Insider Threats: A Worst Practice Guide to Preventing Leaks, Attacks, Theft, and Sabotage
CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program cordially invites you to a book launch event for Matthew Bunn and Scott Sagan’s newly released Insider Threats: A Worst Practice Guide to Preventing Leaks, Attacks, Theft, and Sabotage(Cornell University Press)
Moderated by Sharon Squassoni
Director and Senior Fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, CSIS
With Matthew Bunn
Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
Scott D. Sagan
Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science;
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies;
Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation; Stanford University; Senior Advisor, Global Nuclear Future Initiative, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science in International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School; former Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy
High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders—trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.
Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.