Experts React: The Challenges and Opportunities for the Trump Administration in Africa

Photo: JONATHAN ERNST/AFP via Getty Images
On January 20, 2025, Donald J. Trump will assume the presidency of the United States of America for the second time. As the world watches the changing of the guard between the returning president and Joe Biden, analysts will parse Trump’s inaugural speech for any hints of his vision for U.S.-Africa relations. They will also monitor his executive orders and legislation from the Republican-majority Congress for what they purport for Africa. This is particularly true considering the unfortunate words he reportedly had used to describe Africa during his previous term, as well as his attacks on African and Haitian refugees during the last presidential campaign.
Trump’s “America First agenda,” notwithstanding, Africa matters. As his administration sets out to deliver on his campaign promises at home and assert U.S. leadership abroad, the United States cannot afford to ignore Africa. The new administration must prioritize developments unfolding across the continent. Africa’s role on the world stage will continue to expand whether as a target of foreign interests within the context of great (and middle) power competition seeking access to its vast natural and human resources, leveraging its strategic location, or as an important voting block at the United Nations.
In this collection, CSIS Africa Program staff and affiliates highlight some areas of importance and opportunity where the United States should increase its engagement and commitment, including green industrialization, strategic economic partnership, the prioritization of policy over programs, and good governance and democracy. We offer recommendations to help strengthen U.S.-Africa relations in those mutually beneficial areas of potential cooperation and highlight other sub-regions and countries where the United States could be a better partner.
— Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Senior Fellow and Director, Africa Program
Trump II: An Opportunity to Create a Strategic Economic Partnership with Africa | Laird Treiber
Support African Green Industrialization | Rafiq Raji
Prioritize Policy Over Programs | Jon Temin
Nigeria Will Be Looking for U.S. Leadership Around the Globe | Brigadier General Saleh Bala (Rtd)
Prepare for Uncertain African Transitions | Cameron Hudson
Mozambique: Near-Term Challenges and Long-Term Opportunities | Emilia Columbo
Reconciliation or Rupture: The Future of U.S.-South African Relations | Ryan Cummings

Trump II: An Opportunity to Create a Strategic Economic Partnership with Africa
Laird Treiber, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
The incoming second Trump administration has an opportunity to put its imprimatur on U.S. foreign policy for decades by outlining a vision for a Strategic Economic Partnership with Africa (STEP) with Africa. Doing so would recognize Africa’s growing importance as a global economic partner, spurred on by the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), while also leveling the playing field for U.S. companies with their many competitors from Europe and Asia.
A STEP could include several overlapping elements:
- Support AfCFTA: The AfCFTA is a landmark agreement in the scope of sectors it includes (such as digital trade) as well as its ambition to cover the entire continent, facilitating regional and continental value chains, including in priority sectors of automotive, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness and transportation. The Trump administration should reiterate U.S. support for AfCFTA while increasing engagement on specific AfCFTA protocols as needed to open trade and investment. At the same time, Trump’s second presidency should articulate a clear vision for how it would like to engage African countries on trade and investment issues, spelling out whether it foresees concluding free trade agreements with individual countries (like Kenya, with which Trump’s first presidency began FTA negotiations).
- Renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): The AGOA has been the centerpiece of U.S. economic engagement with Africa since it was passed in 2000. This unilateral trade preference program offers Africa duty-free access to the U.S. market for 1,800 goods not available to other regions under other programs (like the Generalized System of Preferences). The most important step Trump’s second presidency can take to support engagement with Africa is to encourage Congress to renew the AGOA by Easter, well before its expiry in September 2025. Renewing the AGOA for at least 10 years (ideally longer), with some practical improvements like addressing graduation once countries attain middle-income status, is the single most important support the United States can provide to realize AfCFTA’s potential.
- Develop specific tools tailored to realize the potential of specific sectors: There have been a number of proposals to increase U.S. engagement with African countries on issues like critical minerals, investment, and Information and Communication Technology by adding provisions to the AGOA. Each of these sectors is important, but realizing the potential of increased partnership extends far beyond the scope of a unilateral trade preference program. Each merits detailed discussions and coming up with a menu of tailored engagement (e.g., for better resource mapping and investment codes or engagement on digital taxation); several can be supplemented by engagement with international forums (like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or World Trade Organization). In some cases, it may make sense for the United States to pursue specific bilateral agreements with countries, either on a specific sector or as part of a broader free trade agreement.
- Update U.S. trade and investment tools: African institutions have proven agile and innovative in coming up with programs to support industrialization and trade under AfCFTA. U.S. trade and investment support agencies (the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Trade and Development Agency, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation) should make Africa a case study of how to develop similarly agile tools that can match the best of our competitors, particularly in Europe, who deliver results in weeks, not months. Reaching out to private sector financing and providing support for trade associations would also be an effective way to get more U.S. companies to focus on opportunities in Africa.

