Six Months of Prabowo: Indonesia’s Diplomatic Charm Offensive

Six months into President Prabowo Subianto’s tenure, Indonesia has picked up its diplomatic game to become one of the most active players in Southeast Asia. Upon taking office, Prabowo set the country on a new diplomatic track that prioritizes giving Indonesia a bigger voice on the global stage. He has pursued a range of security and economic partnerships, especially with China, Russia, and the Middle East. Within the span of just one week in April 2025, Indonesia became China’s first two-plus-two dialogue partner, it stepped up its engagement with Russia, and Prabowo visited five Middle Eastern countries.

Meanwhile, since President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, U.S. policy in Southeast Asia has largely been characterized by the imposition of high tariffs on regional countries and the controversial closure of USAID. But while the United States has been preoccupied pursuing these high priority items for the Trump administration, important relationship maintenance with Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia has fallen by the wayside. Tariff talks between Indonesia and the United States have not made much progress, and with no permanent ambassador posted in either Washington or Jakarta, the relationship is at risk of drying up. 

The changing face of Indonesian foreign policy

In January this year, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian nation to formally join BRICS. Indonesia’s admission to the grouping—which is now a ten-member intergovernmental bloc that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates—marked a significant move under Prabowo to expand Indonesia’s diplomatic relationships after former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo put Indonesia’s admission to BRICS on the backburner. 

Prabowo clearly wants to hedge Indonesia’s bets through strategic friendships. This is exemplified in what has become Prabowo’s foreign policy catchphrase: “A thousand friends are too few, one enemy is too many,” which is a Chinese proverb. Of course, China is number one on Indonesia’s charm offensive list. Prabowo’s first overseas trip as president was to Beijing in November 2024 before heading to Washington immediately after, where he met with then-president Joe Biden and spoke to the president-elect, Trump. In early April, President Xi Jinping called Prabowo ahead of a tour of Southeast Asia during which he skipped Indonesia. The two exchanged congratulations over the 75^th anniversary of diplomatic ties. 

In late April, Indonesia became the first foreign country with which China launched two-plus-two talks, attended by Foreign Minister Sugiono, Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and their Chinese counterparts Wang Yi and Dong Jun. The talks addressed enhanced cooperation on law enforcement, maritime security, infrastructure development, and critical minerals. This meeting was held just two days after Sugiono returned from a trip to Washington to negotiate on tariffs, where he met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio. That Sugiono met with officials in the United States and China so closely together is demonstrative of where Indonesia’s priorities lie—it is engaging in a long tradition of non-alignment while maximizing its interests by actively pursuing a broad range of partnerships.

A leader in the Muslim world

Indonesia’s courting of international partners does not stop there. While Sugiono was leading diplomatic efforts in Washington and Beijing, Prabowo embarked upon a multi-city tour of the Middle East with stops in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt. As leader of the world’s largest Muslim majority country, Prabowo’s attention to the region is unsurprising.

The conflict in Gaza has been a major area of contention between Indonesia and the United States with Jakarta rejecting President Trump’s plan to take over the Gaza Strip. President Prabowo has repeatedly affirmed support for Palestinian self-determination, and most recently announced a plan for Indonesia to take in over 1,000 evacuees from Gaza. The role of Islam in Indonesian diplomacy shouldn’t be overlooked—some analysts think that this trip is a signal of Prabowo trying to change Indonesia’s posture in the Islamic world.

This year, there has been a noticeable uptick in Indonesia’s engagement with Turkey. In February, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Jakarta, where the two governments signed one agreement for Indonesia to acquire over 60 Turkish-made reconnaissance drones and another on defense manufacturing between Turkish company Baykar and Indonesia’s Republikorp.

Upon Prabowo’s arrival in Ankara in April, he became the third Indonesian president to give an address before the Turkish parliament. Afterward, he and Erdoğan held the first Indonesia-Turkey High Level Strategic Cooperation Council. The two leaders also set a bilateral trade volume target of $10 billion (Indonesia’s trade with the United States was $83 billion in 2024) and discussed training Indonesian cadets and officers in Turkish defense institutions in cyber operations, intelligence, and counterterrorism.

Prabowo kept pace throughout the rest of his trip. Indonesia signed memoranda of understanding with the UAE on climate, maritime and fisheries cooperation, counterterrorism, and Islam. Qatar pledged $2 billion in funding through Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund Danantara focused on critical minerals processing, renewable energy, health, and technology. During Prabowo’s stop in Egypt, the two countries upgraded their ties to a strategic partnership with a focus on political, economic, security, and educational ties.

Diplomatic gaffes with close neighbors

Indonesia’s diplomatic offensive with a broad range of partners has had U.S. ally Australia on edge. Indonesia’s relationship with Russia recently made headlines when Jane’s reported that Russia had sought a permanent air force base in Indonesia. Australia immediately sought out a meeting to get to the bottom of the reports. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles met with his Indonesian counterpart Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who according to Marles rejected the reports as “simply not true.” A spokesperson for the Indonesian foreign ministry also dismissed the report, stating that “Indonesia has never granted permission to any countries to build or base their aircraft in the country.”

Australia’s concerns about Indonesia and Russia becoming closer are not completely unfounded. Indonesia has been deepening its bilateral relationship with Russia: in February, Prabowo met with senior Russian official Sergei Shoigu to talk about security cooperation, and in April Indonesia engaged in talks with Russia about an Indonesia-Eurasia free trade agreement. Prabowo is scheduled to travel to Russia to sign the trade agreement in June. This meeting will constitute Prabowo’s second trip to Russia in one year—he also visited Moscow in July 2024 as president-elect.

Indonesia’s broad—and widening—base of partnerships is true to classic Indonesian foreign policy. But the pace of its diplomatic visits and new agreements warrants attention. Indonesia wants to play a more active role on the global stage, and it has the strategic and economic weight to do so. While the United States turns inward, including cutting diplomatic personnel and ending a decades-long legacy of development assistance in Southeast Asia, there is a chance that relationship management with Indonesia could slip through the cracks.

Gemma King is a former research intern with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.