Photo: Tr3/Adobe Stock
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. will visit Japan between February 8 and 12 to meet with Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida. For the leaders, the meeting will serve as a chance to synchronize their security partnership and defense strategy. At the very least, it will offer a venue for each to convey their country’s top priorities. For observers, the meeting will be a bellwether, indicating the direction and scope of Japanese-Philippine security cooperation.
In Tokyo, Marcos and Kishida will likely build on the last decade of partnership by announcing progress on equipment exchanges, joint exercises and training, or defense agreements. The visit may not transform the partnership overnight, but it will lay the groundwork. Additional equipment transfers appear one likely outcome. Marcos and Kishida may announce that Japan will transfer additional multi-role response vehicles to the Philippines. Additionally, they may expand humanitarian and disaster relief exercises, with an eye toward Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) negotiations between their respective foreign and defense ministers and secretaries.
Equipment Exchange
Since the Aquino administration, Manila and Tokyo have recognized the necessity of responding to Chinese revisionism on their own terms—through developing maritime capability. Over the last decade, Japanese-Philippine diplomacy has delivered results in agreements, equipment, and joint military exercises.
The countries elevated relations to a Strengthened Strategic Partnership and brokered an agreement for defense equipment and technology in February 2016. Through the agreement, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces leased five TC-90 aircraft to help the Philippines patrol disputed territory in May 2016. In August of the same year, Japan also delivered the first of ten multi-role response vessels (MRRVs) through an official development assistance loan. The Duterte administration put the 2016 agreement to good use, importing additional MRRVs and $113 million in long-range air surveillance radar systems.
In October 2022, Mitsubishi announced it had completed the first fixed radar system, and the Japanese Embassy in the Philippines initiated the transfer. The Philippines will receive two more fixed systems as well as the J/TPS-P14, a mobile S-band radar with a range of 400 kilometers. The systems will enable the Philippines to track incursions into their exclusive economic zone and territory in the South China Sea. The Philippine government might learn from the example of the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) by cataloging Chinese intrusions over time. The radar transfer holds as much symbolic value for Japan as it does functional value for the Philippines, as it marks Japan’s first and only major defense export since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe relaxed the Three Arms Export Ban in 2014.
Following Prime Minister Abe’s example, Liberal Democratic Party lawmakers now intend to review the ban in order to facilitate Japanese defense exports. According to one government source, the Japanese government also plans to revise the ban’s implementation guidelines this spring. As promised in Japan’s December 2022 National Security Strategy, revisions aim to “promote [the] smooth transfer of defense equipment and technology of high security significance.” If enacted, amendments would likely expedite and expand defense imports for partners like the Philippines, who would no longer have to rely exclusively on the ODA loan transfer process.
As the MRRV case demonstrates, the Philippines has inherited assets from the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Looking ahead, Japan’s assets today might be the Philippines’ tomorrow. In that way, current Japanese equipment might preview future Philippine capability. Consider the long-term potential of surveillance technology transfer. In October 2022, the Japan Coast Guard launched its “SeaGuardian” UAV, which is capable of round-the-clock surveillance. The JCG praised the technology’s ability to monitor intrusions and assist in disaster relief—critical needs for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Surveillance is one area where the Philippines might inherit trickle-down capability from Japan over the long-term.
But it is not the only opportunity. In its 2022 National Defense Strategy, the Japanese Ministry of Defense outlined how it will reinforce air and missile defense capabilities and acquire additional unmanned assets by FY2027. If it is not possible for the Philippines to independently acquire asymmetric capability in the short-term, the country should press Japan for transfers of relevant technologies over the medium- to long-term.
Military Exercises and Visits
Concurrently, the countries have ramped up joint military exercises and training. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force participated in the U.S.- and Philippine-organized Kamandag exercises in 2021 and 2022. Likewise, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force joined the United States and Philippines for the SamaSama exercises in both years, focusing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Finally, during SAPPHIRE22 in late October and early November, the PCG trained with counterparts from Japan and the United States. The three coast guards continue to hold three to four trainings each year.
Japan and the Philippines also cooperate independently of the United States. In July 2021, Japanese and Philippine air forces held inaugural joint exercises focused on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In another first, two Japanese fighters landed in the Philippines in December 2022—evidence of strengthening military cooperation, according to the commanding general of the Philippine Air Force.
