What Do the Results of the Midterm Elections Mean for Clean Energy and Climate?
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For the past two years, unified Republican control over Congress and the executive branch has shifted U.S. energy policy toward promoting fossil fuels and rolling back climate policy. The next two years will see mixed governance, as Democratic gains in the midterm elections have changed control of Congress and numerous state governments. What does this mean when it comes to clean energy and climate?
Q1: What can a divided government realistically accomplish on clean energy policy over the next two years?
A1: Democratic influence over energy and climate policy remains constrained by the Republican administration. President Trump has threatened to veto legislation sent to his desk, and federal agencies will continue to pursue the deregulation and energy dominance agenda of the last two years. Democrats will likely frame clean energy technologies, including electric vehicles, as strengthening energy security and lowering household energy costs rather than primarily as climate policy. Through budget reconciliation, which only requires a simple majority in the Senate, Democrats could thus pass “affordability” legislation that includes climate and clean energy provisions—not with expectations of the president’s signing it, but rather to draw a veto and sharpen the political contrast over energy costs leading up to the 2028 presidential election.
Similarly, from an appropriations perspective, Congress will likely leverage “must-pass” funding legislation to extract policy concessions around climate and clean energy, knowing the administration may attempt to withhold spending that conflicts with its agenda. It is therefore again unlikely clean energy will see increased federal support over the next two years. Instead, such disputes could trigger congressional investigations and potential litigation, further distinguishing the party platforms on climate and energy issues.
If the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA), which advanced in the Senate on November 9, passes in the current session—and if the administration allows clean energy to benefit alongside fossil fuels—implementing the legislation quickly and effectively would be one clear bipartisan priority that could help accelerate near-term clean energy deployment.
Q2: How will state support for clean energy and climate policy change because of the midterm elections?
A2: Congress is not the only dramatic shift in the balance of power resulting from the midterm elections. Democrats took over state governments and governorships in traditionally or recently Republican states, broke Republican trifectas in five states, and gained full control of state government in six states (Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), giving them the ability to pass new energy legislation, not just shape regulation. States have authority over utility investments, infrastructure siting, resource planning, and retail rates, so these changes are consequential for energy policy. Most of these newly elected Democrats ran on platforms of energy affordability and will likely use resource planning, oversight, and permitting to influence utility investments and infrastructure deployment.
The gubernatorial changes could be impactful for state electricity policy. In five states with newly elected Democratic governors (Texas, Iowa, Ohio, Nevada, and Alaska), the governors appoint utility regulators. Over time, as the terms of the utility commissioners end, this gives these governors the ability to shape electricity policy even when the state legislative control remains split, although in some states commissioners require legislative approval. In Georgia, the public service commissioners are instead directly elected, and Democrats gained a 3–2 majority for the first time in decades. Utility regulators significantly influence electricity investment because they determine what gets built and how those costs are distributed.
Q3: How will the elections shape the debate on powering AI and data centers?
A3: Powering data centers will continue to be central to the public debate, especially with respect to grid reliability and electricity rates. Democratic leaders at the federal and state level who campaigned on energy affordability will be focused on transparency, including achieving more clarity around data center demand, behind-the-meter emissions, and impact on ratepayers. In the near term, data center development will slow in some jurisdictions as regulators work to put safeguards in place and address cost allocation concerns; the governors-elect of Texas, Ohio, and Georgia have all pledged to limit new data center construction. At the local level, voters favored limiting data center development in 40 of 41 contests across 10 states.
Perhaps counterintuitively, increased oversight might ease public backlash. A Pew survey found 54 percent of U.S. adults believe data centers are mostly bad for the environment and 50 percent believe they are mostly bad for home energy costs. Clearer rules on cost allocation and environmental disclosure could help address these concerns. Speculative or uncooperative projects may face greater scrutiny and slower approval, while projects that are able to clearly demonstrate how they will pay for infrastructure and limit impacts on ratepayers may have a clearer path toward deployment.
Q4: What do the election results mean for U.S. emissions and climate change?
A4: One of the most consequential challenges to federal climate policy over the last two years was the repeal of the greenhouse gas endangerment finding. The issue will likely be decided by the Supreme Court, and without a veto-proof majority, a Democratic Congress has few tools to directly restore it or reverse other major climate policies, such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Voters have also indicated that while they care about climate change, there are other higher-priority issues. The importance voters attached to climate change has changed little since the 2022 midterms across all parties. This year, less than 50 percent of voters ranked climate change as extremely important or very important to their vote for Congress, compared with 87 percent for the economy and 77 percent each for health care and the situation in Iran.
However, deprioritized climate policy does not mean that clean energy and greenhouse gas emissions will not be on the congressional agenda altogether. While the clean energy–related tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act that were terminated or accelerated to phase out by the 2025 reconciliation bill are unlikely to be reinstated in full, Congress will likely prioritize appropriations for clean energy research, development, and deployment. The motivation for the investments may be framed as affordability, reliability, and economic competitiveness rather than as climate policy.
The trajectory of U.S. emissions over the next two years is a different question and will primarily be determined by market conditions such as electricity demand, fuel prices, and cost of capital rather than by federal policy. Over the past two years, the administration has used its emergency authority to delay planned coal plant capacity retirements. As a result of Department of Energy orders, among other reasons, the Energy Information Administration estimates almost 5.5 gigawatts of coal plants slated for retirement in 2025 have continued operation. Congressional oversight could focus on the economic consequences of such extensions. Whether these coal plants ultimately retire or remain online could be one way the federal government will influence near-term power sector emissions.
Q5: What do the midterm elections mean for energy investment certainty?
A5: Passage of the BAAJA would increase energy infrastructure investment certainty. The midterm results initially cast doubt on the bill’s likelihood of passing because Democratic gains reduced the incentive for current members to compromise. However, activity since then, including the manager’s amendment and White House support, means passage in the lame duck session remains viable though uncertain.
While investors will be keenly aware of energy policy uncertainty beyond the 2028 election, the fact that Congress and the administration are at odds will broadly limit large policy swings in either direction in the near term. Neither Congress nor the administration will easily be able to enact a major policy change without a degree of compromise. In this respect, investors may have a greater degree of confidence in policy stability over the next two years.
Finally, regardless of federal climate policy, load growth will continue to be the dominant driver of large-scale energy infrastructure investment in the United States. Even with a likely slowdown in data center development that may result from newly elected state politicians and local prohibitions, domestic manufacturing and electrification are projected to increase electricity demand. The investment question will therefore continue to be not whether the United States needs this infrastructure, but which projects will have durable regulatory and public support to elicit the investment certainty needed to build it.
Leslie Abrahams is deputy director and senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.