Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s newest president, was inaugurated on October 20. He won the country’s 2024 elections on a campaign focused on playing up his gemoy persona—as a jovial older uncle and cat-lover. This was a far cry from his previous two presidential campaigns in 2014 and 2019, where he had unsuccessfully tried to appeal to voters as a tough, military strongman. While Prabowo’s recent success may be attributed to his toned-down image, the transformative role of political “buzzers” in pushing Prabowo’s transformation, and shaping the results of Indonesia’s 2024 elections, cannot be understated.
Buzzers are recruited individuals managing fake social media profiles, which amplify political messages to influence and manipulate public opinion under clients’ orders. Most political buzzers are employees of professional agencies, offering services tailored to mimic organic social media activity, such as posts, likes, views, and customizable comments. These services are often openly advertised on Instagram or e-commerce sites like Shopee.
Such services are neither new nor unique to Indonesia. Yet, the societal entrenchment and increasingly sophisticated tactics of buzzer usage in Indonesian political culture are noteworthy. These factors bear concern for the democratic deterioration, spread of dis/misinformation, and decreasing public trust in the world’s third-largest democracy. Increased social media governance and the promotion of responsible tech regulations are critical in combating the usage of buzzers in Indonesia, lest Indonesia’s current turn toward authoritarianism continues.
Origins and implications of buzzer culture in Indonesia
Buzzers for hire have long existed in Indonesia, initially serving as a commercial marketing tool to generate favorable public opinion—from endorsing new products, to boosting a restaurant’s reviews. Indonesia’s buzzer culture took on a political spin in the wake of the highly contested 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Then-candidate Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s campaign volunteers capitalized on the rise of social media usage among Jakarta’s urban, middle-class voters to flood social media with pro-Jokowi messaging, resulting in eventual victory.
The subsequent 2014 presidential campaign featured a more professional approach by both candidates, Jokowi and Prabowo, with the burgeoning use of hired public relations and buzzer agencies. Beyond promotion of their respective candidates, social media campaigns focused heavily on conjuring up ostensibly organic social media posts, memes, and infographics for kampanye hitam, or “black” smear campaigns, against opponents.
By the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, buzzers were firmly entrenched as an integral aspect of Indonesian electoral politics. The election marked a significant escalation in the use and impact of buzzers on political discourse: all candidates employed buzzer teams to amplify campaign messaging, while buzzer activity heavily contributed to heightened social, religious, and political polarization. The election pit Chinese Christian incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, against Muslim opponents. A targeted disinformation campaign by an army of buzzers featuring manipulated clips of a campaign trail speech by Ahok referencing verses from the Quran eventually contributed to his defeat and imprisonment on blasphemy charges.
Buzzers, unlike typical influencers, mislead by posing as legitimate users, interspersing their political messaging with spurious personal posts. They also often act in tandem with influencers and bots as part of a coordinated ecosystem, such as by amplifying influencer posts through views and likes, while bots boost hashtags initiated by buzzers. Buzzers may have connections to traditional media outlets, sometimes paying to secure favorable news coverage for their clients. The use of buzzers distorts Indonesia’s information landscape and hampers the organic discourse critical for democracy.
Leading up to Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, the hashtag #SkandalSandiaga attacking vice presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno proliferated on Twitter. A social network analysis by domestic counter-disinformation company Media Kernels identified a network of bots and buzzers driving the hashtag’s uptick in the smear campaign.
Buzzing has morphed into a lucrative industry for Indonesians, particularly youth. It offers a semblance of job security in a country with a 13.9 percent unemployment rate, especially during peak periods like elections. Some buzzer agency owners frame their businesses as entrepreneurial ventures and digital marketing agencies—a testament to how deeply normalized the practice has become. The manipulation of public opinion, by working-class citizens to serve the elite, highlights the cruel irony of Indonesia’s democratic erosion—empowering the disadvantaged while fueling their disenfranchisement.
Buzzers, pervasive in Indonesia’s crowded digital space, also manipulate public opinion by silencing criticism and spreading false narratives, posing concerns for Indonesia’s democracy. Once confined to elections, their use is now standard practice for hot-button issues, with politicians sometimes openly acknowledging and justifying their use. This practice impacts not just domestic politics but also foreign policy, public health, and security, as seen in efforts to promote COVID-19 policies, sway international opinion on West Papuan independence, and discredit Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) investigators as Muslim fundamentalists.
