U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is likely to maintain its broad contours under a Harris or a Trump administration. The Harris and Trump teams share the view that China challenges and threatens the established international order, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States. “Managing” China or “winning” against China will be a top priority for the next U.S. administration, as intense U.S. competition with China will likely continue. On Taiwan, the first Trump administration showcased tremendous support for the island and will likely continue to strengthen Taiwan’s ability to resist Chinese coercion and defend itself. Similarly, Harris would likely continue the Biden administration’s deepening of relations with the island. These similar approaches have led some Chinese scholars to assess that “the China policies of a new Trump administration and a Harris administration will likely be strategically consistent.”
Major Differences between Harris and Trump
Beyond these similarities, Chinese and Taiwan experts have identified four major areas of potential differences between a Harris and a Trump administration: on economics and trade, Taiwan, U.S. commitments abroad and military alliances, and combating PRC influence in the United States.
- Economics and Trade: Chinese experts worry that a new Trump administration would significantly ramp up trade disputes and economic competition against China. This includes higher tariffs on Chinese products, more restrictions to prevent transfer of U.S. technology and knowledge to China, and increased strategic and economic decoupling. Under a Harris administration, Chinese experts expect continued but less dramatic increases.
- Taiwan: Experts are uncertain about Trump’s views on Taiwan—including the extent to which he supports China’s claims over the island. In particular, there is concern that Trump, unlike Harris, might negotiate with China on Taiwan to gain an overall U.S. advantage. But some PRC scholars believe that China may not be willing to accept U.S.-proposed deals, such as trading Taiwan for PRC economic concessions. Some in Taiwan note that even if Trump were to hold a summit on Taiwan with Chinese president Xi Jinping, there may not be much follow-through. Such engagement could have the same fate as Trump’s meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in 2019, which did not result in any significant breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korea relations.
- U.S. Commitments Abroad and Military Alliances: Whereas most experts believe that a Harris administration would largely strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships in line with the Biden administration’s efforts, the PRC recognizes the realist and isolationist strand within the Trump camp. Experts at China’s Fudan University assess that a new Trump administration would likely be more selective in sustaining U.S. commitments abroad and more careful in using military force abroad. Some PRC experts believe that Trump would be less willing to go to war with China over Taiwan or to defend any other U.S. ally or partner against China in a conflict. The minilaterals and latticework of relationships that the Biden team advanced may not be consistently maintained. Taiwan experts assess that Taiwan, like other U.S. allies and partners, would have to shoulder more responsibilities and contribute more financially under Trump.
- PRC Influence in the United States: Some in China fear that a new Trump administration might amplify the China threat in the United States and embrace more drastic measures to stem potential PRC influence, interference, and activities. The U.S. Department of Justice’s China Initiative during the first Trump administration is a prime example. PRC experts note that if the new Trump administration embraces such measures, it could lead to a more complete societal decoupling between the two countries and a more hostile environment in the United States for Chinese citizens, Chinese Americans, and Asian Americans in general.
The First 100 Days
China will reach out to whomever wins the U.S. presidential election to establish direct communications with President Xi. Although Chinese experts expect Harris to largely continue the Biden administration’s policies, they see her as lacking in foreign policy experience and as untested on the international stage. Although Trump is a known quantity for Beijing, China views him as unpredictable but welcomes some of his recent statements that suggest that he wants to have a relationship with and work with Xi. Regardless, Xi is likely to use direct diplomacy to seek agreements or principles for guiding U.S.-China relations, lay out China’s red lines, and make the case that the United States should adopt a different (less hostile) approach to China.
Initially, Beijing is likely to avoid proactive measures that directly target the United States. China will want to see how the new U.S. administration shapes up. But Xi has demonstrated strong PRC willingness to push back—the United States should expect China to retaliate against any new policies it does not like or views as hostile.
However, Beijing is likely to test the limits and willingness of the new U.S. leadership to support U.S. allies and partners in the region. Beijing will be cautious in doing so given uncertainty over how the new U.S. team will respond, China’s desire to prevent a rapid deterioration of relations with the United States, and the internal challenges Beijing faces. This testing could happen before or after the new U.S. president is inaugurated.
If Trump wins, there may be more incentives for China to be opportunistic and test the United States before he is inaugurated. China could, for example, significantly and temporarily increase coercive behavior in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. If Beijing is willing to partially de-escalate after Trump is in power, this could be cast as a win-win from Beijing’s perspective: China can advance its claims and interests at the end of the Biden administration, and the new Trump administration can demonstrate its ability to deter China, blaming any loss of ground on the Biden administration for failing to manage U.S.-China relations.
Similarly, Taiwan will take advantage of the period following the election but before the inauguration. Taipei may seek to arrange a phone call between President William Lai and the U.S. president-elect. There is precedent for Taiwan leaders to speak with U.S. presidents-elect but no precedent for Taiwan leaders to speak with sitting U.S. presidents. Taiwan is unlikely to significantly change course or policies, regardless of U.S. election results, but if Trump wins, Taipei will likely further emphasize how much it is contributing to the U.S. economy and jobs, how much more it is willing to spend on its defense, and the progress it is making on defense resilience. Under Lai, these efforts have already kicked into higher gear. To the extent that Taipei is worried that Trump might be willing to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip, Taipei is likely to intensify exchanges and ties with U.S. congressional leaders and potential Trump administration officials to ensure that they encourage Trump to continue to support Taiwan.
Recommendations
In the months before and after the next U.S. president is inaugurated, the United States should ensure that the leadership transition does not create openings for China to engage in provocative and opportunistic behavior. Both the Harris and Trump teams must be prepared to lead on day one, and potentially even before that. Although a new Trump team may not want to manage China until Trump is in office, the Trump team could make clear that any PRC provocations that emerge after a Trump win should be viewed as at least an indirect challenge to President Trump upon his return. To the extent possible, the Biden team should consider briefing or increasing engagement with Trump’s potential China or Asia advisers before the election.
With respect to Taiwan, the next U.S. president-elect should embrace the opportunity to directly communicate with President Lai before the inauguration and view that communication as a means to convey key U.S. priorities, not just to display support for the island. To the extent that the United States wants to push Taipei to invest more in defense, the new U.S. team should engage not only with Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party but also with the opposition parties—the Kuomintang and Taiwan People’s Party—which hold a majority in the island’s Legislative Yuan.
Bonny Lin is a senior fellow for Asian security and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
