Transatlantic Relations Under Trump: An Uneasy Peace

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled Navigating Disruption: Ally and Partner Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Introduction

The transatlantic relationship is surviving, just. Every transatlantic interaction, new U.S. policy initiative, or presidential social media posting has the potential of triggering a deep rupture in the grand alliance. The surprise thus far is that the explosion and rupture have not yet happened.

During its first year, the second Trump administration has pushed to reorient the transatlantic alliance. Believing that the past alliance relationship was unfair, with the United States ensuring European security but getting little in return, the Trump administration has sought to invert the relationship, viewing allies more as clients and creating terms, conditions, and fees for service. The linkage between economic and security discussions, while not completely unprecedented, represents a new dynamic.

Thus far, European leaders have seemingly accepted the transactional shift in transatlantic relations, taking the necessary steps to appease Trump. Needing the United States to ensure its security and support Ukraine, Europe has not pushed back as it initially indicated it would. However, submitting to Trump’s demands on trade and fawning over the president has been an internal humiliation for Europe, leading to domestic political acrimony directed at Europe’s leaders.

For the European Union, with an economy roughly the size of the United States and China combined, this humiliation was a choice. Europe has the economic tools to respond assertively to the United States but has chosen not to deploy them, choosing instead to bide its time and manage relations with Trump while working to reduce its security dependence on the United States. By inverting the transatlantic relationship, Trump is triggering the European Union to do what the French have long called for—develop strategic autonomy and reduce its reliance on the United States. Europe is now acting to invest in defense and reorient its foreign, domestic, and economic policies to reduce its exposure to outside powers, whether that be the United States or China.

There is presently an uneasy peace in transatlantic relations. Yet, this peace may not last, especially as new transatlantic policy collisions emerge.

The Trump Administration’s Policies

For more than a half-century, a bright line separated security and economic issues, with the United States and European Union clashing over all sorts of policies but the U.S. commitment to NATO never wavering. When discussing a transatlantic trade row, President John F. Kennedy once sarcastically asked, “Is the Grand Alliance going to founder on chickens?” But now, it might.

Transatlantic relations today are incredibly dynamic because there is now a direct, transactional linkage between security and economic issues. President Trump has talked repeatedly about the need for Europeans to “pay up,” and the United States has sought European commitments in trade negotiations to purchase U.S. weapons and invest in the United States. Vice President J.D. Vance warned that if Europeans do not respect “free speech” (i.e., stop requiring content moderation on digital platforms), the United States may not come to their defense. In a leaked Signal chat over a planned strike on Yemen, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Steven Miller wrote, “If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation at great cost there needs to be some further economic gain extracted in return [from Europe].”

Transatlantic relations are currently focused on three increasingly entangled issues: the Trump administration’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and the U.S. commitment to NATO.

Tariffs

The European Union had been preparing for a trade war with the United States since well before Trump took office. When President Trump announced tariffs against the European Union on April 2, 2025, the European Union announced retaliatory measures, just as it retaliated during trade fights in Trump’s first term. But when Trump abruptly announced a 90-day pause to create time for negotiations, the European Union similarly paused its retaliatory measures to give talks a chance. This is where the administration’s approach to negotiate a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine came into play.

The Russia-Ukraine War

Initially, the Russia-Ukraine war looked like the issue most likely to cause a rupture in the transatlantic alliance. President Trump seemed to believe that Ukraine was the obstacle to peace, and he put immense pressure on Ukraine while offering praise of Vladimir Putin and sending emissaries to Russia offering economic enticements. After dressing down Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office in February 2025, the Trump administration cut off U.S. weapons deliveries and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, resulting in battlefield losses and creating deep concern across Europe. However, after Zelensky reengaged and expressed a desire to reach a ceasefire in talks with senior U.S. officials, the administration reversed its stance on military deliveries and intelligence sharing. European leaders were also deeply troubled and annoyed to be cut out of peace talks. They used the intervening months to engage Trump on the conflict in an effort to shift his views on Russia.

Meanwhile, Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine and its military offenses continued, despite U.S. efforts. The quickly convened Anchorage summit between Presidents Trump and Putin in August had a lot of pomp and circumstance, but there was little substantive breakthrough. Russia, it seems, was unwilling to make any real concessions. The convening of European leaders with President Zelensky at the White House the following week was much more positive than Zelensky’s February meeting and left European leaders believing that Trump had softened his stance toward Ukraine and hardened his stance toward Russia.

NATO

NATO was put on notice at the beginning of the Trump administration. Ahead of a meeting of European defense ministers in February, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claimed in a written brief that the United States would no longer be “the primary guarantor of security in Europe.” The Pentagon also announced a force posture review, with reports indicating it would result in significant U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe. The signal being sent was that the burden of ensuring European security would no longer be shared, but instead shifted to Europeans.

