Understanding Informal Norms: Politics and Community in Urban Ghana

In our third edition of Talking Urban Futures in Africa, Judd Devermont speaks with political scientist Jeffrey Paller about the politics of belonging in urban Ghana. They discuss three neighborhood types that make up the political fabric of Accra and note how “stranger” settlements can serve as examples of good governance when citizens mobilize around shared problems.

When it comes to outside actors in Accra and across the continent, Paller underscores the contentious role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly as they play into party politics and exacerbate existing cleavages. At the same time, the United States and other foreign governments should pay more attention to the informal norms and relationships that influence urban governance structures.

• Jeffrey Paller is an assistant professor and program director at the University of San Francisco. Specializing in African politics and sustainable urban development, Paller’s research examines the practice of democracy and accountability in urban Africa. He is the recent author of Democracy in Ghana: Everyday Politics in Urban Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

The discussion, moderated by Judd Devermont, has been edited for purposes of brevity and clarity.

JD: Jeff, your book illustrates the politics of belonging—who is a host, who is a stranger, and who is a squatter—and how these identities, coupled with land tenure, affect politics in urban Ghana. Can you walk us through this typology and some of the implications you uncover in your research?

JP: Sure. I wanted to understand differences across neighborhoods in Ghanaian cities, and I identified three distinct neighborhood types. First, I came across indigenous neighborhoods, where inhabitants claim to be the city’s original settlers. And throughout history, these populations have dictated who has lived on what street, which leaders have importance, and how resources are distributed. They have also shaped multiparty politics, like who has been able to become a member of parliament, and who has been able to become the local district assembly person. These individuals are often called “sons of the soil” in other contexts.

Then there are what I call stranger settlements, the neighborhoods where there's this long history of migrant settlement that really started during colonialism. People talk about the founding father of the neighborhood, the person who arrived there first. These neighborhoods have groups of people from all different places, but they all speak the same language, the language of Hausa, and are mostly Muslim. These areas, known as Zongos, exist everywhere across West Africa. They have historical importance.

Then, there are the squatter settlements. In some ways, they have some of the characteristics of Zongos but are less permanent. When I talked to people in the squatter settlements, these new and rapidly growing shack settlements, there was this sense of temporariness. People were still very connected to their rural homelands. Together, these three neighborhoods types shape the politics of the city.

JD: I am interested in the judgments you made about the stranger Zongo settlements, because it challenges some of the conventional wisdom around relationships between leaders and their followers and, in particular, the role of ethnicity.

JP: These settlements are often characterized as dangerous, disease-laden, criminal places. For those of you who have heard about the 419 scams in Nigeria, similar activity has happened in the Zongos. People who live in other neighborhoods often stigmatize Zongos as very dangerous. And I found that to be an inappropriate characterization. These neighborhoods actually provide a lens into how good governance can work, and how people can actually come together and solve problems by themselves when the state won't do it for them.

As you mentioned, ethnicity plays a role. These settlers come from different places—mostly from the north of Ghana, but also neighboring countries like Burkina Faso. But over time, they’re able to establish a sort of public sphere or at least a common sphere. And they start speaking the same language. Critically, they develop a governance structure with their own kind of ethnic leaders, ethnic headmen. These ethnic headmen are part of a more collaborative decisionmaking structure, which is not super hierarchical, but there is a sense of authority and unity. And I think both language and religion play a unifying role.

JD: It seems like there is such rich associational life in the Zongo communities. And some of the outcomes around governance are more inclusive because of this dynamic.

JP: Yes, absolutely. Individuals in Zongo settlements have been forced to take matters into their own hands without the help of the state while at the same time facing forced evictions and demolitions. The arrival of multi-party elections—as well as Ghana’s decentralization reforms of the 1980s—helped to strengthen the existing [political] frameworks within these settlements.

When economists and political scientists think about urban space, they often think of a mix of public, private, and common areas governed by a single municipal entity. But I find that the type of goods distributed depends on the type of neighborhood where people live. I find that the indigenous neighborhoods restrict governance, only admitting those who are members of their group. This is why I call it a “club space.” To be a politician, you have to be a member of the group of original settlers. In squatter settlements, politicians see this space as a way to advance their personal interests. These could be economic and political: politicians may prioritize the provision of services in order to make money and gain popular support, going on to win elections elsewhere in the country or at a higher administrative level.

