Surveying Hutchison’s Port-folio in Latin America: Strategic Vulnerability or Business as Usual?

CK Hutchison’s ownership of several strategically located ports throughout the Western Hemisphere has created significant geopolitical vulnerabilities for the United States. These ports, while serving commercial purposes, are strategically positioned near critical maritime chokepoints and the U.S. mainland, raising concerns about potential dual-use scenarios. China’s national security laws, which require Chinese and Hong Kong–based companies to collect information on foreign entities and provide it to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) upon request, only exacerbate the concern.

Each of the ports present their own vulnerabilities and threats to U.S. commercial and security interests. However, they also share a set of common risks. Beijing’s access to port logistics, cargo flows, vessel movements, and supply chain data raises concerns about commercial espionage involving U.S.-flagged or U.S.-bound cargo passing through these terminals without direct oversight from regulators. With a burgeoning trade war on the horizon between Washington and Beijing, the role of ports as levers of economic power is all the more salient.

Beyond trade, these facilities also present security vulnerabilities in a crisis scenario. Ports operated by Hutchison or other Chinese and Hong Kong–based entities are well positioned to support covert maritime surveillance, signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, or electronic and cyber operations such as GPS jamming. These concerns have already been emphasized by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in its annual posture statement. While these ports are commercial, their proximity to the United States and the influence the CCP has on their operators make them strategically sensitive locations. Even if Hutchison’s ports along the Panama Canal change hands, this broader network will still pose a challenge for U.S. economic and maritime security in the Western Hemisphere.

The following ports represent five of seven active Hutchison-owned ports, from a total of 10 ports owned by other Chinese or Hong Kong companies in the Western Hemisphere. These five have been selected to illustrate the wide geographical coverage of the locations as well as the range of security concerns they pose to the United States.

Mexico

Ensenada

The Port of Ensenada (31.851931, -116.624221), located on the northwest coast of Baja California, Mexico, lies roughly 110 kilometers south of the U.S.-Mexico border. Often utilized as an overflow port for the overcrowded Los Angeles and Long Beach ports, it is well connected by road to Los Angeles., San Diego, and Phoenix.

As the one of the busiest ports in Mexico, the port includes a cargo/muti-purpose terminal, a cruise terminal, and shipyards. In 2000, CK Hutchison acquired a cruise terminal, Hutchison Ports ECV, and a year later a multi-use terminal, Hutchison Ports EIT. These acquisitions were part of a multiport deal for $400 million, with the concession lasting until 2037.

A review of commercially available high-resolution images from 2002 to present shows minor developments since the acquisition more than two decades ago. For example, the port’s breakwater was extended between 2017 and 2020, likely for improved protection and accommodation of increased vessel traffic and larger vessels. However, Ensenada’s throughput has increased nearly ninefold since the acquisition, rising approximately from 26,016 TEUs to 221,215 TEUs between 2001 and 2023. (TEUs, or twenty-foot equivalent units, are the standard unit of measurement for shipping container traffic, referring to the amount of space occupied by a standard 20-foot shipping container.)

On top of the aforementioned risks of commercial espionage and cyber vulnerabilities, Ensenada’s location along the Pacific coast presents some unique additional risks. Vessels departing from Ensenada toward Asia would likely traverse maritime zones north of Hawaii, placing them in proximity to the northeast Pacific flight paths used by U.S. launch operations at Vandenberg Space Force Base. Ensenada also sits approximately 100 kilometers from Naval Base San Deigo, the home port of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, placing the port within privileged terrain for observing and potentially tracking upcoming deployments into the eastern Pacific.

Lázaro Cárdenas

The Port of Lázaro Cárdenas (17.949519, -102.166940), located further south in the state of Michoacán, is Mexico’s second-largest port and sits along key U.S. West Coast shipping lanes. CK Hutchison acquired Hutchison Ports LCT (Lázaro Cárdenas Terminal), which handles containerized cargo, in 2003 and the Hutchison Ports LCMT (Lázaro Cárdenas Multipurpose Terminal) in 2012, which handles non-containerized cargo such as break-bulk shipments, heavy equipment, and vehicles. The LCT and LCMT together boast 76 hectares of total area, 28 post-Panamax and gantry cranes, and three berthing positions.

Historical commercial imagery shows construction of the cargo terminal (LCT) began around 2006, a few years after acquisition. By June 2009, the terminal was operational. Expansion of the terminal grounds continued over the following years and appears to have concluded around 2014, when the terminal reached its current configuration. A more recent image, from October 14, 2024, shows the port at high capacity, with two vessels seen loading or unloading cargo. The smaller multipurpose terminal (LCMT) further south was used for general cargo handling both prior to and during the early years of the acquisition. Beginning in 2014, around two years after Hutchison acquired it, the terminal began being used primarily for vehicles and other break-bulk cargo. However, the October 2024 image indicates LCMT has resumed handling containerized cargo.

The growth of throughput capacity at Lázaro Cárdenas has been explosive since 2003, from just 1,646 TEUs to 1,869,000 TEUs by 2023. Of that total, 1,122,000 TEUs were handled at Hutchison-operated terminals.

Panama

Two ports operated by Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of Hutchison Port Holdings, at Balboa and Cristóbal flank either ends of the Panama Canal, a vital maritime chokepoint for cargo that originates from or is destined for the United States.

