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Triple Tango: Managing Tensions in the East China Sea
Photo: Tr3/Adobe Stock
By Zoe Huang
The Senkaku Islands are a group of disputed islets in the East China Sea administrated by Japan but claimed also by mainland China as the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan as the Diaoyutai islands. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative recently published a new feature on Japan’s military upgrades in the Ryukyu Islands, showcasing Japan’s strategy for defending the Senkakus. But disputes in the East China Sea seen a number of other interesting developments in recent weeks. One event, the renaming of the Japanese administrative district where the Senkaku Islands are located, provides a particularly interesting set of diplomatic data that may shine a light on divergent local and national policy priorities within the claimant countries.
On June 6, the government of Ishigaki city proposed to change the administrative designation of the area where the Senkaku Islands are located from Tonoshiro to Tonoshiro Senkaku. This bill was passed by the city council on June 22nd. The mayor of Ishigaki said the change is meant to streamline administrative work by further dividing the Tonoshiro area, which previously included both the Senkaku Islands as well as parts of central Ishigaki. Reactions from the parties involved reveal a delicate dynamic between Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo.
This proposal triggered immediate response at the local level in Taiwan. The magistrate of Yilan County of Taiwan, Lin Zi-miao, announced that she would visit the islets after the proposal was unveiled, inviting President Tsai Ing-wen to do the same. Local officials in Yilan called for the government to change the name from Diaoyutai Islands to Toucheng Diaoyutai Islands as a response to Japan’s move. Three days after reports about Ishigaki’s renaming plan came out, protesters gathered outside of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association’s office in Taipei, holding signs with slogans such as “Diaoyutais are ours”.
At the central Taiwan government level, however, the reaction has been relatively reserved. On June 10th, four days after Ishigaki revealed its plan and one day after the protest, Tsai made a statement reaffirming the government’s position that the disputed Diaoyutai Islands have always been part of Taiwan’s territory. She also encouraged both sides to put aside the dispute and seek for joint development. Furthermore, she rejected some officials’ invitations to visit the Diaoyutai Islands together. The timing and tone of Tsai’s remarks indicate that they were likely a response to nationalist sentiment within Taiwan rather than Ishigaki’s proposal itself. The Tsai government has been criticized by the Kuomintang for being conciliatory towards Japan. In March, when two Taiwanese fishing vessels were chased by Japanese patrol boats near the water of Hualian in northeast Taiwan, the Tsai government made no statement regarding the incident. Other DPP officials have also been accommodating toward Japan in the aftermath of the announcement. After the magistrate of Yilan county swore to visit the Senkaku Islands, the head of the Association of Taiwan-Japan Relations Frank Hsieh posted on social media saying that there is no need to damage Taiwan-Japan friendship.
Beijing’s response was even more muted. The issue was barely covered in Chinese media, and the foreign ministry made no immediate statement until June 22nd, when the proposal passed. While the eventual statement did condemn Ishigaki’s move, calling it a “serious provocation towards China’s territorial sovereignty,” Beijing’s initial silence is noteworthy By contrast, when Ishigaki city first proposed to change the name of the district to include “Senkaku” in 2017, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang immediately responded with a declaration that the “Diaoyu Islands have always been China’s territory,” urging Japan to “stop triggering any disturbance” on this issue. With many observing Beijing’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy positions or “wolf warrior diplomacy,” this delayed and relatively muted response on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute seems to be in contrast with China’s firmness on similar issues such as the South China Sea disputes.
One reason for Beijing’s silence on the renaming might be linked to Xi Jinping’s planned visit to Japan, which was postponed from March due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This trip appeared to also be highly valued by Tokyo, with Japan’s choice to not immediately close its borders with China early during the outbreak being seen as an effort to salvage the visit. In return, Beijing was minimalizing antagonism toward Japan—the Chinese government reportedly asked its media outlet to refrain from criticizing Abe after he stated that Covid-19 had spread from China. Another possible explanation for China’s amicability toward Japan could be the assistance offered by Japan during the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, when the disease spread across China quickly. According to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, Japan has donated to China 380,000 pairs of gloves, 150,000 protective suits, 75,000 protective glasses, along with other gear and medicine. Financial donations from Japan totaled $4.1 million.