Support African Green Industrialization
Rafiq Raji, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
Yet again, Africa finds itself richly endowed with the critical minerals that the world needs to transition to green energy, from dirty fossil fuels, which it still has abundantly in reserves. The United States has been slow to warm up to Africa’s green mineral prospects, in sharp contrast to China, which quite literally dominates the continent’s mining scene for copper, cobalt, and lithium. Waking up from its slumber, the United States and Europe are developing a logistics corridor to ferry unprocessed battery minerals from mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Port of Lobito in Angola, with the Chinese similarly reviving the Tanzanian railway route from Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam. Common to the approach of both great powers is the mine-to-port extraction model that has historically impoverished Africa, since with little to no processing of mined minerals before they are exported, fewer jobs are created, technology transfer is limited, and the economic gains are not shared fairly. Thankfully, African governments are increasingly determined to avoid repeating this developmental error, and now actively nudge mining firms to forward integrate their operations, even if for just the early processing stages of the global value chain.
China appears more receptive to the African value-addition drive than its Western counterparts, which continue to view the continent from a colonialist lens. The second coming of a business-centric Donald Trump to the White House in early 2024 is potentially a watershed moment for African green industrialization, as it provides another opportunity for this extractive mindset to be reset towards the growing continental consensus of a single African market that wants to participate more in the global value chains of green industries with willing partners, which the continent’s stakeholders continue to believe the United States is. The preference for bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) by successive administrations at the White House, has thus far hobbled the potential of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) for most African countries bar Morocco, which has an FTA with the United States, must be jettisoned for a continental approach, one that fits with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as should the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) when it comes up for review and extension in 2025. If Africa’s economies cannot create enough jobs, which green industrialization can amply provide, the continent’s youth bulge will be a problem for the rich world no matter how tightly shut its borders become. The United States can slow the inflow of African migrants by investing in the continent’s green industrial potential.

Prioritize Policy Over Programs
Jon Temin, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
When you think about the legacy of U.S.-Africa relations left by recent presidents, what springs to mind are flagship programs. For Bill Clinton, it was the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. For George W. Bush, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Barack Obama had Power Africa, and Donald Trump, in his first term, created Prosper Africa. Joe Biden may be remembered most for U.S. support for the Lobito Corridor, which he celebrated with a recent trip to Angola. Most of these programs have had a meaningful, sustained impact on many Africans’ lives.
What doesn’t spring to mind is any of these presidents broadly prioritizing Africa in their foreign policy, or elevating Africa from its seemingly permanent place toward the bottom of the hierarchy of perceived U.S. interests abroad. For too many recent U.S. presidents, the approach to Africa has been policy-by-program—the new programs they create are seen as what they’ll be remembered for and take up a lot of what little high-level policy bandwidth there is. When this happens, Washington perpetuates the notion that Africa is a charity case in need of benevolent support, rather than a partner of enormous economic, political, and cultural potential.
Given the inattention to Africa during his first term, it strains the imagination to believe that Donald Trump is the person to break this trend. But the past doesn’t have to be prologue, and at some point, there will be a U.S. president who sees the genuine importance of U.S.-Africa relations—the question is whether that will happen while there’s still time to build meaningful partnerships. The programs that past presidents have championed are only one part of those partnerships—they should keep going, with new programs added, but they’re no substitute for making Africa a policy priority.

