Takaichi’s Approval Shield: Prospects for Her Second Year in Office

Although Takaichi’s support has fallen from 64.4 percent at the start of her administration to 50.2 percent in the latest Kyodo News poll, the composition of that support suggests that her political standing is firmer than this number alone might indicate. Cabinet approval in Japan often reflects passive support. For example, in a May 2022 Kyodo poll, when then–Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s approval rose to 61.5 percent, the top reason for support was that “there is no suitable alternative,” at 43.3 percent, a pattern that has often hovered in the 40–50 percent range across recent administrations. For Takaichi, that figure has continued to climb, from 18.1 percent last October to 30.5 percent in the latest August survey, making it the single largest reason for support. Still, in the same survey, roughly 61 percent of those who supported her cabinet cited more affirmative leadership- or policy-related reasons, including expectations for her economic and foreign policies, trust in the prime minister, and confidence in her leadership. For now, this suggests that she remains on firmer public footing than many of her predecessors.

Takaichi’s public standing also shapes her position inside the LDP. Her “prime minister premium,” defined as cabinet approval minus support for the leading ruling party, is large by recent historical standards, comparable to the level seen under the popular reformist Junichiro Koizumi in the early 2000s (see Figure 2). This suggests that her political strength rests partly on her own personal appeal, not only on partisan support for the LDP, giving her greater latitude to shape the policy agenda and manage politically difficult decisions.

Within the LDP, no serious internal challenge to Takaichi has emerged yet. However, Takaichi lacks a factional base of her own. The formation of the National Power Research Group in May by Hiroshi Yamada, a longtime Takaichi ally, drew considerable media attention. The group grew out of an earlier policy study group associated with Takaichi, though she is not a member of this latest iteration, and it reportedly includes more than 80 percent of LDP lawmakers, including former Prime Minister Taro Aso and several of Takaichi’s former leadership rivals. However, rather than signaling the formation of a political group or faction, the National Power Research Group is better understood as a broad policy forum for government-party coordination and airing views among a wide range of LDP actors on core administration priorities, such as fiscal stimulus, security policy, and intelligence reform. The group’s breadth may help connect more lawmakers to Takaichi’s agenda, but it also cuts against cohesion, leaving its role as a reliable support base for her uncertain.

Governing Friction in the Diet

By the numbers, the Diet session that concluded in July was a success for Takaichi. All government-submitted bills passed both chambers, marking only the fourth time in the postwar era that the government achieved a 100 percent passage rate. Those statistics, however, obscure the political friction played out during the session, much of it stemming from the challenge of managing a crowded agenda shaped by the priorities of both the LDP and the Osaka-based Japan Innovation party (JIP), the LDP’s new coalition partner.

A JIP-backed measure to create a backup capital outside Tokyo and Imperial Household legislation, important to LDP conservatives, reflected the different priorities Takaichi had to balance within the ruling coalition. Other bills, including retrial-system reform and the National Intelligence Bureau bill, further complicated the legislative calendar. Opposition parties criticized the ruling coalition for heavy-handed handling of the proceedings, at times boycotting committee meetings and organizing walkouts to delay votes. They also pressed Takaichi over campaign-related allegations involving videos attacking her rivals. In the end, the legislative session was extended by eight days, underscoring that even a strong election mandate does not translate into smooth governing.

In addition, public opinion suggests that Takaichi’s success in advancing her policy agenda may have carried some political costs. Nippon TV polls point to a gap between public priorities and the government’s legislative agenda, which likely contributed to the softening of Takaichi’s approval ratings. In October 2025, 92 percent of respondents said they wanted the new cabinet to prioritize measures against rising prices. By August, 64 percent said they did not approve of the government’s response to inflation. The government had advanced a crowded legislative agenda of 64 bills that, on its face, had little direct connection to everyday economic concerns. In the same July poll, 72 percent of independents and 45 percent of ruling coalition supporters said they did not think the government had sufficiently explained its bills and policies.

Consumption Tax Test

Takaichi’s decision to move forward with a temporary consumption tax cut on food and beverages adds a new test of political management as she attempts to regain momentum amid public dissatisfaction with the government’s response to inflation. She initially put forward the idea when announcing the snap election in January, but it has been divisive within the LDP. In July, Takaichi instructed her party to prepare legislation lowering the consumption tax on food and beverages from the already reduced rate of 8 percent to 1 percent for two years, starting in April 2027, while pairing the cut with cash benefits for low- and middle-income earners. This move prompted internal debate within the LDP, where several senior figures have remained cautious.