In the meantime, Japan also seems to be avoiding outright hostility against China in its foreign policy. Compared with Abe’s toughness toward Beijing on the Senkaku Islands in 2013, he has been less vocal condemning China for recent incidents, including an incident in May when two China Coast Guard ships pursed a Japanese fishing vessel near the Senkakus. While Japan did make public statements after the incident, reiterating its sovereignty claim over the islands, it chose not to summon China’s ambassador, as it has after past incidents. The central government’s relative restraint over the Senkakus at the time of Ishigaki city’s renaming decision would thus seem to indicate that decision was, indeed, a local initiative. In weeks since, Japan has grown more vocal in response to the continuous presence of China Coast Guard vessels near the islands, issuing an official protest on July 3. The ships remained for a record-setting 111 days before being forced to leave on August 3 by an incoming typhoon. But even before the vessels had left, China and Japan agreed to hold working level talks on bilateral maritime security issues after the pandemic eases. During Abe’s visit to Beijing in 2019, he and Xi agreed to bring China-Japan relations to a “new era.” The approaches of these two countries on the Senkaku Islands dispute seem to echo this promise as they tacitly balance their foreign policy priorities.
In the end, Ishigaki city’s renaming of its administrative zone does not appear to have led to a significant uptick in tensions. While the actions and responses of actors at the local level initially appeared quite strong, rhetoric at higher levels of government appears to have been carefully managed in order to reduce the impact on bilateral relations with Japan. Even as other incidents near the Senkakus have threatened to increase tensions, the claimants are also engaging in de-escalatory measures. The “triple tango” between Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo indicates that all three governments have been seeking a delicate balance in their foreign policy. Still, the readiness of local actors to embrace nationalist positions and the frequency of encounters between law enforcement and fishing vessels near the islands suggest that the risk of escalation will persist despite relatively reserved responses to recent developments.
Zoe Huang is an intern with Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). She is a recent graduate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Her research focuses on the South China Sea, law and development, and Asia-Pacific affairs.
The Senkaku Islands are a group of disputed islets in the East China Sea administrated by Japan but claimed also by mainland China as the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan as the Diaoyutai islands. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative recently published a new feature on Japan’s military upgrades in the Ryukyu Islands, showcasing Japan’s strategy for defending the Senkakus. But disputes in the East China Sea seen a number of other interesting developments in recent weeks. One event, the renaming of the Japanese administrative district where the Senkaku Islands are located, provides a particularly interesting set of diplomatic data that may shine a light on divergent local and national policy priorities within the claimant countries.
On June 6, the government of Ishigaki city proposed to change the administrative designation of the area where the Senkaku Islands are located from Tonoshiro to Tonoshiro Senkaku. This bill was passed by the city council on June 22nd. The mayor of Ishigaki said the change is meant to streamline administrative work by further dividing the Tonoshiro area, which previously included both the Senkaku Islands as well as parts of central Ishigaki. Reactions from the parties involved reveal a delicate dynamic between Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo.
This proposal triggered immediate response at the local level in Taiwan. The magistrate of Yilan County of Taiwan, Lin Zi-miao, announced that she would visit the islets after the proposal was unveiled, inviting President Tsai Ing-wen to do the same. Local officials in Yilan called for the government to change the name from Diaoyutai Islands to Toucheng Diaoyutai Islands as a response to Japan’s move. Three days after reports about Ishigaki’s renaming plan came out, protesters gathered outside of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association’s office in Taipei, holding signs with slogans such as “Diaoyutais are ours”.