Nigeria Will Be Looking for U.S. Leadership Around the Globe
Brigadier General Saleh Bala (Rtd), Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
While the U.S. presidential elections have been keenly contested and won by the Republicans, the fractiousness in the U.S. society following over two decades of social and political bickering and vile rhetoric between and over convictions of morality in entrenched conservatism and the fear of neo-liberalism, the first responsibility of the returning U.S. president should be to tamper political brinkmanship, in order to pacify and reunify the nation. He will need to regularize his controversial domestic policies, which to the most extent are excluding and divisive. After all, democracy is about and for the people.
On the international policy front, the incoming administration would need to ensure the ascendance of constitutionality, reason, and morality over blatant supreme might as the right. The United States continues to be the world’s leading democracy and example of development, science and technology, and most of all, egalitarianism to the world. Best of all also it is the world’s uncontestable leading military power, with an elaborate earthly reach, and even into space. U.S. military-adventurist foreign policy can do with a huge quantum of reforms and can bear the human face with morality and humanism that it easily professes.
Unfortunately, the United States is poorly drawing a reputation badly illustrated in how U.S. interest has promoted the West’s support to Ukrainian leadership in the avoidable fratricidal war with Russia. Though Russia can easily be blamed for invading a sovereign nation, the diplomatic approach to resolving the conflict between the neighbors must be a priority. Again, as important, the United States should recalibrate its see-no-fault support to Israeli arrogance and inhumanity in the war against Palestinians that breaches every principle of moral conscience, respect for human dignity, and international law. The war is spreading fast beyond its immediate territories with implications of upsetting world peace and stability. As a matter of global concern, Africa and its people feel quite disturbed by the escalating war, which is causing wanton deaths, destruction, and suffering to proportions even higher than those witnessed in World War I, which informed the founding of the League of Nations and its later transformation into the United Nations.
Another area of U.S. foreign policy for which respect and reason must be adopted is democratization and security cooperation with Africa and its nations. U.S. stand on democracy must not begin and end with just acknowledging the usual routine organization and conduct of elections. While the United States and its Western allies feel consistently worried about the reemergence of praetorianism on the continent in military coups, it must also as well react as harshly as it does to such situations with civilian governments who practice democracy in abuse, by manipulating constitutions and the judiciary in order to gain tenure extensions, as the use of their military and police to intimidate and stifle opposition, the judiciary and civil society, aside records of corruption. These are usually the causes of violent protests, insurgencies, and military coups, because of citizens’ loss of faith in constitutionality, and law and order as guaranteed democratic pathways for the renewal of leadership and administrations.
The usual sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies across the spectrum of engagement must be cautiously considered against protracting the usually festering insecurity, poverty, and general underdevelopment commonly hardly addressed by the otherwise self-perpetuating and tyrannical civilian politicians. The United States should upscale its public diplomacy engagements with nations across the continent to promote more visible people-centric projects and security assistance if its losses against its rival Russia, China, and other emerging powers on the continent are to be stemmed and reversed for good. The United States should also respect the sovereign will of African states to self-determination over their internal affairs, and the freedom to choose their partners in the international sphere. Nigerians will look towards the United States to support the bettering of its nascent democracy, as well as to promote development. Additionally, Nigeria will hope for more robust security cooperation devoid of counterproductive sanctions and legislations to assist the armed forces of Nigeria, the police, and its security agencies to acquire critical arms, equipment, and training to deal with the protracted terrorist insurgencies, violent criminality, economic sabotage, and corruption it is facing.

Prepare for Uncertain African Transitions
Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow, Africa Program
President Trump will soon become the oldest person in U.S. history to take the presidential oath of office, eclipsing the record set four years ago by Joe Biden. But many of Africa’s leaders make them look young by comparison. Of Africa’s 54 heads of state, 9 are currently older than President Trump.
Four stand out in particular where both their age, time in office, and the potential for unstable, and even violent, transitions should create cause for concern for Trump’s Africa team. Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, and Uganda all have presidents aged from 80 to 91 years old. Their collective 157 years in office have contributed to a hollowing out of their countries’ institutions to the point where serious questions exist surrounding what will transpire when these presidents pass on—for some, perhaps on President Trump’s watch.
In Equatorial Guinea, it is most clearly understood that President Teodoro Obiang’s son, Teodorin or Teddy, is likely to succeed his father since being promoted to first vice president in 2016. However, the younger Obiang’s flamboyant lifestyle and avaricious spending have not endeared the dauphin to all in the country. With a reputation for ruthlessness, rumors abound that the dynastic succession that Teodoro has planned for could descend into violence when Teddy’s ultimate promotion is challenged.
Similarly, in Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, 89, has secured 38 years in office for himself and his National Resistance Movement party, increasingly through the jailing and intimidation of the political opposition. While Museveni has been grooming his son, Muhoozi, to assume his role, that scenario appears increasingly in doubt. While currently serving as the chief of Uganda’s People’s Defense Forces, Muhoozi’s social media threats to invade Kenya, attack Khartoum, and expel the U.S. ambassador have forced his father to apologize for his son’s impetuous behavior and created deep divisions with Uganda’s military that could upend Muhoozi’s attempt to succeed his father and ignite conflict.
In Cameroon, President Paul Biya, 91, has retained power since 1982 but has been increasingly absent from public view. Last fall, his absence lasted so long that rumors were rife that he had already died, forcing the government’s spokesman to ban news reports speculating on the president’s health. Biya’s line of succession is even less obvious, with local analysts suggesting that if he were to die in office his son Franck would be incapable of securing the presidency without him. With divided allegiances in the country, along with an active insurgency in the country’s Anglophone region, the likelihood of a contested, if not violent, transition seems increasingly possible.
Lastly, in the neighboring Republic of Congo, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 81, faces a similarly contested succession among family members all seemingly vying for his job. After 36 years in office, organized political opposition is nearly nonexistent, and intercommunal, regional, and tribal tensions all remain rife, raising the possibility of a highly contested transition.
The incoming Trump administration should be preparing now to better understand these local contexts to help shape the transitions when they inevitably come. Violent or contested transitions in any of these weak states will undermine peace and stability in the wider region. Planning ahead and working with incumbent regimes and civil societies to anticipate difficult transitions would send a message by a Marco Rubio Department of State that it is committed not only to stability in Africa but to helping democracy take hold when opportunities present themselves. After generations of one-man rule in each of these countries, Washington should not sit passively by and simply accept illegal, unconstitutional, or violent transfers of power. Rather, it is in these countries where our truest commitment to democracy can shine through. The United States should be prepared when that moment comes.