Yet Europeans have since received mixed signals. The State Department has operated as if little has changed in the NATO alliance. It has opposed EU involvement in defense and encouraged the continued purchases of U.S. weapons, similar to past administrations. At the NATO summit, the United States adopted a familiar approach, pressing Europeans to make new defense spending commitments. Every European country, with the exception of Spain, agreed to spend 5 percent of their GDP on “defense”—specifically, a minimum of 3.5 percent on “pure” defense, with the remainder devoted to investment in critical security infrastructure—as demanded by President Trump. But the United States did not commit to do anything in exchange for European spending commitments; Washington did not commit to spending 3.5 percent, maintaining its current troop presence in Europe, or continuing to aid Ukraine.

European Responses

Europe has been torn about whether to confront or appease the Trump administration. While the European Union has the economic might to hit back, European security remains dependent on the United States through NATO. Europe has integrated its economies but not its militaries; reduced economic barriers within the bloc and close bonds with partners like Norway and the United Kingdom have created might in unity. Yet while European countries act as one economically through the European Union, European defense is fragmented across roughly 30 different states. European weakness on defense has hindered its ability to defend its economic interests.

The European Union was initially ready to retaliate, tit for tat, in response to U.S. tariffs. After the 90-day tariff pause, EU leaders were ready to engage in traditional trade talks. However, they soon discovered that this was not a typical trade negotiation involving reciprocal compromises and efforts to reduce trade barriers; rather, the Trump administration expected unilateral concessions. For Europe, this was not an economic calculus but a political one about the future of the transatlantic relationship, as a trade war with the United States could also destroy the transatlantic alliance.

The 90-day trade negotiations overlapped with the G7 and NATO summits in the summer, where European leaders eagerly sought to avoid a transatlantic rupture. At the NATO summit, European leaders heaped praise on the president and sought to meet his demands for more European spending. At the summit, Trump seemed relatively pleased and did not walk away from the alliance, as Europeans feared he might. The NATO summit thus successfully avoided a rupture.

Additionally, Trump’s rhetoric toward Putin on the Russia-Ukraine war hardened somewhat in this period, while his tone toward Ukraine softened. In response to the Pentagon indicating it would halt deliveries of air defense to Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte visited Washington in July, and European states agreed to in effect buy U.S. military aid for Ukraine, weapons the United States once gave to Ukraine as U.S.-funded security assistance. European leaders had averted the worst-case scenario for them and for Kyiv—the cutoff of U.S. weapons flows to Ukraine—even if Europe would now be paying.

Throughout this period of negotiation, European leaders felt they developed a rapport with Trump, and he seemed to appreciate high-profile summitry and the grandeur of European royal pageantry. This sapped the willingness of European states to back a strong retaliatory move on trade from the European Union. EU Director General for Trade Sabine Weyand said as much when she told a public forum that EU leaders accepted a trade deal at Trump’s Turnberry golf course in Scotland because if they did not, “the U.S. would abandon the security partnership with the EU.”

Yet U.S. leverage did not reach its high point until the summer of 2025. While it is unlikely that European states will fully meet the NATO spending commitments promised in the Hague, it is clear that European leaders agreed to spend more not just to appease Trump––in part this is because they do not believe they can rely on the United States any longer. European countries have already implemented a dramatic and sustained increase in defense spending in recent years—up 83 percent since 2015—both to rearm themselves and to aid Ukraine. If EU countries are to meet their new NATO defense spending commitments, the bloc would have to spend roughly as much as the United States on defense. Rearming Europe is a significant undertaking, and in the interim, European leaders have been playing for time. But at some point, Europe will be less reliant on the United States for protection and therefore more willing to stand up to Washington.

EU trade officials have also been working overtime to diversify Europe’s economic relationships and to shift the multilateral trading order to revolve around Europe. The European Union has sought to close or negotiate trade agreements with countries around the world. The bloc has finalized trade agreements with Mercosur (a bloc including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), Indonesia, and Mexico and is working on agreements with India, the United Arab Emirates, and members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. From an EU perspective, the old trading order is not dead—it is only that the United States is no longer part of it. Time will tell if these EU efforts will succeed, but there has been tremendous global interest in engaging the European market.

Looking Ahead

There is likely more turmoil ahead in the transatlantic relationship, and it is unclear whether the present uneasy peace will hold. There appears to be significant hostility within the Trump administration toward Europe, viewing European leaders as essentially political opponents. It would not take a lot for the relationship to combust.

The biggest X factor may be the U.S. force posture review, which is due to be announced in the fall of 2025. While it seems apparent that the Pentagon is intent on passing the baton to Europe on security, the question of whether Trump will approve such cuts remains. European leaders will attempt to persuade him to maintain the status quo. Furthermore, domestic policy interest groups with power in the administration will want to use the potential for troop cuts as bargaining leverage with Europe on other policy issues. Should the United States announce significant cuts, European willingness to confront Trump will increase significantly. Trump’s efforts to make transatlantic relations transactional only works so long as the United States continues to provide the service of defending Europe. Otherwise, the client will inevitably fire the provider.

