Japan Chair Platform: A Chance for Allies to Focus on Alliance Issues

This week, U.S. officials will be meeting with two of America’s most important allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel will visit South Korea for talks with his counterpart after which he will visit Japan where Secretary of State John Kerry will join him for a two-plus-two dialogue with their counterparts in Tokyo. Given President Barack Obama’s focus on rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region, these U.S. allies are vitally important to ensuring continued U.S. presence and therefore regional peace and security. Because serious security issues exist in Northeast Asia, it is imperative these meetings are used to strengthen the separate alliances rather than discuss tertiary issues regarding territorial disputes or history.

Both Japan and South Korea share a similar security threat in North Korea. For Seoul, North Korea remains the primary existential threat. Since 2010 alone, North Korea has sunk the  naval corvette Choenan, which killed 42 sailors; shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing 4 people; tested a third nuclear device; launched short-range missiles; and threatened war against Seoul (and Washington). Japan shares these fears. Not only have North Korean missiles been launched toward Japan and flown through Japanese airspace, Pyongyang has admitted to abducting Japanese citizens and threatened Tokyo in the past. 

China is a common security concern also, though the threat perceptions are different. Tokyo’s immediate concerns regarding China are its military modernization program, the lack of transparency in these efforts, and Beijing’s actions regarding Japan’s southwestern islands, which threaten its territorial integrity. Since 2010, there has been a rapid increase in the number of Chinese vessels and aircraft that come close to or enter Japanese territorial waters and airspace in the East China Sea, resulting in Japanese and Chinese patrol ships in almost daily contact in waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese). These activities have been buttressed by China developing new gas fields in the area near Japan’s claimed median line and various officials questioning Japan’s claim to sovereignty over Okinawa.

While South Korea’s concerns with China are not as severe, bilateral ties are not void of friction. China’s claim to the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo, Chinese fishermen’s illegal fishing, Beijing’s repatriation of North Korean defectors, and territorial disputes over Ieodo (Suyan Rock in Chinese) all challenge smooth bilateral ties. China’s reaction to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents further irritated Seoul, and relations were made worse by President Lee Myung-bak’s hard-line stance against Pyongyang. So far, relations have warmed under Park Geun-hye who has promoted a “trustpolitik” initiative of building trust with the North and reached out to Beijing to help denuclearize the peninsula.

Understandably, America’s allies’ different security challenges are severe in their own right. With U.S. forces in these countries and the U.S. rebalancing to the region, these security concerns are shared by Washington. As such, the upcoming U.S. talks in Seoul and Tokyo provide a perfect venue to focus on ways to respond to these challenges. 

In Seoul, the primary issue of discussion will be the looming OPCON (operational control) transfer. Under the current command structure, the U.S. Forces–Korea commander, who heads the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command, would lead both American and South Korean troops if hostilities broke out with the North. The OPCON transfer would shift these responsibilities to a South Korean commander with the United States then serving under its own command in support of South Korean forces. OPCON transfer has been a continuing source of debate between the allies given the continuing North Korean threat and uncertainty over whether South Korean troops are capable of leading a fight. This led already to one delay. Initially planned to occur in 2012, OPCON transfer was delayed in 2010 after the Cheonan sinking to December 2015. Given that Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin approached Washington during the summer about another delay after North Korea’s recent provocations, while President Barack Obama and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey have both expressed their support of the transfer, there is no doubt that OPCON will be the main agenda item, including the associated negotiations on the Special Measures Agreement (i.e., host nation support of U.S. forces) and the post-OPCON transfer plans to consolidate all of the nearly 28,000 U.S. forces to hubs of bases south of Seoul in 2016. 

Unlike in Seoul, where the United States will focus on maintaining a current agreement, in Tokyo discussions will center on updating and revising bilateral defense guidelines that define the roles played by the U.S. and Japanese militaries. The guidelines were last revised in 1997, and a lot has changed since then, including not only the emergence of a stronger and more assertive China and a provocative North Korea, but a Japan more capable and legally able to partake in a wider range of operations. This last point is particularly relevant. The government of Japan under Shinzo Abe is currently working on new national defense program guidelines, the establishment of a Japanese version of the National Security Council to facilitate policy coordination, and continuing a discussion about exercising the right to collective self-defense. These domestic changes impact bilateral dialogue with the United States and both must therefore go hand-in-hand to develop coherent defense and security principles. This means that the allies have a lot to talk about regarding a review of their roles, missions, and capabilities and possibly new areas into which to expand the range of areas for cooperation, including cyber defense and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Included in these talks will inevitably be discussions on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and the road ahead to implement the Okinawa consolidation plan agreed to earlier this year.

What this means is that Seoul and Tokyo have serious alliance issues to discuss with Washington. While territorial disputes and problems over history are important to both Seoul and Tokyo, these would be distractions to this week’s discussions. The United States will not talk about sovereignty of islands, not even Japan’s dispute with China. The furthest Washington will go is to reiterate its recognition of Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands and attendant U.S. treaty obligations. Nor will the United States take sides in disputes over history. Both meetings are a time for the United States and its allies to discuss and review the strength of the two alliances and their abilities to deal with changing circumstances.

While the United States understands there are numerous issues in Seoul-Tokyo ties that prevent trilateral cooperation from progressing further, it can play a very important role in convincing both allies that the two alliances are mutually complementary and that coordination between them would best serve the security interests of all three countries. 

The United States should be cognizant that with both allies there are questions about the U.S. commitment to their security stemming from U.S. plans to realign its forces that could reduce the number of boots on the ground in both South Korea and Japan. South Korea is particularly piqued given that the OPCON transfer and subsequent move south of Seoul removes the U.S. tripwire. The shrinking U.S. defense budget adds to these fears, leading many to question whether the United States has the financial resources to back up its commitments. Understanding this, it would be best for the United States to emphasize that the reviews and realignment of forces are meant to put it in a position to maintain the same commitment to regional security with fewer financial resources. Reduced fiscal resources and personnel in the two countries would not reduce the U.S. commitment to regional peace and security. Quite the contrary, successful implementation of the realignment plans will lead to a new posture for U.S. forces in the region and new roles and responsibilities for its allies. Together, this is meant to maintain deterrence against the threats U.S. allies face.

Both alliances continue to play a significant role in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the region, and the meetings this week in Seoul and Tokyo are crucial in furthering close coordination with the United States. While there are a number of territorial or historical issues that are important to Seoul and Tokyo, these would be distractions from the excellent opportunity both U.S. allies have to focus on how best to meet regional security challenges.

Jeffrey W. Hornung is an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, and an adjunct fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Japan Chair Platform is published by the Office of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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