Balboa

The Port of Balboa (8.959357, -79.562874), located at the southern end of the Panama Canal, was acquired by CK Hutchison in 1997 and has since been operated by Hutchison Ports PPC (Panama Ports Company). The port encompasses 40 hectares of storage area, five berth positions, and is well connected by rail and road, enabling ship-to-ship cargo transfers to the Atlantic side of the canal in just four hours. Throughput at the Port of Balboa increased from negligible levels at the time of acquisition in 1997 to 2.31 million TEUs by 2023, making it the second-largest port in the Canal Zone and reflecting a dramatic expansion in capacity and activity under Hutchison’s operation. Its location at the southern approach to the Panama Canal, a much narrower stretch of the waterway, makes it the potentially riskier of the two ports in terms of China’s ability to restrict access to the Panama Canal in the event of a conflagration.

Cristóbal

The Port of Cristóbal (9.349928, -79.901591) is located at the northern end of the Panama Canal and was acquired by CK Hutchison in 1997. Also operated by Hutchison Ports PPC, the terminal at Cristóbal is smaller than Balboa, with 14 hectares of storage area, three berth positions, and an on-site rail terminal that provides connectivity to the Pacific side of the canal.

The earliest high-resolution imagery readily accessible after the 1997 acquisition is from 2004, by which time the piers and berthing positions of the port already closely resembled their current configuration. A notable development post-acquisition is the development of a rail line inside the terminal, constructed around 2012, accompanied by the expansion of container storage area in the southern section of the port. While exact throughput figures at the time of acquisition are unavailable, sources suggest it to be negligible, in the low tens of thousands of TEUs. By 2023, throughput had increased significantly to 888,306 TEUs, highlighting the port’s integration into regional trade under Hutchson’s operation.

The Panama Canal continues to be one of the most geopolitically and commercially sensitive locations in the world, and CK Hutchison’s ownership of the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal presents unique geopolitical risks for the United States. Although the Panama Canal Authority retains sovereign control over canal operations, Hutchison’s presence at both ends of the canal provides it physical access and operational visibility into commercial and naval movements transiting this vital maritime chokepoint. The positioning also raises concerns about data exposure and logistics monitoring.

Additionally, during times of crisis or heightened tension, the United States faces an asymmetric vulnerability to disruptions or blockages at the canal that could significantly affect both trade flows and military mobility between oceans. Forty percent of U.S. container traffic passes through the Panama Canal, making an interruption uniquely damaging for U.S. economic security, potentially far more so than the 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal. Hutchison’s presence at this location exacerbates that risk by placing an operator linked to the Chinese government in a position of influence within the region. Loss of access to the Panama Canal could cause delays of between 10 and 22 days if ships were forced to transit through the Strait of Magellan instead. Even a temporary disruption to the canal’s operation could severely limit the United States’ ability to move forces between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters in response to a crisis.

The Bahamas

Freeport

The Freeport Container Port (26.526529, -78.769512), located on Grand Bahama Island, sits roughly 120 kilometers off the coast of Florida and serves as a key transshipment hub between the U.S. East Coast, the Caribbean, and South America. Acquired by CK Hutchison in 1997, the port is operated by Hutchison Ports FCP and includes both a container terminal and cruise port with 57 hectares of storage area and three berthing positions.

A review of high-resolution commercial imagery from 2002 onward shows that most of the port’s core infrastructure was already in place by the time of acquisition, with a June 2002 image indicating no major new construction in the early years of Hutchison’s operation. No significant expansions or redevelopment have been observed in the two decades since. Despite limited visible infrastructure growth, the port’s throughput has more than doubled, increasing from approximately 470,000 TEUs in 1998, a year after acquisition, to 1,215,000 TEUs in 2023. In addition to the container terminal, the company invested in harbor facilities, the local airport, large land holdings, and the island’s largest resort property, indicating a broad commercial footprint beyond port operations.

Freeport’s proximity to the U.S. mainland amplifies geopolitical risks posed by Chinese influence over the location. As it is located only 120 kilometers (less than 75 miles) from Florida, the port is positioned near key U.S. naval transit routes and lies almost directly beneath the flight path of space launch vehicles launched from Cape Canaveral.

The port’s location allows for covert SIGINT collection, maritime surveillance, or electronic and cyber operations such as GPS jamming closer to the U.S. coastline than any other Hutchison-owned port in the Western Hemisphere. The strategic sensitivity of Chinese influence at Freeport is amplified by the fact that SOUTHCOM is headquartered in Doral, Florida, just 180 kilometers from the port. Freeport could also support Chinese intelligence operations in nearby Cuba as part of the port’s potential dual-use role in a regional crisis.  

The examined ports illustrate a wide geographical footprint and a range of strategic concerns for the United States should they remain under Chinese influence. The risk of commercial espionage and, while operated as commercial facilities, their proximity to critical maritime corridors and U.S. naval infrastructure creates clear threats. Whether or not the Hutchison-BlackRock deal proceeds, the prospect that these ports remain under Chinese influence, either through Hutchison or an alternative state-linked buyer, highlights the vulnerabilities posed by Beijing’s access to logistics, cargo flows, and port operations across the Western Hemisphere.

Jennifer Jun is an associate fellow and project manager for imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS. Special thanks to Ryan Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, and Joseph Bermudez.

Related Content:

• The Geopolitics of Port Security in the Americas
• Advancing U.S.-Panama Security Cooperation