The next big issue to roil transatlantic relations will likely be Europe’s tech regulations. The Trump administration and big U.S. tech firms bitterly oppose EU regulations, which they say unfairly target them and restrict their business. U.S. tech firms are also deeply concerned that EU regulations could be adopted by countries worldwide, becoming a global regulatory standard. The Trump administration has also railed against European restrictions on “free speech” in response to the European Union’s Digital Services Act, which requires content moderation for online platforms. The Trump administration attempted to bring digital regulations into trade negotiations, but the European Union pushed back. While EU leaders have some room to discuss how they implement the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, these are EU laws, and it is just as hard for the European Union to change a law as it is for the United States.

While a fight over tech regulations would likely upend the U.S.-EU trade deal and initiate a trade war, this is a war the European Union is ready to fight. While a trade war would not be good for Europe, trade with the United States amounts to 20 percent of EU exports, roughly 3 percent of EU GDP. It would certainly be survivable. The European Union could also retaliate by using its “anti-coercion instrument,” which widens its ability to respond. As the Financial Times’ Martin Sandbu assessed, “The US has a lot more to lose than either side’s behaviour would suggest. Whatever pain the US can impose through tariffs, the EU can do the equivalent through measures against service imports or US companies’ intellectual property rights.” The European Union would no doubt lose more economically, but President Trump could lose more politically.

There are many other potential transatlantic flashpoints: the European Union introducing a carbon tariff in 2026; U.S. sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court; growing European recognition of Palestinian statehood; the ending of U.S. foreign aid; and U.S. support of far-right parties in Europe.

Lastly, the issue of Ukraine and Russia remains. Presently, Europe feels it has successfully moved President Trump to adopt a firmer line toward Russia. However, as a peace agreement looks increasingly unlikely, it remains unclear who the president blames, if anyone, for the failure of the talks. Furthermore, U.S. leverage in the conflict—perhaps never quite as strong as President Trump thought—is decreasing as U.S. military aid and deliveries to Ukraine decline. President Trump appears to have no intention of asking Congress for more assistance. Meanwhile, as European defense production ramps up for itself and for Ukraine, and as Ukraine’s indigenous defense industry grows, Ukraine is becoming less reliant on the United States. Europe, not the United States, will become Ukraine’s most important supporter, sapping European willingness to cater to the whims of the president on the war.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The Trump administration is right to want to transition responsibility for defending Europe to Europeans. However, this should be a managed transition, as it will take time for European states to organize themselves to replace U.S. combat power. An abrupt transition will leave Europe exposed militarily and cause a deep, possibly permanent rupture in transatlantic relations.

Additionally, the Trump administration should recognize that burden shifting will also change the nature of transatlantic relations. This will inevitably result in the weakening of U.S. influence; U.S. defense firms will lose market share in Europe, and the European Union will play an increasing role integrating European defense efforts. That is the cost of such a transition, and frankly, it is one worth embracing. But that means instead of opposing EU defense initiatives, the Trump administration needs to accept them. 

This transition will also prompt Europe to stand up for itself more assertively. With a militarily stronger Europe, should the Trump administration push too far economically, the European Union may snap back hard. Policymakers in Washington should recognize that Brussels has significant retaliatory tools, and an overly aggressive push by the United States and its companies risks triggering a major European backlash. The United States should recognize that the European Union is not going to abandon its domestic laws on tech or climate. While Europe is dependent on U.S. tech companies, it could conceivably take dramatic steps to reduce its dependence, just as it is doing to decouple from Russia on energy. This would be the worst possible outcome for U.S. firms.

Lastly, an additional effect of the Trump administration’s transactional approach to transatlantic relations may be to facilitate the emergence of the European Union as a global actor. While the European Union moves slowly, in a world without a dependable United States, Europeans are being increasingly forced to act as one on the world stage. Brussels, for instance, without any pressure from Washington, has adopted a firmer approach toward Beijing, especially regarding its support for Moscow and its trade practices. The European Union’s global economic and commercial diplomacy on trade, climate, and regulations has ramped up and made real headway. The European Union and its member states are set to spend like a major military power. Additionally, the EU energy and climate transition is continuing apace, with European reliance on U.S. natural gas decreasing.

Trump’s policies and rhetoric are pushing Europe to be more assertive globally. This is a positive development, but it also means transatlantic relations will have to adjust. The United States has long taken European weakness for granted. But as Europe strengthens, the Trump administration will need to come to terms with the fact that the stronger, more assertive Europe it helped bring about will not be nearly as compliant.

Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.