Failure to Launch: Russia’s Stalled Pivot to the Indo-Pacific

While undeniably a Pacific power by geography, Russia’s ability and willingness to exercise influence in the region has been in question in recent decades. Recognizing Asia’s growing economic importance as well as the strategic weakness of Russia’s eastern flank, President Vladimir Putin declared Russian intentions to turn to Asia at the 2012 Indo-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Vladivostok. In the ensuing years, through a myriad of economic, diplomatic, and particularly defense arrangements, Moscow quietly positioned itself as a third power in the Indo-Pacific—a new option amid the increasingly bipolar rivalry between Beijing and Washington. 

Yet for all its efforts, the return has been minimal. Thirteen years later, Russia remains dwarfed by the United States and China in security and economic influence, a trend that has been further cemented by the material demands and diplomatic marginalization stemming from the war in Ukraine. For all its investments in the Indo-Pacific, it would appear Moscow has reaped few benefits.

Expectations

The economic pillar of Moscow’s pivot was developed as an alternative to its European dependence following the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Russian foreign trade with the Indo-Pacific grew from 26 percent of all foreign trade in 2013 to 33.3 percent in 2021. Alongside this modest growth, Russia has been at the forefront of regional energy projects, with companies operating with both Vietnam and Indonesia. This was complemented by new development schemes with China and Japan as Putin sought the development of the Russian Far East to facilitate Moscow’s involvement in the Pacific arena. 

On the security side, the Russian Pacific Fleet (RUSPAC) has spent the last decade modernizing from its post-Soviet decline. While the war in Ukraine has drawn resources from all aspects of the Russian military, including marine assets from RUSPAC, most of the fleet has been left untouched and been allowed to continue modernization. After 2025, RUSPAC is expected to retire all Soviet-era ships while continuing to develop ocean-going vessels and modern submarines. 

Beyond the build-up of RUSPAC, Russia has continued its active security diplomacy. Since its pivot, Moscow has conducted over 100 military exercises with China alone, with the most recent being Northern United-2024 held in the Sea of Japan. Beyond China, Russia held an ASEAN-wide exercise in 2021, and has drilled with the navies of Myanmar, India, Thailand, Malaysia, and most recently Indonesia. Joint exercises have been paired with arm sales, with states like Vietnam and Indonesia entering deals with Moscow despite the threat of Western sanctions. 

Russia has mounted successful diplomatic offensives in Southeast Asia as well. Under Russia’s chairmanship, BRICS welcomed Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam as official partners, with Indonesia having since ascended to full membership. Putin's visit to Vietnam alongside Russia’s increasingly vocal role within ASEAN further reinforces the importance of the pivot to an isolated Moscow.

Reality

On paper, these steps would seem to bode well in terms of establishing Russia as a third option for regional states looking to avoid taking sides between China and the United States. But when compared with the investments of others in the region over the same period, Moscow’s efforts start to look underwhelming. And under increasing pressure from the West in response to the invasion of Ukraine, many opportunities to deepen regional influence have dried up just when Moscow needs them most.

Even before its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia had struggled to match the influence of China and the United States in Southeast Asia. As of 2023, Russia ranks 10th as a source of FDI and trade value, well behind China, the United States, Japan, and European partners. Economic returns for Russia have also fallen short of expectations. Decades of development programs with China were expected to modernize Russia’s Far East and give Moscow the infrastructure necessary to execute its pivot. Instead, the first program concluded in 2018 with only 15 of 91 projects in the implementation phase. This lackluster performance seems to have been repeated with the 2018-2024 development program, with the Far East still underdeveloped while Russian trade in the region has declined since 2012 with all partners save for China.

Russia has also found the limits of its energy diplomacy. Russia’s Rosneft has been facing increasing scrutiny over delays in its promised funding for the Turban grassroot refinery project in Indonesia. A joint venture with Jakarta’s state-owned oil company PT Pertamina, promised funding from Rosneft has been delayed for months on end due to sanctions related to the Ukraine conflict, causing the Indonesian government to consider new investors. Exporting energy products has also proven difficult, with Russia’s state-owned natural gas company Gazprom reporting continued losses in revenue. The discount prices Russia is forced to sell at in Asia make the region a poor replacement for Europe, with the lack of infrastructure for transportation and refining ultimately leaving Russia unprepared to complete an energy market pivot. 

Even in the security sector where Russia has historically enjoyed strong relationships in the region, room for cooperation and influence is starting to dry up. Russian arms exports to traditional partners India and Vietnam have fallen significantly as both look toward arms diversification. While the modernization of RUSPAC and Russian participation in joint exercises and defense conferences in the region will ensure Moscow remains a security player, little headway has been made otherwise. The Philippines has drawn close to the United States, while the rest of maritime Southeast Asia has adopted a hedging strategy between Beijing and Washington. Moscow is increasingly seen as aligned with Beijing, leading its naval deployments and political offensives to be viewed as an extension of this alignment, if not outright threatening.

Cumulatively, these developments suggest that Russia has failed to establish itself as a reliable third option in the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it seems that Russia’s relationship with the region has become increasingly dependent on China. With Moscow and the region at large failing to connect on investments, security ties, and political commitments, Beijing has stepped in to fill the vacuum. Even so, it remains to be seen whether this pattern of cooperation will prove to be a lasting one—or whether Russia will ever succeed in achieving a more diversified set of relations in the Indo-Pacific.

Leon Cao is a former research intern with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.