Much of that caution centers on funding and fiscal sustainability. Consumption tax revenue supports social security, and the proposed cut is expected to create a revenue shortfall of roughly ¥5 trillion ($31.7 billion) annually. Critics have also questioned whether the food tax cut is well targeted since higher-income households also benefit from reduced rates and tend to receive a larger absolute benefit because they spend more on food. That helps explain why the government paired the 1 percent rate with targeted cash benefits for low- and middle-income households, despite the added fiscal and administrative complexity.

Public opinion reflects the same tension. NHK polling found that 49 percent of respondents supported Takaichi’s proposal, while 39 percent opposed it, with 67 percent expressing concern about the fiscal impact. The LDP is likely to fall in line now that the prime minister has personally committed to the proposal, but whether the tax cut becomes an asset or a liability will depend largely on how clearly the government can present a credible funding plan and demonstrate that the combined measure effectively addresses citizens’ concerns about inflation.

Outlook for Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

The prime minister is expected to reshuffle her cabinet and LDP leadership team in September, coinciding with the expiration of the one-year terms of senior party officers. For Takaichi, the broader challenge is how she balances her relative independence within the party and preference for top-down decisionmaking centered in the prime minister’s office with maintaining support across the LDP. So far, media attention has focused on how Takaichi will handle the Aso faction, whose support was instrumental to her leadership victory last fall and could again prove important ahead of another party leadership election next year. Early reporting suggests that the reshuffle may not be a complete overhaul. Key questions include whether Takaichi retains senior figures and former leadership rivals in prominent posts, and how she formalizes the LDP’s coalition arrangement with the JIP. Observers also wonder whether she will adjust her economic team as Japan navigates yen depreciation, consumption tax cut funding, host-nation support talks with the United States, and investment commitments tied to the 2025 U.S.-Japan trade deal.

After announcing her new cabinet, Takaichi will once again need to navigate coalition dynamics in the Diet. The upcoming session is expected to take up legislation on the consumption tax cut and revisit the JIP-backed Lower House seat reduction bill, which was carried over from the previous session due to opposition resistance. Unlike the Lower House, the LDP-JIP ruling coalition lacks a majority in the Upper House, requiring Takaichi to seek issue-by-issue cooperation from opposition parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), which opposes the consumption tax cut. Bridging those differences and potentially opening the door to broader cooperation with the DPFP on other priorities will be another challenge for the LDP in the coming months. Across each of these fronts, relatively strong public approval remains Takaichi’s most important shield for the time being. As long as her ratings hold, few LDP lawmakers have an incentive to challenge a prime minister who delivered a historic Lower House victory. As Takaichi approaches the one-year mark since taking office, the fall agenda will determine whether her political strength and public support can be sustained.

The foreign policy implications are less about a likely change in direction than about how much political capital Takaichi can bring to implementation. Her active diplomatic calendar, engaging partners across the Indo-Pacific and beyond, has underscored continuity in Japan’s external engagement. She also benefits from broad alignment within the LDP and Japan’s policy community on priorities central to the U.S.-Japan alliance, including increased defense spending, defense industrial base coordination, partnerships with like-minded countries, and greater emphasis on economic security.

Japan’s recent defense reforms reinforce that sense of continuity. Despite political transitions across three prime ministers and early concerns over funding, Tokyo has already delivered on the defense spending increase set out in the 2022 strategic documents, reaching the 2 percent of GDP target two years ahead of the original schedule. The government will also be revising the three strategic documents that guide Japan’s national security and defense policy, including an updated threat assessment that addresses emerging challenges such as drone warfare. The revision will proceed in tandem with the budget formulation process for the next fiscal year, with both expected to be finalized by the end of the year.

As Japan updates its strategic vision, Takaichi’s relatively solid public support and strong Lower House position should help her sustain that record of follow-through and offer her an opportunity to signal that Tokyo remains committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance agenda.

Yuko Nakano is a fellow with the Japan Chair and associate director of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Leadership Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.