Mozambique: Near-Term Challenges and Long-Term Opportunities
Emilia Columbo, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
The incoming Trump administration will face a Mozambique that is undergoing unprecedented political upheaval, requiring policies that will help address not only the short-term fallout of this instability but also help get at the grievances these protests have unlocked. The late-October declaration of FRELIMO (the Mozambique Liberation Front) candidate Daniel Chapo as the winner of the Mozambican presidential election set off a wave of national protest that has continued almost without pause. These protests have been violent and destructive. As of mid-December, as many as 100 protesters have died and vandalism associated with these protests has caused over USD 45 million of damage. The durability of these protests, their geographic spread, and the diverse constituencies participating in them point to an outrage that goes beyond electoral fraud and that touches on long-standing public frustration with corruption, poor service delivery, and shrinking political space.
- Invest in security sector reform. Both the recent national political protests and the long-standing insurgency in northern Mozambique have highlighted major weaknesses in the security services not the least of which is its relationship with civilians. Programs that would contribute to a broader cultural shift away from service to the state and toward service to the people, including human rights training, would have the potential to start building a better relationship with the public and provide an opening for trust-building between the state and its people.
- Promote greater bilateral commercial engagement. Mozambique is a country rich in natural and human resources, but where wealth tends to be concentrated among elites. Indeed, job creation and security were both important issues to voters during the presidential race. The need for economic opportunities has grown more acute in the wake of protests, which cost the economy 2 percent of GDP in October alone and have disrupted regional trade routes. Promoting greater business partnerships and investment between U.S. and Mozambican businesses and entrepreneurs would have the further benefit of enhancing the U.S. role as a true partner to Mozambique, an approach that would likely work well regardless of how the current political crisis is resolved.
- Support greater democratic opening. These protests have revealed the depth of public frustration with the lack of government transparency and the inability to make their voices heard through the electoral process. Support to the education sector and civil society, while also leveraging U.S. assistance and potential economic partnerships to foster greater transparency on the government side, would likely help pave the way for greater political participation and begin to restore the social contract.