JD: I found your provision index very revealing and a low-cost approach to think about public and private goods. Can you talk about the index, how you put it together, and what it told you about the various communities?

JP: I went to 150 different, very local spots in these neighborhoods and gathered data on the quality and distribution of goods. Early on, I noticed that I had to distinguish between the provision of goods and the management of goods, or how the neighborhoods themselves organize and maintain these goods. When comparing provision and management, you get very different answers and it tells us a very different story.

One of the things that we tried to do with the team of researchers I led was think of innovative ways to understand the management of goods. For example, one of the management indicators was assessing the smell of public toilets. Now this is slightly subjective, but this is something that really matters to people and would actually impact whether they would use that toilet or not. In addition, it is a record of how well it is maintained. Is the toilet paper or newspaper just thrown about, or is it well cleaned?

We also looked at public goods like water access, the cleanliness of sewers, and garbage collection, and created an index. We then ranked the different neighborhoods on these public goods. And there is a clear correlation across the different types of settlements. When you don't have the government providing sewer collection, for example, it is up to the communities to clean their own sewers, and it becomes a collective action problem. In the book, I used this descriptively to show the differences, but I think the World Bank and others could use the index to actually look at interesting correlations.

JD: The index says a lot about the political economy and can help guide other actors on how to navigate the space, or at least to start thinking about some of the challenges. You talk in your book about the role of NGOs. Can you explain how NGOs factor into urban life and politics in Ghana?

JP: NGOs are part of the political story. They may try hard to stay apolitical, but they get brought into local political rivalries in these neighborhoods. In my book, I try to be as objective as possible and simply explain what I witnessed, and it sometimes comes across as critical of certain NGOs. But the real point to be made is that we need to think about NGOs as political actors themselves, as economic actors, because people in these neighborhoods are relying on them to advance their own political and economic interests. Local leaders in these neighborhoods see NGOs, political parties, and religious organizations as ways to make money and gain a political following for themselves.

Sometimes perception is more important than the truth. The way that people perceive certain NGOs, the way that they think about the leaders of NGOs, can actually undermine the distribution of goods, the distribution of resources. Transparency and accountability of NGOs could help solve this problem. Clarifying where the money goes, how decisions are being made, and why certain people have relationships with the NGOs while others do not could really help.

JD: I want to talk about how the United States and other foreign governments engage in these spaces. What should be the guiding principles for governments that are trying to do more in addressing urban challenges?

JP: I think the first thing is understanding the informal norms, the informal relationships, that inform governance structures of these places. In addition, foreign governments should understand the political economy, how decisions are being made, how politicians are thinking about these spaces, how they’re treating them, and what economic of political advantages they are getting from the various spaces they are trying to develop or modernize. I think it's good to always be a skeptic when it comes to urban development. I mean, throughout history, we have examples of this in the United States. Every single urban development exercise has winners and losers. It becomes tricky for the U.S. government or development agencies who claim to be apolitical and not pick sides.

External stakeholders should also recognize that agendas shift due to the relationships between various government agencies engaged in the project. One of the big problems in urban areas is that the Ministry of Transport might not work well with the Ministry of Land, which might not work well with some Ministry of Urban Development, but they all need to work together. There have been some good initiatives to build capacity across these ministries, but they are largely political.

Finally, external stakeholders should stop trying to be so grand. These neighborhoods don’t need “slum upgrading”—a term I used in my book—where donors come in and build a whole new city with high-rises. That might be great in theory, but it doesn’t work in practice. But if we can fix up a small road and get people along that road to buy into the project, people will begin to see the benefits. And then after that, fix up another road, and slowly but surely the neighborhood becomes more planned. I don't like to use this metaphor of buying hearts and minds, but you're winning people’s trust, which is something that governments and foreign donors haven't done a great job of.

JD: Any final points?

JP: When looking at how cities function, we need to take into account how people think, feel, and act on a daily basis. Yes, technical and scientific advancement and planning is important. But I used to think that if you get the formal institutions right, then the daily behaviors will change. But that’s not necessarily the case. People have strong emotions, interests, and desires that are incredibly rational and that can get in the way of progress but can also facilitate positive change and growth. I think we should be paying attention to that as both social scientists, and as policymakers.

Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.