The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has gained strategic prominence as an arena for great power rivalry. Since unveiling the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road concept in 2013, China’s presence in the IOR has expanded through port developments, an overseas base, and increased deployment of warships, submarines, and survey vessels. These actions have heightened apprehension within India’s strategic community. New Delhi has accelerated efforts to forge regional partnerships and upgrade military infrastructure on bases like Minicoy Island and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The United States, seeking to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, has found strategic alignment with India, exemplified by the June 2023 Master Ship Repair Agreements allowing U.S. naval ships to use Indian bases for resupply.
Ramifications of geopolitical shifts in the IOR extend beyond India and China to other nations along the Indian Ocean highway. Singapore, located on a chokepoint between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is especially prone to effects of potential conflict on either side of the crossroads. Maintaining strategic equilibrium—through exercises of agency based on pragmatic interests—helps small states like Singapore preserve autonomy. But it is not an easy exercise. Former U.S. navy secretary Kenneth Braithwaite’s proposal to establish a new fleet in Singapore or India for a potential “dust-up” is a stark reminder that the country could be embroiled in unwanted squabbles. A Korean proverb warns, “In a fight between whales, the shrimp’s back gets broken.” It is no irony, then, that Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, envisioned the city-state as a “poisonous shrimp”—a small but lethal force capable of defending itself against behemoths of the region in a post-colonial era.
While there is no imminent military threat in the IOR, Singapore’s best defense in a contested IOR is active, strategic involvement to advance its interests, fortify relationships, and bolster resiliency. Renewed interest in the region generates both prospects and hurdles, and Singapore is well-positioned to seize these opportunities. Leveraging its strategic position as a global trading hub along the Malacca Strait, economic clout in Southeast Asia, and close ties with major powers like the United States, China, and India, Singapore has been actively pursuing collaborations and enhancing its resilience to navigate complexities of a contested IOR.
Singapore’s most vital interest in the IOR is the protection of trade routes. The Indian Ocean handles half of the world’s container ships, a third of bulk cargo, and two-thirds of oil shipments. With its trade volume three times the size of gross domestic product, ensuring the security of international sea lanes is crucial for Singapore’s economic resiliency. Recent congestion at Singapore’s port due to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea illustrates how potential conflicts could disrupt supply chains. In the words of Singapore’s foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan, “maintaining the right of freedom of navigation as a right, not by grace of the littoral state, remains absolutely essential.” Singapore regularly advocates for maritime activities in the Indian Ocean to be carried out in accordance with international law, including The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Out of freedom of navigation concerns, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) has participated in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since 2009.
Beyond immediate concerns, Singapore has pursued in-depth military and economic cooperation in the IOR. Singapore is one of the seven founding members of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation, the predecessor to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), in 1995. For bilateral engagements, in 2017, the Singapore Armed Forces was the only military with bilateral agreements covering all service branches with India. A Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with India—the first such agreement signed by India—and the Singapore-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement underpin Singapore’s strategic priorities in the region.
Yet the IOR should not be viewed solely through a security lens. Most IOR nations are far more concerned about bread-and-butter issues like climate change and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing than they are about military competition. Through its membership in IORA, Singapore has adopted a multifaceted approach that advocates for broad cooperation founded on mutual interests. Three prominent areas stand out:
Maritime surveillance and capacity-building is one aspect. The proliferation of illicit trade, piracy, and maritime terrorism in the Indian Ocean threatens livelihoods and economies of IOR countries. RSN’s Information Fusion Centre boasts 100 linkages with 43 countries, many of which are Indian Ocean littoral states. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre, based in Singapore, produces high-quality reports on piracy in Asia. Additionally, Singapore organizes training programs and joint exercises designed to enhance the maritime capabilities of regional partners, strengthening collective efforts to combat maritime threats in the Indian Ocean.
Climate change is another issue of mutual concern. A recent report reveals that the Indian Ocean will likely be in a “near-permanent heatwave state,” accelerating coral bleaching and the destruction of marine biodiversity. As a nation with half the population residing within roughly two miles of the coast, Singapore sees great interest in and has called for joint work on climate finance and technical cooperation with IOR countries. In other innovative channels, Singapore has been contributing to the Silk Alliance Initiative, which aims to promote zero-emission shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. A Singaporean ambassador presided over a high seas biodiversity treaty under UNCLOS, highlighting Singapore’s commitment to conserving the oceans.
Finally, topics at the nexus of economy and ecology like sustainable tourism, blue economy, and fisheries and seafood production are avenues of cooperation with potential for expansion. Of note, coastal and marine tourism contribute to about 70 percent of the western Indian Ocean’s annual gross marine product. Tourism is also a key economic pillar and service sector in Singapore. To share its technical expertise, the Singapore Cooperation Program organized a capacity-building course on sustainable tourism for IORA member state officials.
Singapore’s multifaceted approach to the IOR underscores the importance of comprehensive engagement in the region, balancing security concerns with economic, environmental, and cooperative strategies. As great power competition intensifies, small states like Singapore demonstrate that strategic agency and regional cooperation can safeguard their interests and promote a more stable and secure IOR.
Xuan Ling Neo is a former research intern with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.
