Business Support for Human Rights Defenders in an Era of Government Retrenchment

The Business Case: A Growing Recognition That Civic Space and Corporate Interest Are Intertwined

Human rights defenders (HRDs)—the individuals and organizations who document abuses, hold power accountable, and defend land, labor, and civic rights—have moved from the periphery to the center of the business and human rights agenda over the past decade. This shift did not emerge from altruism alone. It reflects a maturing recognition within the corporate and investor community that the “shared space” of civic freedoms, rule of law, and democratic accountability is foundational to a stable business operating environment. Businesses themselves have issued joint statements to this effect.

This logic has begun to register more broadly across the field. Businesses increasingly recognize that mandatory human rights due diligence and related regulatory frameworks can support, rather than undermine, sustainable growth and long-term competitiveness, even as some firms simultaneously lobby to dilute those same frameworks. And a growing infrastructure of civil society–led tracking tools and benchmarks has made corporate links to attacks on defenders more visible, and corporate inaction correspondingly harder to justify.

The Collapse of Government Funding for HRDs

The growing corporate recognition of the importance of HRDs arrives at a moment of unprecedented contraction in government and other funding that has historically sustained HRD work worldwide. Over the course of 2025, the United States government dismantled the great majority of its support for the global human rights and democracy ecosystem. Following a sweeping review that began in January 2025, the administration terminated 86 percent of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awards and 41 percent of State Department awards by March 2025—a combined cut of approximately $80.5 billion—with 97 percent of USAID’s and 51 percent of the State Department’s democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) awards canceled outright. The DRG sector was targeted with particular precision: Budgetary obligations for DRG programming fell nearly 75 percent between fiscal years 2024 and 2025, and the Human Rights Funders Network projected that human rights–focused official development assistance would decline by a further $1.4 to $1.9 billion—22 to 31 percent—by 2026. These included cuts to numerous specialized funds designed specifically to support HRDs or civil society organizations under threat. These funding cuts were combined with severe reductions in staff responsible for programming this money as well as advocating for these issues within the U.S. government.

The human consequences have been documented in granular detail. Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that the abrupt and comprehensive nature of the cuts halted investigations into abuses, cut off support for victims, and forced human rights organizations to scale back or close entirely—prompting HRW’s Washington director to call the withdrawal “music to the ears of autocrats.” Field-level surveys corroborate the scale of the damage: Roughly 7 in 10 civil society organizations reliant on U.S. funding are expected to close as a result of the freeze, with local funding shortfalls ranging from 40 to 100 percent depending on the region, and HRDs and independent journalists in exile—particularly from Russia, Belarus, and Central Asia—reporting losses of 50 to 100 percent of their operating support.

Nor is this a uniquely American retreat. Other traditional government donors are simultaneously reducing their commitments to foreign assistance, including the DRG sector: The United Kingdom intends to cut international development spending from 0.5 to 0.3 percent of GDP by 2027 to accommodate rising defense spending, and the Dutch government has made even steeper reductions, with other European governments facing similar fiscal pressure to prioritize military budgets over civic and development assistance. The result is that the DRG funding ecosystem is contracting from multiple directions at once, with no government or philanthropic donor positioned to absorb the shortfall left by any other. (That said, a number of governments, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, together with foundations and civil society organizations, launched Lighthouse, the Global Protection Fund, earlier this year to help address this gap by providing protection support to HRDs and civil society groups at risk because of their vital work.)

The Opening for Business as a Funding Source

The convergence of these two trends—rising corporate recognition of the business case for the protection of HRDs and the dramatic reduction in the government funding base that has long sustained their work—creates both an opportunity and an obligation for business to address these needs. Analysts of nonprofit funding structures have observed that heavy reliance on government money can itself crowd out other funding streams and concentrate resources in a small number of large institutions, narrowing the pluralism of civil society; a corollary is that diversifying toward private and corporate capital could, in principle, broaden and stabilize a funding base that has long been overly dependent on a handful of state donors.