Indonesia’s 2024 elections
On February 14, Indonesians selected a new president and vice-president, parliament, and local legislators in the world’s largest single-day election. Regional elections to elect governors, mayors, and district heads were held on November 27. Courting the youth vote—particularly through social media—became a cornerstone of these elections, with almost 60 percent of the electorate consisting of Generation Z and Millennial voters and 22.8 percent being first time voters.
In an era characterized by the ubiquity of social media, this year’s electorate was more susceptible than ever to political messaging from buzzers. A 2023 survey found that 42.3 percent of respondents believed in some disinformation about the 2024 elections, such as foreign interference. The use of buzzers and misinformation were instrumental in electing Prabowo, allowing him to sanitize criticism such as his past human rights record and the controversial court ruling that allowed Jokowi’s son to run as Prabowo’s vice-president. The viral videos of Prabowo dancing, appealing AI-generated cartoon avatars, and historical retellings of his military days all helped radically engineer Prabowo’s new image, never mind his previous visa ban by the United States for military atrocities.
Confronting buzzer culture: paths to reform and accountability
The Indonesian government has taken steps to combat buzzers. These include task forces organized by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics that collaborate with digital platforms such as Meta, Google, and TikTok to monitor and prevent the spread of disinformation. The government is also working with non-profit organizations such as MAFINDO, which conduct fact-checking, public education, and advocacy work to strengthen digital literacy. Plans have also been announced to revamp the existing Electronic Information and Transactions law to boost cybersecurity robustness.
There are also heartening grassroots efforts to shore up information transparency and healthy political discussion. Youth-led social media initiatives such as What Is Up Indonesia and Bijak Memilih encourage increased youth engagement and interest in Indonesian politics through clear, accurate, and timely information. The Cek Fakta network comprises 6,000 fact-checkers with around 25 media organizations dedicated to combating misinformation.
While commendable, these efforts and initiatives achieve little against the government’s ongoing complicity and its selective focus on addressing only the misinformation and buzzer usage that challenge its interests. Furthermore, they are inadequate in combating the pervasiveness of buzzers in Indonesian politics without government acknowledgement of its democratic implications.
Indonesia’s buzzer culture holds disturbing ramifications for U.S. interests. Concerns over Indonesia’s democratic backsliding have burgeoned over the years, particularly under former president Jokowi, who weakened democratic norms and institutions and consolidated his power to advance his own interests. Prabowo swept to power in part due to these conditions, with Jokowi’s tacit support. The societal fragmentation, tension, eroded public trust, and weakened democratic processes in which buzzer culture perpetuates are all antithetical to the advancement of the democratic norms championed by the United States.
Indonesia’s struggle with digital governance and disinformation are echoed around Southeast Asia. Data governance regimes across the region are highly disparate, and policies initiated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—such as the forthcoming Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) and Framework on Digital Data Governance—are expected to be non-binding with no enforcement mechanisms. While this offers the opportunity for greater U.S involvement to promote transparency, accountability, and norms setting, it is likely that such initiatives may meet resistance or a lukewarm response.
The poor regulation and governance of digital platforms in the United States also means that Washington is ill-equipped to act as a leader on these issues. The United States has struggled domestically with enacting robust digital governance laws, like a comprehensive federal data privacy law equivalent to the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. It also lacks a cohesive federal framework to combat disinformation, resulting in a patchwork system of state laws and voluntary guidelines from social media companies.
Furthermore, a largely reactive regulatory approach in the United States regarding disinformation is an obstacle for U.S. leadership in digital governance. First Amendment protections often constrain efforts, limiting the government's ability to regulate speech and hindering policymakers from implementing pre-emptive measures.
Their ubiquity means that the Indonesian public expects the involvement of buzzers in any public discourse or government communications, and are resigned to having buzzers as an inevitable facet of Indonesian politics. Beyond the warping of accurate information, the most tragic ramification of buzzer culture is its unsaid harm to the freedom of expression and healthy political discussions of the Indonesian public, who deserve transparency, accountability, and better from their elected government.
Natania Seah is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.