At the central Taiwan government level, however, the reaction has been relatively reserved. On June 10th, four days after Ishigaki revealed its plan and one day after the protest, Tsai made a statement reaffirming the government’s position that the disputed Diaoyutai Islands have always been part of Taiwan’s territory. She also encouraged both sides to put aside the dispute and seek for joint development. Furthermore, she rejected some officials’ invitations to visit the Diaoyutai Islands together. The timing and tone of Tsai’s remarks indicate that they were likely a response to nationalist sentiment within Taiwan rather than Ishigaki’s proposal itself. The Tsai government has been criticized by the Kuomintang for being conciliatory towards Japan. In March, when two Taiwanese fishing vessels were chased by Japanese patrol boats near the water of Hualian in northeast Taiwan, the Tsai government made no statement regarding the incident. Other DPP officials have also been accommodating toward Japan in the aftermath of the announcement. After the magistrate of Yilan county swore to visit the Senkaku Islands, the head of the Association of Taiwan-Japan Relations Frank Hsieh posted on social media saying that there is no need to damage Taiwan-Japan friendship.
Beijing’s response was even more muted. The issue was barely covered in Chinese media, and the foreign ministry made no immediate statement until June 22nd, when the proposal passed. While the eventual statement did condemn Ishigaki’s move, calling it a “serious provocation towards China’s territorial sovereignty,” Beijing’s initial silence is noteworthy By contrast, when Ishigaki city first proposed to change the name of the district to include “Senkaku” in 2017, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang immediately responded with a declaration that the “Diaoyu Islands have always been China’s territory,” urging Japan to “stop triggering any disturbance” on this issue. With many observing Beijing’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy positions or “wolf warrior diplomacy,” this delayed and relatively muted response on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute seems to be in contrast with China’s firmness on similar issues such as the South China Sea disputes.
One reason for Beijing’s silence on the renaming might be linked to Xi Jinping’s planned visit to Japan, which was postponed from March due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This trip appeared to also be highly valued by Tokyo, with Japan’s choice to not immediately close its borders with China early during the outbreak being seen as an effort to salvage the visit. In return, Beijing was minimalizing antagonism toward Japan—the Chinese government reportedly asked its media outlet to refrain from criticizing Abe after he stated that Covid-19 had spread from China. Another possible explanation for China’s amicability toward Japan could be the assistance offered by Japan during the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, when the disease spread across China quickly. According to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, Japan has donated to China 380,000 pairs of gloves, 150,000 protective suits, 75,000 protective glasses, along with other gear and medicine. Financial donations from Japan totaled $4.1 million.
In the meantime, Japan also seems to be avoiding outright hostility against China in its foreign policy. Compared with Abe’s toughness toward Beijing on the Senkaku Islands in 2013, he has been less vocal condemning China for recent incidents, including an incident in May when two China Coast Guard ships pursed a Japanese fishing vessel near the Senkakus. While Japan did make public statements after the incident, reiterating its sovereignty claim over the islands, it chose not to summon China’s ambassador, as it has after past incidents. The central government’s relative restraint over the Senkakus at the time of Ishigaki city’s renaming decision would thus seem to indicate that decision was, indeed, a local initiative. In weeks since, Japan has grown more vocal in response to the continuous presence of China Coast Guard vessels near the islands, issuing an official protest on July 3. The ships remained for a record-setting 111 days before being forced to leave on August 3 by an incoming typhoon. But even before the vessels had left, China and Japan agreed to hold working level talks on bilateral maritime security issues after the pandemic eases. During Abe’s visit to Beijing in 2019, he and Xi agreed to bring China-Japan relations to a “new era.” The approaches of these two countries on the Senkaku Islands dispute seem to echo this promise as they tacitly balance their foreign policy priorities.
In the end, Ishigaki city’s renaming of its administrative zone does not appear to have led to a significant uptick in tensions. While the actions and responses of actors at the local level initially appeared quite strong, rhetoric at higher levels of government appears to have been carefully managed in order to reduce the impact on bilateral relations with Japan. Even as other incidents near the Senkakus have threatened to increase tensions, the claimants are also engaging in de-escalatory measures. The “triple tango” between Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo indicates that all three governments have been seeking a delicate balance in their foreign policy. Still, the readiness of local actors to embrace nationalist positions and the frequency of encounters between law enforcement and fishing vessels near the islands suggest that the risk of escalation will persist despite relatively reserved responses to recent developments.
Zoe Huang is an intern with Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI). She is a recent graduate from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Her research focuses on the South China Sea, law and development, and Asia-Pacific affairs.