The UN Prepares to Impose New Sanctions on North Korea
March 4, 2013
On February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted its third underground nuclear test. The test was met with harsh international criticism; it was condemned by the European Union, ASEAN, NATO, Russia, Japan, China, South Korea and many other countries. Meeting in emergency session, the UN Security Council promptly issued a nonbinding statement that “strongly condemned” the test and pledged to respond with “appropriate measures.” Negotiations are still underway with regard to how to respond to North Korea’s most recent provocation.
Q1: Is another UN Security Council Resolution likely?
A1: Based on past experience, the UNSC will pass a new resolution. UNSCR 1718 was adopted 5 days after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. That resolution marked the first time that the Security Council imposed economic and commercial sanctions on North Korea under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The targeted sanctions included an embargo on military and technological materials and luxury goods, as well as limited financial sanctions. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1874 18 days after Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, which imposed further sanctions on North Korea, including a ban on all financial assistance to North Korea except for humanitarian purposes, and on all weapons exports and most weapons imports by North Korea.
The most recently imposed UN Security Council resolution against North Korea was adopted 41 days after North Korea launched a long-range Unha-3 rocket on December 12, 2012. UNSCR 2087 tightened existing sanctions, naming new targets of the previously imposed travel ban and asset freeze. The Council also called on Member States to exercise “enhanced vigilance” in preventing the transfer of funds related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. It expressed the UN Security Council’s determination to take “significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test.”
Q2: What new steps could the UNSC take this time?
A2: The UN Security Council could expand the prohibition on the range of prohibited items to include all goods that could be used in a nuclear program and financial sanctions designed to restrict North Korea’s access to international financial markets could be further strengthened. Additional North Korean individuals and companies could be added to the sanctions black list. The arms embargo could be expanded by banning the export of small arms. The UN could authorize states to board and search vessels in international waters that are suspected of carrying illicit cargo, although this would conflict with some of the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and thus highly controversial.
Q3: What are the obstacles to adopting tougher sanctions at the UN Security Council? What are Chinese concerns regarding a more robust regime?
A3: Securing Chinese and Russian support is critical to the adoption of a more robust resolution at the UN Security Council. Both parties have so far proven unwilling to go as far as the United States and its allies in punishing North Korea for its provocations. For example, China and Russia voted in favor of resolutions 1718 and 1874, but neither would agree to make interdiction and cargo inspection mandatory. In response to North Korea’s failed April 2012 satellite launch, the United States and Japan reportedly submitted a list of 40 North Korean entities as possible targets of additional sanctions to the Security Council’s North Korea sanctions committee but Beijing would only consent to naming three.
China is likely to support a new UNSC resolution that imposes additional sanctions on North Korea. However, as in the past, it is only likely to support sanctions under Chapter 7, Article 41, which does not authorize the use of armed force, but permits steps such as interruption of economic relations and of “rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication.” Beijing will probably oppose sanctions under Article 42, which would permit the use of armed force, including blockades, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the Members of the UN, to enforce implementation. Russia is like-minded in its stance on this matter. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has publicly said that both his country and China have agreed that it is vitally important not to “allow the situation to be used as a pretext for military intervention.” If Moscow is willing to shield Pyongyang from tougher sanctions, it will be even more difficult to persuade Beijing to support them.
China fears that tightening sanctions on financial flows and authorizing UN-sanctioned interdictions of ships could result in domestic instability in North Korea or provoke Pyongyang to take retaliatory measures that could severely damage Sino-North Korean relations or cause an escalatory spiral of tensions on the Peninsula.
Q4: Was China’s reaction to the test stronger than in previous years?
A4: While China is undoubtedly angered by the February nuclear test, the official language used to condemn the test wasn’t as tough as the wording it used to criticize China’s first nuclear explosion. Immediately following the recent test, China’s foreign minister summoned the North Korean ambassador in Beijing, telling him that China was “strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed” to the test and urged North Korea to “stop any rhetoric or acts that could worsen situations and return to the right course of dialogue and consultation as soon as possible.” These are undeniably harsh words, but nonetheless milder than the official foreign ministry statement issued after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, which stated that North Korea had “ignored universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test.”
Q5: How has the Chinese public responded to the nuclear test, and will this impact Chinese decision-making?
A5: Small-scale protests against North Korea’s nuclear test were reported to have taken place in Beijing, Harbin, Hefei, Hengyang, Guangzhou and Shenyang. Chinese citizens who reside in provinces bordering North Korea have expressed concern about possible contamination of water and soil. Articles published in non-authoritative Chinese media have called on the Chinese government to curtail assistance to North Korea as punishment.
However, growing public frustration is unlikely to be a major factor in Chinese decision making toward North Korea. In contrast to Chinese policy toward Japan, where the leadership cannot ignore nationalistic calls for retribution, the impact of public opinion on policy making toward Pyongyang is likely to be marginal.
Bonnie Glaser is senior adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies and senior associate with the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Brittany Billingsley is a research associate and program coordinator for the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS.
Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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