Reconciliation or Rupture: The Future of U.S.-South African relations
Ryan Cummings, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
As was the case in the United States, the reelection of Donald Trump has elicited polarized responses from the African continent. Some have welcomed the return of Trump who epitomizes the strongman leader that has emerged as the continent’s dominant political authority in the post-independence era. Such overtures have been echoed from several corners of the continent, with political leaders such as Kenya’s William Ruto, Nigeria’s Bola Tinubu, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi expressing their desire to deepen relations with the incoming Trump administration.
Elsewhere in South Africa, the reelection of Trump has raised concerns over the future of bilateral relations between two countries that are finding themselves on opposing ends of geopolitical fissures. Despite asserting its strategic neutrality or nonalignment, South Africa has cozied up with U.S. rivals such as Russia, China, and Iran whilst championing multilateral reform that seeks to dilute the U.S.-led order. Most controversially, in January 2023, South Africa embarked on a joint naval exercise with Russia and China, only a month after allowing for the docking of a sanctioned Russian ship, Lady R; both acts were viewed as a direct affront to U.S. national security interests, sparking a brief diplomatic row. In September 2024, relations with China were upgraded to an “all-round strategic cooperative partnership”—a largely rhetorical yet symbolic reflection of the growing relations between the two countries. A similar gesture is yet to occur with the United States or any other Western power. The African National Congress–led government has also opposed U.S. policy on the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip. Here, the administration of Cyril Ramaphosa has paradoxically defended Russia in Ukraine, while concomitantly hauling Israel to the International Court of Justice for comparable hostilities in the enclave of Gaza.
South Africa’s inconsistency has frustrated U.S. policymakers, with a growing bipartisan interest in reassessing relations. Prior to the November 2024 election, 36 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted for legislation requiring a “comprehensive review” of U.S. ties with South Africa due to its policy positioning vis-à-vis China, Russia, and Israel. Notable, one of the republican lawmakers who voted in favor of the diplomatic review, namely Michael Waltz, has since been nominated by Trump as national security adviser. The nomination of Waltz came off the heels of Trump electing fellow republican congresswoman, Elise Stefanik, as his ambassador to the United Nations. Stefanik is a staunch ally of Israel and has gone on record as describing South Africa’s International Court of Justice case as an “antisemitic baseless attempt by the international community to perpetuate false and dangerous allegations against the Jewish state.” Notably, Trump’s pick for secretary of state, Senator Marco Rubio, was similarly combative toward South Africa for its contentious decision to relocate Taiwan’s diplomatic office from the South African capital of Pretoria to the city of Johannesburg.
Rhetoric by the Trump administration suggests that bilateral relations with South Africa may deteriorate over the next four years. This could result in South Africa losing trade benefits under the (AGOA)—which will be subject to renewal in 2025. It may even see funding cuts to initiatives such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership and additional risk premia imposed on doing business with South Africa. This will compound existing aversion among Western companies, further restricting South Africa’s portfolio and foreign direct inflows. That said, losses will not be one-sided. Any ostracization of South Africa will likely push Africa’s hegemonic power into the orbit of Russia and China. This could provide the United States’ foremost geopolitical rivals with a competitive edge on a continent endowed with critical minerals and which is home to the world’s fastest-growing consumer market. If such losses are to be avoided, both the United States and South Africa may be forced into concessions that emphasize mutual interest.

Supporting Ghana and the Rest of the Gulf of Guinea States in the Face of the Sahelian Crisis
Will Brown, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Africa Program
In December 2024, Ghana held what seems to have been a masterclass in democracy and peaceful transition. But president-elect John Mahama now faces enormous challenges. Aside from boosting the economy and bringing down inflation, the war in the north will likely be one of the foremost things on his mind.
Burkina Faso, which shares a 550-kilometer border with Ghana, is close to complete collapse. The government there barely controls any territory outside the capital, Ouagadougou. There were many problems with the French-led Western security response across the region from 2013 to 2022. But the Russian mercenaries who have flooded into the region, replacing them, have shown themselves to be not only bloodthirsty but also woefully incapable of holding back the tide of insecurity.
Despite the public indignation and protestations from the previous Ghanaian government, journalistic reporting and insiders indicate that Al Qaeda has set up rear operating bases in northern Ghana. The security forces are currently playing a bloodless game of cat and mouse with the jihadists. This could easily spill out into a tit-for-tat of violent attacks, bringing Ghana into the Sahelian war. Indeed, Amadou Koufa, the second-in-command of al-Qaeda-affiliated group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, has made no secret of the fact that Ghana is in his sights.
Ghana has proven itself a strong partner time again, consistently standing with the United States at the United Nations against Russian aggression in Ukraine. It is a stalwart democratic leader in a region increasingly defined by putschists and guns for hire. However, despite having a strong military by regional standards, Ghanaian military officials privately admit they are unprepared and under-equipped for the task at hand. If asked, Washington and London should stand ready to throw their weight behind the new Ghanaian government as a key strategic partner.
While many European nations are somewhat paralyzed after their sudden expulsion from the Sahel, the United States and the United Kingdom are well-positioned to support Ghana. There are years of quiet and effective military cooperation between the three countries to build off, as well as close historical and cultural ties. Hostile actors are clearly investing serious resources and effort to destabilize coastal West African countries by promoting views favorable to the region’s autocrats and putschists. This means any military cooperation should go hand in hand with funding and capacity building for countering disinformation and exposing what hostile actors are doing in the region.
Any serious level of military cooperation with the three Sahelian juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger is off the table for now, given the domestic posturing of the juntas and reports of appalling abuses against civilians and ethnic minorities. However, if opportunities do arise to train Sahelian soldiers in third countries like Ghana at a later date, this should at least be considered. There are high risks associated with this course of action but it would be far better if the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ghanian troops were giving training to Sahelian soldiers en masse, with compulsory lessons of the rules of war, than free rein being given to outside actors who care little about mass executions, the abduction of journalists or torture.