What Would a Ceasefire in Ukraine Look Like?

As the United States and Russia prepare to engage in a historic meeting in Alaska about the future of the war in Ukraine, a major technical issue remains unresolved: What will a ceasefire look like? Ceasefires are one of the most dangerous moments in a conflict cycle. While both sides are often exhausted, they are still bargaining and seeking to end the war on more favorable terms at the negotiating table. This makes it essential to start thinking about what an international ceasefire-monitoring force would need to look like to set conditions for ending the war in Ukraine.

Q1: What’s the current risk of failure?

A1: High. Based on historical analysis, 31 percent of interstate wars end in a stalemate under ceasefire agreements, which halts large-scale violence but leaves underlying disputes unresolved. Worse still, most ceasefires experience minor failures within 10 days, with larger failures tending to occur between 65 and 193 days. When external monitors are involved, it tends to reduce large-scale violence but not minor clashes. This means that any ceasefire in Ukraine is almost certain to fail absent some external monitoring and security guarantee.

Second, Russia has a track record of breaking past ceasefires. Ukraine accuses Moscow of violating 25 ceasefire agreements since 2014. The Minsk I Protocol (2014) and subsequent memorandum quickly broke down and paved the way for renewed offensives. Moscow has historically used ceasefires more as a way to position forces on the battlefield than as a way to seek long-term peace. Even the Minsk II agreement only slowed fighting to the contact line in the Donbas while setting the stage for the 2022 invasion. This track record further reinforces the historical trend: Lasting ceasefires need a mix of monitors and security guarantees. Securing time and space for peace negotiations today will require unmanned aerial surveillance, real-time sensors, and multinational enforcement contingents.

Q2: What would a durable ceasefire require?

A2: External ceasefire monitors and international security guarantees. If President Trump can convince Putin to declare a ceasefire and usher in multilateral negotiations involving Ukraine and the European Union, there will need to be significant monitoring and external security guarantees. Past failures like Minsk illustrate that vague buffer zones and unarmed monitors do not stop hostilities. A more robust model—potentially combining Ukrainian forces, NATO observers, or neutral peacekeepers—that could monitor over 1,000 kilometers of front and deter local counterattacks would consist of drone swarms, artillery, and fighter jets supporting assault teams.

On-the-ground forces would have to at least function as a “trip wire” capable of deploying small monitoring teams along a new demilitarized zone. Like multiple ceasefire missions the United Nations manages globally, this force would likely be multinational and more focused on documentation and deterrence than defense.

A more credible force would likely include multiple multinational brigades that are either positioned along the front line or placed in training areas in western Ukraine. A forward-deployed posture would signal to Russia, the most likely state to violate a ceasefire, that any action risks drawing multiple countries directly into the conflict. As a result, this approach requires more extensive diplomacy and political will, as well as funding to support the high operational costs of keeping thousands of soldiers in the field. Alternatively, a safer bet would be a training force that occupies key positions in western Ukraine. Similar to training missions prior to the 2022 invasion, this force would help train new Ukrainian brigades and corps headquarters, freeing up combat units to occupy positions along the front line. Russia still incurs higher risks if it attacks, but multinational forces play more of a supporting role while also creating a strategic reserve.

Q3: Are ceasefire-monitoring groups limited to ground forces?

A3: No. Ceasefire terms must include safeguards for multiple domains. Modern war isn’t just between opposing armies. It involves air, naval, space, and cyberspace battles.

In the air, there will need to be extensive monitoring and possibly an aerial policing mission. Russia isn’t just attacking along the front line. It is using long-range air and missile attacks and firepower strikes to wage a coercive punishment strategy targeting the will of the Ukrainian people. This means ceasefire violations are likely to involve more mass drone salvos than tanks attacking across a demilitarized zone. Denying that option and hence setting conditions for peace negotiations will require enhancing Ukraine’s integrated air and missile defense.

Any ceasefire monitoring will also need to extend to the sea. The Black Sea remains a strategic flashpoint. Ensuring safe maritime corridors for Ukraine’s ports, preventing naval escalations, and providing monitoring seaborne zones is critical.

Last, a modern ceasefire can’t ignore the digital or orbital domains. External states will need to help secure communications, protect critical infrastructure from cyberattacks, and safeguard satellite systems to preserve command and control integrity during peace negotiations.

Q4: What non-military measures can support a ceasefire?

A4: It’s all about the economy. Any ceasefire will be a window for Putin to rearm and reposition his forces. This means that securing time and space for peace negotiations must be paired with a mix of diplomacy and economic statecraft that imposes costs on Moscow. First, the international community will need to take more deliberate steps to ban the electronic imports Russia uses to fuel its war machine. Second, there needs to be a sliding scale of preapproved sanctions on Russian oil and gas linked to conditions. This economic coercion tool kit should include secondary sanctions as well as measures targeting Russian smuggling.

Last, European states will need to make larger investments in their defense industrial base, including expanding cooperative agreements with Ukraine. Nothing deters future Russian aggression better than knowing your adversaries can fight a protracted war. This should include accelerating programs like the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) that uses loans to expand the European defense industrial base. Underwriting those loans with frozen Russian assets sends a powerful deterrent signal to Moscow as well as future authoritarian aggressors.

Q5: What happens next?

A5: Turning these concepts into an actionable ceasefire framework will require moving quickly on several fronts. The first step is drafting a comprehensive negotiating framework that goes beyond territorial lines to include explicit provisions for maritime security, airspace control, cyber defense, and space-based communications, essentially closing the gaps that Russia has historically exploited. Once the scope is set, the parties must secure agreement on an integrated monitoring architecture, combining satellites, unmanned aircraft systems, ground sensors, and real-time data-sharing platforms operated by a trusted international body with the authority to investigate and report violations. To give the agreement teeth, negotiators should define clear, automatic sanctions triggers that would take effect immediately if Russia violates the ceasefire, ensuring that any breach carries predictable and escalating costs. Finally, even under a truce, NATO and Western states must maintain robust commitments to Ukraine’s defense capacity through training, equipping, and ensuring interoperability across allied forces so that Moscow understands renewed aggression will meet immediate and credible resistance.