The Future of the U.S. Military and Irregular Warfare
On November 22, 2005 the CSIS Global Strategy Institute and International Security Program hosted a panel event with resident experts, a noted author and national security journalist, and current and former Special Forces officers to consider the role of U.S. Conventional and Special Forces in conducting irregular warfare. The panel discussed lessons learned and unfolding in the U.S. military’s current engagements, and also addressed the role of irregular warfare in potential future conflict.
This notion, to separate the combatant and the non-combatant elements in a conflict, was identified by Maj. Gen. Lambert, following Robinson’s remarks, as the "true revolution in military affairs". Maj. Gen. Lambert stated his belief that for many years military planers have focused on destroying the "bad guys" while minimizing harm to non-combatants. However, planners have not adequately engaged the question of how to separate the ties between the "bad guys" and the civilian population—the complex relationships that drive guerilla and insurgency warfare. This is primarily a matter of intelligence collection and sharing, across government agencies and across countries. As Maj. Gen. Lambert noted, prevention is always preferable to preemption for Special Forces and Conventional Forces alike.
The expert panel also included Major James A. Gavrilis, a Special Forces operator in both the 3rd and 5th Special Forces groups (currently assigned to the Joint Staff, Pentagon), and Clark Murdock and Daniel Benjamin of the CSIS International Security Program. The panelists agreed unanimously that the U.S. Special Forces are essential to fighting Irregular Warfare, but Benjamin cautioned against thinking of the Special Forces as a panacea to all current U.S. problems. He noted that the U.S. currently has a preference to rely on "door kickers" rather than fully utilizing more nuanced, conventional assets such as psychological operations and civil affairs teams. Robinson added that conventional forces must also adapt to the reality of modern warfare—which from the U.S. perspective will be fought in almost any foreseeable situation against asymmetrical foes.
Currently, 90 percent of U.S. Special Forces assets are engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Murdock and Robinson suggested that our military needs to not only increase the number of Special Operations soldiers but also make our Conventional Forces more like the Special Forces in order to meet this operational commitment. Lambert asked a question yet to be answered, "What will the world look like in four years if all of our forces are out of Iraq and Afghanistan?" Are we planning for the last war instead of the next?
