Can The U.S. Win A Counterinsurgency War?
Developed by the 173rd Airborne Brigade in 2010, the “soft approach” in Afghanistan’s Lowgar and Wardak Provinces was one of America’s most effective counterinsurgency efforts in the War on Terror. The program used local governments to rebuild trust between the people and the government of Afghanistan —a fundamental element of modern counterinsurgency policy. In his latest book, Why Counterinsurgency Fails: The U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dr. de Tray highlights how this 2010 program affirmed that Afghanistan’s district sub-governors have both the will and capacity to serve their people. He suggests that perhaps the poor outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam before them are the result of a poor implementation of the U.S.’s counterinsurgency strategy.
Dr. de Tray holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago and is a former World Bank Country Director for Indonesia and the five Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). He has contributed to the work of several think tanks including the Center for Global Development, Results for Development Institute, and is currently a non-resident senior associate at CSIS. Erol Yayboke, deputy director and senior fellow of the Project on Prosperity Development who himself served in Iraq and Afghanistan, will moderate the discussion.
A free PDF or e-book version of Why Counterinsurgency Fails: The U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan will be made available to event attendees.
This event is made possible through general support to CSIS.