TWQ: Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan? - Spring 2011

April 1, 2011

On December 24, 1998, five Pakistani terrorists associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI)—a Pakistani jihadist organization—hijacked an Indian Airlines flight in Kathmandu with the goal of exchanging three Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails for the surviving passengers. Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitated the hijacking in Nepal. After a harrowing journey through Amritsar (India), Lahore (Pakistan), and Dubai (United Arab Emirates), the plane landed at Kandahar Air Field in Afghanistan, then under Taliban control. Under
public pressure, the Indian government ultimately agreed to the terrorists’ demands to deliver the three prisoners jailed in India. Both the hijackers and the terrorists who were released from prison
transited to Pakistan with the assistance of the ISI. Masood Azhar, one of the freed militants, appeared in Karachi within weeks of the exchange to announce the formation of a new militant group which he would lead, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM).

This incident dramatically underscores why New Delhi cannot take its eyes off of Afghanistan and the Taliban. JM quickly became one of the most vicious terrorist groups operating in India, and is one of many groups active in India that has long had ties to Afghanistan and the Taliban (it also has enjoyed support from the ISI), threatening vital Indian national security interests.

Less than three years after the hostage swap, the United States routed the Taliban and Hamid Karzai took the reins of Afghanistan’s interim government. On December 22, 2001, India’s Minister for External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, flew to Afghanistan to participate in Karzai’s inauguration and to re-open the Indian embassy, which closed on the eve of the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul in 1996. With the U.S.-led invasion after 9/11 and subsequent occupation, India has been able to steadily
re-establish its presence in Afghanistan while free-riding under the U.S. and NATO security umbrella. India, with its $1.2 billion pledged to Afghanistan, is the fifth largest bilateral donor and the most significant donor in the region. What willIndia do in Afghanistan? What are New Delhi’s current interests in Afghanistan, and does it have the means to achieve these goals? What are the consequences of its activities for India, Pakistan, and international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan?