A Pawn in the U.S.-China Chess Game? Why the U.S. Approach in Southeast Asia is Problematic

Emerging in the Trump administration and continuing through the Biden administration, U.S.-China competition has become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Under the Trump administration, the term “great power competition” was used to describe U.S.-China relations. After Trump left the White House in 2021, the Biden administration took further steps toward formalizing this framework. During the U.S.-China Summit in November 2022, Biden openly admitted to China’s president Xi Jinping that the two countries are in competition, emphasizing that the United States would continue to enhance U.S. strength at home and abroad.

The expansion of Chinese investment into neighboring developing countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, aims to widen Beijing’s sphere of influence. As such, Southeast Asia has emerged as a strategically important region to the United States. Although balancing China is an important part of U.S. national interests, the United States should not let China dictate its course of action. Notably, a U.S catch-up game, paired with faulty political rhetoric, significantly undermines Washington’s influence in Southeast Asia. Such flawed foreign policy stems from a competition-driven approach that strips away agency from Southeast Asian countries, preventing the United States from creating holistic partnerships in the region.  

Why the “Competition” Framework Is at Fault

Placing Southeast Asia against the backdrop of U.S.-China competition results in ineffective engagement strategies, significantly undermining support for the United States among Southeast Asian publics. 

A “competition” mindset incentivizes the United States to shape its economic, security, and diplomatic cooperation in Southeast Asia to counter China’s efforts in the region. To strengthen economic ties in the region, the United States encourages foreign investment in sectors that China dominates. After Donald Trump called for more investment in infrastructure in his National Security Strategy, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act in 2018. This bill creates a framework for private sector infrastructure investment, seeking to counter China’s global infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the BUILD Act promised $60 billion in development funding across the Global South, actual investments thus far have been significantly lower. Under the BUILD Act, the United States invested only $8.5 billion in the Indo-Pacific in 2023, a significant disparity compared to China’s economic presence in Southeast Asia alone. In 2022, BRI investment in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states reached $18.6 billion, more than double U.S. commitments in the region. Although Washington may wish to invest more in sectors like critical minerals and infrastructure, it is difficult for the United States to do so. China can direct capital to major infrastructure projects abroad through state-owned enterprises, which allows the government to focus investments on its desired projects. Meanwhile, the United States cannot force private companies to invest based on the government’s needs. Therefore, it is doubtful that disbursement of the United States’ funding in Chinese-dominated sectors would work to counter China’s influence.

Moreover, in recent years, the United States has largely focused its diplomatic efforts toward countries that are strategically important vis-à-vis China. In this sense, the United States pays significant attention to Vietnam and the Philippines due to both countries’ ongoing tensions with China in the South China Sea. Although engaging with countries in strategic locations is necessary, only ramping up diplomatic efforts to match China when Beijing steps up its own activities may not create sustainable partnerships. Washington notably did not reinforce ties with Cambodia until the prolonged deployment of two Chinese vessels in Ream naval base raised concerns about China’s permanent military presence in Cambodia. Two months after the reports from Ream, U.S. secretary of defense Lloyd Austin paid a visit to Cambodia, testing the waters on China-Cambodia relations. 

This approach is problematic as U.S. strategic interests are defined by those of China. Given China’s unpredictable foreign policy, the United States cannot know in advance which countries or regions will fall under China’s orbit in the future. It will also be ineffective for the United States to only start meaningful engagements with a country after China has already consolidated its influence. This catch-up game can also be seen in the Pacific Islands, a region that Washington has long overlooked. Amid concerns about the region’s increasing links with China, the United States has made up for its absence with increasing diplomatic presence and economic cooperation. Despite recent efforts, some Pacific leaders still view the United States unfavorably, condemning Washington for being disingenuous in its engagements with the region. Similarly, this catch-up strategy, fueled by a “competition” mindset, can also bring more harm than good to U.S. credibility in Southeast Asia.

Viewing Southeast Asia mostly in the context of U.S.-China competition is also harmful to public and elite support for the United States in the region. Then-deputy prime minister of Singapore Lawrence Wong emphasized in 2023 that ASEAN does not want to take sides, expressing his wish to grow ties with both the United States and China. In 2023, 76 percent of Southeast Asian elites surveyed by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute expressed concerned that ASEAN member states could be used as major power proxies amid competition. Therefore, perpetuating a U.S.-China rivalry narrative while discussing U.S. engagements in Southeast Asia feeds into this fear. This narrative also hinders support from Southeast Asian publics as it strips away agency and sovereignty from Southeast Asian states, raising perceptions that regional countries are just pawns in the U.S.-China geopolitical chess game.

Moving Away from the U.S.-China Competition Framework: A Toolkit

In refraining from the “competition” mindset, the United States could better foster a well-rounded U.S.-ASEAN partnership to advance its soft power in the region. The United States must establish more holistic economic and diplomatic engagements with countries in the region. Instead of reactive policy that hinges on China’s strategic interests and attempting to best China in its own comfort zone, U.S. economic activities in the region should play to U.S. competitive advantages. By redirecting investments in infrastructure and critical minerals toward U.S.-dominated sectors such as AI, semiconductors, high-value-chain technology, and financial services, the United States can establish unique specialties without compromising its economic ties with Southeast Asia. The United States should also trust its long-standing allies to lead investments in the sectors that it falls behind China. For instance, Japan specializes in infrastructure investments while the European Union pioneers in green development. 

Furthermore, U.S. diplomatic presence is currently insufficient in Southeast Asia. President Joe Biden’s decision to skip important regional meetings in 2023 cast doubt on the United States’ commitment to ASEAN. Although limited human and financial resources may restrict the United States from conducting bilateral visits to every Southeast Asian state, Washington should show good faith efforts to the international community. U.S. leaders can leverage multilateral diplomatic channels such as the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit, the ASEAN Summit, and the East Asia Summit to further foster ties in the region. Showing up for major regional discussions is an effective way to voice U.S. stances on issues of mutual concern and show respect for regional leaders.

Besides establishing more holistic partnerships in the region, the United States should be consistent with its narrative that countries are free to choose their own paths. Under the Trump administration, narratives surrounding U.S.-China competition focused on comparing a “free and open” U.S.-led future to a “repressive” China-dominated international order. This rhetoric presents Southeast Asian countries with a binary choice—to distance themselves from Beijing or to accept an autocratic world order. However, Biden’s rhetoric has shown the opposite. He emphasizes Southeast Asian countries’ freedom to choose their partners, reaffirming that the United States respects each country’s autonomy over their foreign policy. Although Biden’s narrative attempts to reassure the region, inconsistent approaches could undermine the region’s trust in U.S. commitments. By not forcing Southeast Asia to choose a side, Washington can increase its normative power in the region. With a potential change in administration following the upcoming November elections, the United States should reassess its foreign policy approach toward Southeast Asia to earn trust and respect from its partners in the region. 

Giang Pham is a research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.