Philanthropic sector leaders have begun explicitly calling on business and philanthropic actors that have “benefited from the harmonized investments of the U.S. government in the civic sector” to now step into the space that government retrenchment has left behind, particularly given that no other government donor is positioned to fill it. The conclusion is increasingly difficult to avoid: Business should become a more direct and structural source of financial support for HRDs—not as a substitute for government responsibility, but as a necessary complement to it in an environment where that responsibility is being diminished.

The “How” of Business Support for HRDs

Current mechanisms through which companies are funding HRDs and other DRG-oriented local civil society organizations all seek to address two issues. First, and most important, is the organizational independence of grantees. Second is protection for the companies themselves against host-country repercussions for supporting human rights and governance work.

Civil Society Institutional Independence

An intermediary organization is vital to ensure independence for local civil society grantees. One business and human rights representative from a company that funds HRDs through an intermediary organization told one of the authors that they know they have successfully achieved institutional independence when grantees are criticizing their own company’s operations. That is laudable, but such independence is likely to prove unsustainable if companies are directly involved in selecting grantees, particularly in the event of corporate personnel changes or when grantees take on especially sensitive issues.

One structural option for these types of intermediary organizations is to find a grantmaking organization with a long history in the geographic or subject matter area of interest, or both, and simply provide it with money. One example of this is the Fund for Global Human Rights, which partners with Apple to provide support for human rights and environmental defenders. The Lighthouse fund serves a similar function. While new, it is primarily coordinated by a consortium of groups with a long history in the space. This takes advantage of long-running and trusted relationships, as well as know-how developed from deep experience. It also likely creates a barrier between individual dollars spent and the grantee organization, given the likelihood that such organizations have preexisting sources of funding. Finally, such an approach abides by the development maxim not to recreate structures that already exist.

Another approach is to create a new structure that is most fit for purpose. This allows for maximum alignment with goals, both in subject matter and in chosen geographies. It does, however, require substantial startup work, including developing relationships and trust with local organizations such that their independence will be respected. If such trust is lacking, impact could be limited, as organizations may be disinclined to take corporate money. Trusted individuals with strong backgrounds in the field and connections to populations being served are a vital part of the development of such organizations, as are grant agreements that provide both high levels of independence and, where possible, multiyear funding cycles to alleviate fears of nonrenewal in response to grantees’ work, including criticism of the funder.

Corporate Protections from Negative Consequences

A fear regularly espoused by private sector actors considering greater support for civil society organizations in places where they operate has been potential repercussions stemming from funding politically sensitive activities. Foreign companies operating within a country are accustomed to providing support for healthcare, education, economic development, and other ways of improving communities that are favored by host governments. Addressing issues that are not necessarily priorities, and may even be deeply disfavored, by host governments can create new concerns. Some of the most prominent examples include support for democracy and human rights activists, individuals and groups working to expose and counter corruption, whistleblower protections, and, in many contexts, women’s rights or sexual and reproductive rights. When touching political third rails, private sector stakeholders have expressed fear of punishment, up to and including loss of license to operate within a country. Such a fear is particularly prevalent for companies operating in industries that are not portable, such as mining.

One means of allaying this concern is the use of pooled funds. One representative intermediary fund interviewed by one of the authors, working on a particularly sensitive issue and geographic context, has operated under a double-blind model, in which corporations were aware of the grantees of the fund, and grantees were aware of the corporations that provided money, but individual grants and individual donations were not earmarked for particular groups or particular topics. This provided a level of deniability for corporations while preserving institutional independence for both the grantees and the intermediary organization.

Conclusion

Foreign direct investment and development efforts have for many years run in parallel, to mutual benefit. Investment from businesses is critical to providing economic growth, jobs, and diplomatic openings for states across the globe. Development work, especially in the DRG space, has helped foster a more predictable and sustainable business environment through improved governance, countering corruption, and strengthened rule of law. Over the last two years, however, the development ecosystem has become increasingly fraught, with shrinking resources, increased attacks on civil society, and limited diplomatic support for the work of vital organizations. It is an existential moment for many impacted stakeholders. Private sector support for HRDs can play a major role in reinvigorating the sector, and, in providing that support, businesses can help to ensure a continually improving operating environment for business operations across the globe.

Andrew Friedman is director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Scott Busby is a senior advisor at Human Rights First, distinguished fellow at Georgetown University Law Center, and former deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the U.S. Department of State.