What a New Biosecurity Policy Can Teach Us About Overseeing Frontier AI
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This month, the White House released a long-awaited policy to strengthen the bioeconomy and biosecurity of the United States. The policy—which covers nucleic acid synthesis screening (NASS, sometimes also referred to as gene synthesis screening)—arrives as states and Congress grapple with various approaches to frontier AI governance and are increasingly focused on leveraging independent verification organizations (IVOs) to oversee frontier AI companies. The history of NASS policy in the United States—and the new policy’s dual-verification approach—offers hard-won lessons for where to go next on AI policy.
The White House Replaces Self-Attestation with Verified Compliance
Scientists across the United States often don’t make their own nucleic acids in-house. Instead, they purchase synthetic DNA and RNA from companies that provide this as a service, known commonly as providers. For over a decade, a consortium of companies known as the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) voluntarily screened synthetic nucleic acid orders coming in from scientists to ensure that their orders were not unnecessarily dual-use or that the person making the order had a legitimate reason for purchasing a particular sequence that could be dual-use. The group formed in response to high-profile biosecurity episodes such as the 2006 purchase of a smallpox DNA fragment from a provider without adequate vetting and the reconstruction of the 1918 pandemic influenza virus from synthetic DNA. The IGSC saw the potential of their technology to be misused and opted to ensure that this would not happen, both for the safety and security of humanity and for survival of their business model. If a horrific biosecurity incident occurred using DNA or RNA that a provider sold, not only could the company face potentially catastrophic liability, but it also would lose consumer trust and invite reactive and overly burdensome regulatory requirements.
But over time, this voluntary regime proved not to be enough. While companies in the IGSC represented a large share of the nucleic acid provider industry, bad actors could simply order from a company that did not screen. Red teaming of IGSC member companies by private actors, whereby individuals made orders that should not have been completed or at least flagged under IGSC policies, also revealed that the member companies did not necessarily comply with their own voluntary policies.
The result has been an evolution of NASS policy from self-regulation into escalating levels of verified compliance. In the process of that shift, NASS policy has shown itself not only as one of the few emerging technology topics that represent a rare convergence of bipartisan political will, industry support, and technical readiness, but also as an exemplar for how to approach other advanced technologies, including AI. Advocates for the new NASS policy point to strong nucleic acid synthesis security as the first step in a multilayered defense approach to biosecurity to deter misuse without hindering beneficial research, due to its unique effectiveness as a choke point.
The White House’s newly released policy, the National Policy for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening, replaces the Biden-era 2024 Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening. On full implementation, the new policy will also supersede the Biden-era 2023 HHS Screening Framework Guidance (which itself began during President Trump’s first term). The policy is a triumph for advocates who have sought to build on the 2024 framework. Where the 2024 framework required all federally funded entities to purchase their synthetic nucleic acids only from providers that screened orders, that policy relied on providers self-attesting to the screening policies outlined in the 2024 framework. The updated policy goes further than the 2024 framework in numerous ways, but most importantly, it establishes a trusted vendor program through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and extends its reach to subrecipients of federal funding.
Instead of providers self-attesting that they comply with specified screening practices, the new policy tasks NIST with issuing screening standards that third-party screeners will then need to demonstrate compliance with to become verified by NIST. Providers that demonstrate use of such screeners or can demonstrate their own compliance with the standards will then be approved as “adherent suppliers,” and a public list of such companies will be maintained for all federally funded recipients and subrecipients to look to when purchasing synthetic nucleic acids. This effectively ends the voluntary NASS regime by incentivizing companies that want access to the U.S. nucleic acid synthesis market—which is about 75 percent federally funded and is the largest in the world—to actually comply with screening standards rather than simply claim to.
The new policy covers more providers by expanding the reach of the policy to subrecipients of federal funding. For example, if an academic lab receives federal funding, the lab and any of its subcontractors would also be bound by the policy. However, it’s unclear how exactly this will be implemented: In mixed funding situations, for example, where an academic lab gets both private and federal funding, is it still allowed to purchase synthetic nucleic acids from noncompliant providers using private funds, or does the federal funding requirement extend to the use of any funds, regardless of whether federal funds are being used explicitly or not? This same question would similarly extend to subrecipients of federal funds.
Frontier AI Needs the Same Two Layers of Verification
Frontier AI governance is different in several ways from biosecurity; for example, it is moving much faster than developments in the NASS policy. While NASS policy advocates have been working for about two decades, advocates for frontier AI governance emerged more or less around 2016, the same time as the breakthrough in transformer models that underpin the most advanced modern AI systems. Frontier AI is also far less reliant on federal funding. Still, it has striking similarities to the unfolding of NASS policy.