Bilateral Diplomacy
Consistent diplomacy has enabled cooperation on equipment transfer and exercises. In October 2021, the Japanese and Philippine foreign ministries held the Fourth Maritime Dialogue, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Philippines-Japan Strategic Partnership. To commemorate the occasion, the foreign and defense ministers launched an annual two-plus-two dialogue. The two-plus-two will institutionalize cooperation and compel bureaucratic action. It will also serve as a venue for the Philippines and Japan to recognize shared interests and advance practical initiatives.
The two-plus-two joint statement provides a blueprint for the partnership, outlining motivations and methods. Specifically, it articulates how the countries will expand equipment transfers and training exercises. Likewise, the sixth point serves as a standing Philippine invitation for Japanese equipment and technology transfers. The seventh covers motivations, summarizing Japanese and Philippine interests in the East and South China Seas.
The April 2022 Foreign and Defense Ministerial reaffirmed the trajectory and rationale for defense cooperation. It also produced concrete administrative progress. The countries agreed to pursue a Reciprocal Access Agreement, which would facilitate the provision of supplies and future exercises.
The countries’ bureaucracies have signaled steadfast commitment. Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi in particular has voiced Japan’s commitment time and again. The same day as Marcos Jr.’s inauguration, Hayashi stressed that “it is essential to beef up relations with the Philippines in the fields of security and maritime safety.”
The July 2022 phone call between Foreign Ministers Enrique Manalo and Hayashi dispels any doubt on the trajectory of the relationship. Hayashi not only reaffirmed Japanese commitment to boost the security partnership but also specified that Japan remains committed to building the capacity of the PCG. And immediately after the ministers agreed on additional exercises between armed forces, Hayashi voiced his strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas. The sequencing implied a linkage between Japanese-Philippine cooperation and the challenge posed by China.
Marcos and Kishida: Aligned Interests, Complementary Capabilities
The leaders are as aligned as their bureaucracies. Marcos Jr. has repeatedly expressed support for the modernization of the PCG, calling it “frontline” in the defense of the country’s territory and exclusive economic zone. He has also repeatedly stressed that his administration will prioritize the country’s sovereignty. For his part, Kishida expressed his hope to take the strategic partnership to new heights when he congratulated Marcos Jr. on his election victory.
Japan and the Philippines not only align on interests, but they also complement one another’s capabilities. Japan has the equipment, technology, and know-how that the Philippines needs. The Philippines remains willing to stand its ground against Chinese coercion in the South China Sea—where Japan has vital interests, but not the military authority to advance them. Japan could not directly respond to Chinese coercion in the South China Sea due to constitutional constraints on the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. As a result, Japan has strengthened Philippine deterrence capability in support of its own vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Japan has leveraged security cooperation with the Philippines to contest China’s nine-dash line and press its own line of advantage.
The Marcos-Kishida Meeting and Beyond
This month, a Philippine president committed to maritime strength will meet a Japanese prime minister intent on enhancing his country’s role in regional security. The backdrop for their meeting is nearly a decade of accelerating cooperation. When they first met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, they agreed to strengthen security cooperation and planned the state visit. Now, the leaders will likely announce concrete progress on equipment, exercises, or negotiations. An MRRV announcement appears one likely candidate. First, Philippine leaders have signaled their interest. Marcos Jr. aims to secure additional vessels during the visit, according to one adviser. Likewise, Admiral Artemio Abu also previewed that the Philippines will request that Japan provide five additional vessels to the PCG and assist with the construction of a new headquarters, following his meeting with Japan International Cooperation Agency President Akihiko Tanaka on January 20. Second, doubling down on vessel transfers would serve both sides’ interests. For Marcos Jr., the outcome would show follow-through on his campaign promises to modernize the PCG. For Kishida, it would provide early and tangible evidence that his administration will live up to its National Security Strategy. Likewise, Marcos Jr. and Kishida may expand joint drills in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a stepping stone toward finalizing a reciprocal access agreement and acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.
Alignment and consistent diplomacy will continue to deliver concrete progress in equipment exchanges, exercises, and agreements. The Marcos-Kishida meeting will mark yet another step forward.
Mike Tiernan is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.