The Trump Administration Wants to Establish a UN Support Office in Haiti—Now What?

The announcement late last week of a Trump administration plan to move forward with a push in the UN Security Council to establish a UN Support Office in Haiti is significant. The immediate policy backdrop is two developments requiring action: On the security front, the stalled effectiveness of the UN-approved Kenya-led Multilateral Security Support (MSS) mission; and on the political front, a Haitian transitional governance agreement with a hard deadline of February 2026 for an elected government to take office. This shift in U.S. policy is worth paying attention to, but what does it actually entail?

To be clear, the notion of a UN Support Office—first proposed last February by the UN secretary general—does not directly involve the deployment of a conventional UN peacekeeping mission. Its main function would be to support a multinational security force in Haiti—in effect, the multinational administrative, logistical, and, critically, a more predictable financing pathway that could support the ongoing MSS mission. Presumably, one could then envision a multinational scaling-up of security operations in Haiti.

Initially launched and funded during the Biden administration, the MSS-Kenya deployment at less than 1,000 never reached its envisioned 2,500 force. Its UN mandate is up for renewal in September, while funding has been dependent on shaky U.S. appropriations, coupled with voluntary pledges to a UN trust fund (which never surpassed a little over $100 million).

Nonetheless, despite a lukewarm interest in multilateral diplomacy by senior leaders of the current US administration, acquiescing to a UN option suggests a belated recognition of at least two realities. First, the makeup of a proposed UN Support Office in Haiti represents the very logistical and financing building blocks that have hampered the MSS effort over the past 18 months. Second, it also probably represents the outcome of a realistic evaluation of the most plausible U.S. policy alternatives to address Haiti’s layers of crises—but that do not come close to matching the proposed UN option. These include (1) a possible security initiative led by the Organization of American States (OAS), an institution not suited for this type of multilateral action, as it has no use-of-force mandate; and (2) a direct U.S.-led military intervention, reminiscent of past U.S. responses to crises in Haiti. The latter option would not mesh with a White House not keen on being perceived as initiating overseas U.S. military interventions.

Instead, what potentially begins to emerge is a more sustainable hybrid option—a robust version of the MSS, enhanced by a multilateral support structure provided by the UN Support Office in Haiti. And to the degree that Washington’s hopes for greater engagement from other key Western hemisphere actors pay dividends, this potentially also points to more productive roles for the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The latter organization was directly engaged in mediating last year's agreement towards a transitional governance arrangement in Haiti—the Traditional Presidential Council (TPC).

Coming in the wake of near silence on U.S. Haiti policy under the current administration, and the uninspiring record of the Biden administration, much now needs to happen to see positive results in the streets of Haiti, beginning with greater clarity in the U.S.-Haiti policymaking process. Although a low profile may be by design, outside of the presumed sensitivity to Haiti policy from the secretary of state, and a knowledgeable holdover from the previous administration (Barbara Feinstein) as deputy assistant secretary of state for the Caribbean and Haiti, it remains unclear who constitutes—the Haiti policy brain trust within the administration. One exception is the nomination of a new U.S. chargé d’affaires to Haiti earlier this year, Ambassador Henry Wooster, an experienced diplomat. His mandate appears to have been to assess the situation on the ground and report back to Washington. This occurred earlier this month, and one must presume that the decision to support a UN Support Office is related to that.

Sustained UN diplomacy is also required. Previous U.S. efforts to transition the MSS to a UN peacekeeping operation have run up against roadblocks from Russia and China. Their opposition has not been motivated by any principled stance regarding the situation in Haiti as much as the inclination to be unhelpful in a geopolitical environment where the United States has always been the key actor. Objectively, these are surmountable U.S. problems with a more dynamic UN diplomacy. Washington has probably not helped its own case by showing distaste for multilateralism, including cutbacks to U.S. funding to the UN and its key agencies and international peacekeeping efforts. Nor has the on-off nominations process for UN ambassador helped—first Representative Elise Stefanik, then abruptly withdrawn and replaced by then-head of the National Security Council, former Congressman Mike Waltz—which as of now remains in limbo.

In tandem, a more concerted effort toward the OAS (which has so far consisted mostly of highlighting U.S. frustrations with the institution) provides opportunities for a Haiti-related regional diplomacy. Recently installed secretary general, Albert Ramdin, faces a broadening set of political and budgetary headaches in his relations with the Trump administration. Nonetheless, the recently published 40-page OAS Haiti Roadmap does represent a plausible, if ambitious (and pricey) set of proposals—even if met with some doubt by Haitian stakeholders. But a process that draws from last year’s CARICOM mediation efforts leading to the formation of the TPC, now potentially incorporating the OAS, expands the concept of the crisis in Haiti as being a regional responsibility, not just a U.S. policy problem.

Much of Haitian society is conscious of the fact that the country is headed in the wrong direction, even if there is no consensus as to how to address this. While much of the focus has understandably been on Haiti’s expanding scope of national violence, there is a strong argument that an even more pressing issue is the challenge of an orderly political transition by February 2026 as outlined by the April 2024 transitional political agreement—which at present is hard to envision. Unfortunately, Haiti’s transitional governance structure continues to be undermined by severe internal political divisions, accusations of corruption against several of its members, a wobbly quarterly rotating leadership structure, and a Prime Minister who heads a somewhat invisible government. All of this begs for a much more energetic and effective TPC.

International receptivity to addressing Haiti’s crisis can probably be strengthened if clear proposals were to originate from the TPC itself, as opposed to waiting for international actors to articulate those proposals. The TPC’s new head, Laurent Saint-Cyr, is a respected member of Haiti’s private sector (which also includes the prime minister). This could offer an opportunity to approach U.S. political leadership with notions of a “deal,” a characterization that hopefully could outflank the U.S. perception of Haiti as only a “problem.” Such a “deal,” or package of ideas, could underscore attention to two challenges of immediate interest to Washington.

The first is a consolidation of what are, at this point, disjointed elements of Haiti’s security-related initiatives. This includes the need for renewal of the Kenya-led MSS, providing greater transparency to the agreements that have been signed by the TPC with foreign security contractors and how these contribute to an overall security strategy, and outlining greater operational coordination of the Haitian National Police and the small Haitian army capabilities.

The second would include an expansion of the existing CARICOM mediation efforts by including the OAS and looking beyond the immediate security challenges that will require paths towards governance solutions, including looking beyond February 2026.

The Trump administration’s announcement to move forward with a UN Support Office is a positive development, which, along with greater attention to the political and security crisis in Haiti, could begin to stabilize the country and provide a more propitious environment for an orderly political transition.

Georges Fauriol is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.