The rising level of violence in Iraq is difficult to measure and interpret, but it presents a serious risk that Iraq could return to the level of civil conflict it experienced during the mid-2000s. A new analysis by the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS examines the patterns and trends in Iraqi violence since the departure of US forces at the end of 2011. It examines both the statistics on violence and their limits. It also examines the relative role of the Iraqi central government as a cause of such violence relative to the role and nature of violent non-state actors and extremist groups.
The study is entitled Violence in Iraq in Mid 2013: The Growing Risk of Serious Civil Conflict, and is available on the CSIS web site at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130822_iraq_violence.pdf.
The study finds that there are many serious challenges in analyzing the available data on Iraq and problems in estimating its level of violence, its causes, and the responsibility of given actors. The data are, however, good enough to warn that Iraq may be sliding back towards a level of civil conflict that will amount to a serious civil war.
The data also reflect the fact that violence is not simply the product of extremists and terrorist groups; Iraq’s growing violence also results from the fact that Iraq is in the midst of an ongoing struggle to establish a new national identity: an identity that one hopes can bridge across the deep sectarian divisions between its Shi’ites and Sunnis, as well as the ethnic divisions between its Arabs and its Kurds and other minorities.
Iraq does have great potential and its political divisions and ongoing low-level violence notwithstanding, Iraq can succeed in establishing stability, security, and a better life for its people. Iraq cannot succeed, however, by ignoring the problems it faces, failing to address increasing internal violence, and denying the responsibility of its current political leaders to take on the challenges it faces.
Improving the quality and focus of Iraqi efforts at counterterrorism and internal security is a key priority, but Iraq cannot end its violence through force or repression. Iraq’s leaders must build a new structure of political consensus. They must build an effective structure of governance, and social order that sharply reduces the problems caused by the problems it currently faces, including dictatorship, war, sanctions, the lingering effects of occupation, and a burgeoning civil conflict that began in the 1970s and has continued ever since.
Iraq must also deal with deep underlying problems. It must cope with a steadily growing population, and diversify an economy that is so dependent on petroleum exports that they provide some 95% of its government revenues. If left unaddressed, Iraq’s escalating violence and ongoing governance issues will continue to strain the country, contribute to new rounds of serious civil conflict, and could potentially divide the country along ethnic and sectarian lines.
Table of Contents and Summary of Figures:
INTRODUCTION 2
THE CHALLENGES THAT SHAPE IRAQ’ VIOLENCE 5
Figure One: US Census Bureau Estimate of the Growing Demographic Pressures on Iraq 12
IRAQ’S CONTINUING LEVELS OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE 13
The Underlying Patterns of Violence 13
The Problems in Analyzing Iraqi Violence 13
Reassurance vs. Rising Violence 14
Measuring Trends Rather than Absolute Numbers 15
The Rise in Violence in 2012-2013: How Much is Too Much? 16
Casualty Estimates through 2012 23
Figure Two: Iraqi Ministries (Color) vs. Iraq Body Count (Gray) Estimate of Trends in Casualites: 1 Jan 2011-30 December 2012 25
Figure Three: Iraqi Body Count Estimate of Trends in Casualties: 2003-2013 26
Figure Four: Recent Trends in Casualties: “The Country Remains in a State of Low-Level war Little Changed Since Early 2009” 27
Figure Five: NCTC data on Total Victims (Killed, Injured, Kidnapped) In Iraq and recent Trends in Civilian Victims, 2005-2011 28
Figure Six: Bombings and Shootings Remained the Key Killing Mechanisms through 2012 29
Figure Seven: Consistent Trend Data Do Not Exist, But Army and Police Remain Key Targets 30
Figure Eight: The Impact of Internal Conflict on Smaller Minority Groups 2003-2011 31
Figure Nine: Arrests on Terrorism Charges (1/14/2012-4/10/2012) 33
Figure Ten: Selected Acts of Apparent Targeted Violence, 1/11/2012–4/10/2012 34
Figure Eleven-Part 1: SIGIR Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 35
Figure Eleven-Part 2: SIGIR Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 36
Figure Twelve– Part 1: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 37
Incidents During January 2012 37
Figure Twelve– Part 2: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 38
Incidents During February 2012 38
Figure Twelve– Part 3: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 39
Incidents During March 2012 39
Figure Twelve– Part 4: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 40
Incidents During April 2012 40
Figure Twelve– Part 5: AKE Estimates of Patterns of Violence By Quarter 41
Incidents During May 2012 41
Figure Thirteen: Iraqi Body Count Estimates of Patterns of Violence by Province in 2012 42
The 2013 Surge in Violence 43
Figure Fourteen: The US State Department Estimates that Iraq Ranks Second Among the Top Ten Centers of Terrorist Activity in 2012 46
Figure Fifteen: Iraqi Body Count Estimate of Trends in Casualties: 2010-2013 47
Figure Sixteen: UNAMI Estimate of Iraqi Killed and Injured November 2012-July 2013 – Part One 48
Figure Sixteen: UNAMI Estimate of Iraqi Killed and Injured November 2012-July 2013 – Part Two 49
STATE ABUSES OF POWER VERSUS THE CONTINUING ROLE OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS 50
The Threat of Extremist Non-State Actors 54
SIGIR reports 55
US State Department Annual Report on Terrorism, and the Annual calendar of the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 56
Figure Seventeen: US Official State Department and NCTC reports on Terrorist Threats and State Sponsors of Terrorism in or Near Iraq: 58
AL-QA’IDA IN IRAQ 58
SYRIA 60
ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES 61
ANSAR AL-ISLAM 61
IRAN 62
KATA’IB HIZBALLAH 64
KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY 64
KONGRA-GEL (KGK) - formerly the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, PKK 65
Syrian Spillover & al Qa’ida’s Iraqi-Syrian Merger 66
Figure 17: IBC Estimate of Iraq Bombings and Attacks between August 1-18, 2013 70
Other recent studies that deal with the trend in Iraq include Changing U.S. Strategy: The Search for Stability and the “Non-War” Against “Non-Terrorism,” available on the CIS web site at: http://csis.org/publication/search-stability-and-non-war-against-non-terrorism
