to be prioritizing economic disruption over destruction of state infrastructure, a likely move to both increase its revenue stream while still undermining the state. In contrast to previous years, when the group regularly attacked electricity transformers and destroyed government buildings, the insurgency appears to have shifted its attention more exclusively to disrupting mining interests, transportation corridors, and local agricultural activities, an approach that both undercuts government narratives of improving security while potentially increasing the group’s access to resources. According to an ACLED study, insurgent activity on N380, the primary north-south road in the province, increased by roughly 70 percent between 2023 and 2024, a trend that has continued into 2025. For example, multiple media sources reported in April that insurgents operating on the N380 road were frequently extorting motorists. The group has also increased activity along the N14, a key west-east road in southern Cabo Delgado connecting mining operations to the port in Pemba, disrupting the flow of travel and commerce as they stop travelers to demand a “toll.” Furthermore, the group in recent weeks has increased its operations in Niassa Province, targeting areas known for tourism and conservation work.

The shift in targets also reflects an uptick in attacks on foreign actors, including the Rwandan Defence Forces, which had previously seemed to provide at least a deterrent effect on insurgent activity. For example, Islamic State media in May claimed the group had killed as many as 11 Mozambican soldiers in an attack and three Rwandans in a separate incident. Mozambican media reported insurgents held four Chinese nationals for ransom, while in May, the group reportedly attacked a Russian-flagged vessel engaging in oceanic research near Mocímboa da Praia.

Political Dialogue a Potential Bridge to Cabo Delgado

The uptick in insurgent activity in Cabo Delgado is taking place at the same time political leaders in Maputo are exploring how to prevent a recurrence of the widespread political violence that followed the October 2024 election, an effort that has the potential to shake up the government’s approach to the conflict in Cabo Delgado. Public outcry over the CNE’s declaration that FRELIMO candidate Daniel Chapo had won the presidential election in October led to months of national, often violent, protests that resulted in as many as 300 deaths, according to Amnesty International. Furthermore, widespread vandalism of businesses and protests targeting key economic nodes, such as the Port of Nacala, the Port of Maputo, and the primary border crossing between Mozambique and South Africa, took a significant economic toll; the Mozambican business association in March estimated protests had already cost the economy three percent of its GDP, warning the cost could rise to 30 percent by year-end if protests continued.

The government’s initial approach to protests was not unlike its approach to the insurgency. The government quickly deployed the police and later the military to disperse protesters, resulting in 4,000 detentions and civilian casualties, according to human rights organizations. Chapo himself, in comments to the press in February, likened the protestors to the terrorists in northern Mozambique, drawing parallels between vandalism against small businesses during protests to looting of markets in Cabo Delgado.

The government’s pivot toward dialogue in March 2025 surprised observers accustomed to this more hardline approach. While the government had previously met with political party leaders to discuss a solution to the crisis, the exclusion of Venâncio Mondlane from this dialogue undercuts its potential given his widespread following. The March meeting between Chapo and Mondlane, therefore, represented a more serious step forward in developing a more long-term, realistic solution to the political crisis. Both leaders agreed this meeting would be the first of several to resolve the issues underpinning political protests to prevent their repetition, and the pair met again in May to continue exploring the issues raised in the March meeting. Readouts of both these meetings emphasized a shared desire to prevent further political violence, a goal both sides agreed to pursue at both the national and local level, instructing allies on the ground to avoid conflict. Furthermore, these meetings produced promises to compensate protesters harmed by police and to provide amnesty for the thousands detained during those months of protest.

Leveraging Dialogue to Benefit Cabo Delgado

The relevance of the topics under discussion to address post-electoral violence to the grievances underpinning the conflict in Cabo Delgado suggests that keeping this line of negotiations on track would have benefits for social stability beyond the immediate goal of preventing future bouts of political violence. The preliminary commitments that have come out of these two meetings, if applied to the Cabo Delgado context, would likely be a step forward in repairing the social contract in northern Mozambique and move the state closer to a more comprehensive approach to the conflict. Furthermore, a recent study by the Observatório de Meio Rural, a Mozambican NGO, of the geography of the protests revealed protests were most intense not only in urban areas but areas associated with extractive industries, such as Montepeuz District in Cabo Delgado, while a separate organization noted the added strain on Mozambican security forces during protests created an opening for increased insurgent operations in Cabo Delgado. These trends add to the urgency of ensuring negotiations progress and the government takes concrete actions to fulfill the commitments that have arisen during these political talks.

Apply basic commitments to Cabo Delgado. One of the outcomes of the March meeting between Chapo and Mondlane was a commitment to provide compensation and support to victims of police brutality, a promise that would likely resonate with residents of Cabo Delgado who have also experienced violence and harassment at the hands of security services for years. This promise again arose in the context of a late-May follow-on meeting between the two leaders, suggesting Mondlane intends to maintain pressure on the state to follow through on this commitment. Holding security services accountable for civilian abuses in Cabo Delgado as well would be a powerful indication of at least an initial effort to demonstrate that the security services should be protecting civilians above all else, a move that would help counter insurgent messaging about a self-interested FRELIMO government and begin to repair the social contract in the region.

Use amnesty offer as launching point to revisit due process. Both meetings between Chapo and Mondlane have raised the prospect of amnesty for citizens detained during the protests, a proposal that spotlights issues in the application of due process and the rule of law nationwide. Civilians in Cabo Delgado have similarly reported harassment and detention by authorities on suspicion of being associated with the insurgency without proper process. Using amnesty as a springboard for pursuing reforms to better ensure civilians’ legal rights are being respected has the potential to start building public confidence in the legal system.

Support youth initiatives. The meetings between Chapo and Mondlane have also referenced support to youth initiatives in general terms, a program that, if developed into something more concrete, would again have the potential to enhance the economic opportunities of a large segment of the population in Cabo Delgado. Frequent displacement, especially during the planting and harvest cycle, coupled with insecurity on key trade routes, has heavily diminished economic opportunities for Cabo Delgado’s youth. Disruptions in education—recent reports indicate 2,300 schools have been destroyed in the province during the past five years—have further weakened opportunities for youth, especially young women.

Emilia Columbo is a senior associate (non-resident) to the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.