U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of the EU, EU3, and Non-EU European States

The various states that comprise the EU and non-EU Europe play a critical role in the competition between the US and Iran. Iran’s progress towards a nuclear weapons threshold capability, and evidence that it may be seeking to deploy nuclear armed missiles has led to enhanced policy coordination between leaders in the US and Europe. In the face of a growing Iranian threat, Western governments have stepped up their efforts, including strong economic sanctions, to pressure Iran to fully comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The role Europe plays is laid out in detail in a new analysis by CSIS entitled US and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of the EU, EU3, and non-EU European States. This analysis is available on the CSIS website at: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120305_Iran_Chapter_XI_Europe.pdf

It is part of the Burke Chair project analyzing US strategic competition with Iran funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation.

The analysis shows that the EU states—and particularly the EU3 (Britain, France, and Germany)—are America’s most consistent allies in seeking to roll back Iran’s nuclear efforts. Although the approach of EU and European states have differed from that of the US, disagreements with the US have focused more over tactics and timing than over the need to take strong steps to halt Iran’s progress towards nuclear weapons.

Britain and France also provide military support to the US and the Arab Gulf states.  While their force projection capabilities are limited and slowly dropping under the strain of budget reductions, British and French forces still play an important role in the Gulf and Red Sea, and their military advisors remain an influential factor in the competition between the US and Iran.

There are, however, important differences in approach and perspective. Many European nations are far more reluctant to risk the use of military forces than the US. Iran’s oil exports are important to several European states, in part because of easier credit terms and pricing. Additionally, most European states are less sympathetic to Israel than the US.

Iran has attempted to exploit these potential fault lines between the US and Europe. The Iranian leadership, and particularly President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, frequently state that Iran seeks partnership with Europe and tries to encourage Europe to pursue energy and trade deals that would separate it from the US.

Nevertheless, the US and EU approach to Iran has steadily converged since 2002, following the discovery of the Iran’s clandestine nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. In the years that have followed, the EU—under the leadership of EU3—began a series of negotiations to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment and provide greater transparency as to the purpose of its nuclear program.  After several years of failed bargains, EU negotiators gradually began to take a harder line toward Tehran, until the rhetoric and polices of European governments closely resembled those of the US.

The EU has unilaterally implemented punitive measures against the IRI’s defense and energy sectors. Working in partnership with the US as part of the P5+1 (comprised of the US, Britain, China, France, Russia, and Germany), the EU3 have supported UN sanctions and lobbied both non-Western members of the Security Council to approve of UN resolutions targeted at Iran’s nuclear program.

European countries outside the EU play a smaller role in US-Iranian competition. Their presence can be felt most strongly when they work to broker compromise between both parties, when they broadly track with the EU and by extension the US, or when they pursue opportunistic policies in opposition to the established order.

The EU, and the other European states that share its strategic views, remain committed to a dual track approach to Iran consisting of sanctions and incentives, but they have also largely sided with the US and resigned from mediating between the US and Iran. Experience has shown that US-EU unity presents a formidable challenge to Iran, while division provides the Islamic Republic space to advance its interests.

The new sanctions on Iranian oil imports that the EU agreed to in early 2012 have reinforced Europe’s status as an invaluable partner of the US. The EU states have both adapted to reflect US positions when they have proved valid, and played a role in persuading the US to see the merits of incentives and flexibility in dealing with Iran’s legitimate needs.

It is important to note, however, that US and European cooperation is centered around pursuing diplomatic options and sanctions. There is no unclassified indication that any discussions have taken place between the US and EU over preventive military options if diplomacy and sanctions fail, or what level of discussion may have taken place at a more restrictive level between the US and key allies like Britain and France. Many European states may not support, or may actively oppose, any shift to the use of force. Europe and NATO have actively begun to plan for missile defenses, but there has been little public discussion concerning the trade-offs involved in containing Iran, deterring a nuclear Iran, and options like “extended deterrence.”

The contents of the analysis are as follows:

EUROPEAN UNION   

Evolving US-EU Relations   

 

Political Cooperation Based on Mutual Interests   
Interdependent Economic Relations   
NATO and the EU Security Apparatus   
The Impact of European Arms Sales   

Evolving IRI-EU Relations   

IRI-EU Political Relations since 2000: A Decade of Decline   
IRI-EU Economic Relations   

COOPERATION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE   

THE EU3: BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY   

Britain and the Broader Role of Britain, France, and Germany in “The Six”   
Britain and Power Projection in the Gulf   
France and “The Six”   
France and Power Projection in the Gulf   
Germany and “The Six”   
Germany and Power Projection in the Gulf   

NON-EU EUROPE   

Switzerland   
Belarus   

IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY   

Other draft chapters and reports in this series include:

1. Introduction
2. Types and Levels of Competition - This chapter looks at the various arenas in which Iran and the U.S. compete for influence.
3. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - This chapter looks at Iran’s Military forces in detail, and the balance of forces in the Gulf Region.
4. Iran and the Gulf Military Balance II – This chapter looks at Iran’s Missile and Nuclear forces.
5. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Sanctions game: Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change - This chapter examines the impact of sanctions on the Iranian regime, Iran’s energy sector, and the prospects for regime change in Tehran.
6. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in the Gulf States and Yemen - This chapter examines the competition between the US, and Iran and how it affects Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman and Qatar.
7. The Outcome of Invasion: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq - This chapter examines in detail the role Iran has played in Iraq since 2003, and how the US has tried to counter it.
8. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Proxy Cold War in the Levant, Egypt and Jordan - This chapter examines US and Iranian interests in the Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Egypt and Syria.  The military balance is also analyzed.
9. The United States and Iran: Competition involving Turkey and the South Caucasus - This chapter analyzes the US and Iranian competition over influence in Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
10. Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan - This chapter examines the important role Iran plays in the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and how the US and Iranian rivalry affects Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
11. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of China and Russia - This chapter examines the complex and evolving relationships between China, Russia, Iran and the US.
12. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Competition Involving the EU, EU3, and non-EU European States - This chapter looks at the role the EU, and in particular the EU3, have played as the U.S.’s closest allies in its competition with Iran.
13. U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa - This chapter examines the extent and importance of the competition between the US and Iran in the rest of the world.