Whereas the IGSC was formed three years after concerning biosecurity incidents, the Frontier Model Forum—which works on developing similar industry best practices—was formed in 2023, prior to any such comparable incidents. (There have now been several AI-enabled cybersecurity incidents—e.g., the UK AI Security Institute incident and the OpenAI–Hugging Face incident—that are arguably comparable to, or worse than, those biosecurity incidents.) In 2024, synthetic nucleic acid providers still self-attested to best practices; several weeks ago, key frontier AI companies signed the White House Accord on Super Intelligence that served as their own form of self-attestation. In that document, frontier AI companies agreed to implement stronger AI safety and security practices such as strong monitoring and control of AI as well as using third parties to carry out “independent assessments of whether the controls, monitoring, and detection are operating as intended.” Frontier AI governance has effectively mirrored the evolution of NASS policy on an accelerated timeline, rapidly moving from an approach that simply issued standards and included industry-led trade associations to a new mix of self-attestation and third-party verification.
In practice, that accelerated pace offers a mixed prognosis. In many ways, the pace at which frontier AI governance is developing, compared to the pace of NASS governance, is encouraging. At the same time, the jump in capabilities for frontier AI is much faster than the pace of NASS progress. So, when compared more closely, it could be that the ratio between governance and capabilities is roughly the same across both fields, explaining the slower governance in NASS and the faster governance in frontier AI. In some ways that does not matter. Given the scope and scale of AI’s impacts, it is essential to borrow as much as possible from existing policy solutions that deal with similar kinds of problems, so that policymakers don’t have to waste time reinventing the wheel or bringing stakeholders on board.
The new NASS policy demonstrates that not only was self-attestation of screening not enough for the safety and security of the United States (and, via the nature of biology, the world), but that self-attestation of the use of third-party screeners was also not enough. Without a verification regime like the one NIST is spinning up for NASS, policymakers do not have answers to critical questions about the competencies of the third parties that the frontier labs are using—nor do the frontier labs necessarily even have to use these third parties in the first place.
Indeed, the key strength of the verification regime established by the new policy is that there are two layers of verification: first for the screeners (or third parties), and a second for the adherent suppliers (who must use verified screeners). The policy even sets out an ambitious timeline for this: 90 days from publication for standards, and 160 days for the first list of adherent suppliers. Though frontier AI capabilities are reportedly accelerating, similar timelines seem reasonable to develop standards for AI safety and security that balance speed to market with enough robustness to ensure they do not immediately become irrelevant upon issuance.
Establishing a formal NASS-like regime for AI would also ensure not only that frontier AI companies are using third parties for AI safety and security, but that those third parties adhere to a specific standard that the government has developed with expert and stakeholder input. Without that, voluntary use of third parties for safety and security risks serving as safety theater. For example, a frontier AI company could use a third-party auditor or evaluator whose practices may allow for additional incidents to occur or simply forum shop for the third party with the laxest practices to tick off the compliance box.
With a new Congress slated to begin its work in a few months—filled with lawmakers more attuned to AI policy issues—dual-layer verification for frontier AI should be considered a key pillar in any frontier AI governance approach. Policymakers don’t need to make mistakes in one domain that they have already made in another, and they need to act with speed given rapidly advancing frontier AI capabilities.
Congress Should Adopt the NASS Model for Frontier AI
A federal funding lever for frontier AI governance likely won’t have the same effectiveness as it does for NASS policy because providers’ and frontier AI companies’ customer bases are so different. But there are already several other comparable levers that policymakers can use to incentivize frontier AI companies to participate in a dual-verification regime.
There are several bills on the state and federal levels that take a self-regulatory approach to third-party verification. California’s SB 813, enacted in September 2026, tasks a California agency with designating IVOs, third-party verifiers for generative AI. The bill encourages the agency to look to existing regulatory and audit standards rather than create new ones that the IVOs would need to adhere to, contrary to the NASS policy. The bill also explicitly states that it does not require AI companies to use IVOs. Illinois’ SB 0315, enacted in July, goes further: IVOs are mandatory for frontier AI companies. Here, too, the third party itself has no requirements and is not held to any standards beyond minimizing conflicts of interest.
It’s true that auditing a frontier AI company for its adherence to its own safety and security practices is different from doing the work of implementing safety and security practices themselves, as is the case with NASS screeners. It’s part of why AI IVO policies, which are also being considered on the federal level as part of the FRONTIER Act, fail in enhancing safety and security the same way that the new NASS policy does on each of the layers of verification. On the first layer of verification for a screener, the NASS policy asks, “Does this screener implement practices collectively agreed upon by the government and expert stakeholders that decrease biosecurity risk?”; on the second layer it asks, “Does this provider use a screener that has been verified to implement such practices, or implement such practices themselves?” Instead, the AI policies under consideration are asking something more akin to, “Does this Provider use any third party to test their own practices?” That is certainly better than nothing, but insufficient given the lessons from NASS policy.
Given ongoing state-level appetite for AI legislation, one key policy lever in the new year could be dual verification for frontier AI companies implemented in new state laws. The shortcoming of this approach, however, is that states lack the resources needed to publish high-quality standards. Without the standards, there can be no underlying accountability framework for frontier AI companies and their third-party verifiers.
A more practical approach would be for Congress to pass a bill that mirrors the Trump administration’s approach to the NASS policy. Such legislation should (1) require NIST to publish standards within 90 days on AI safety and security that mirror the commitments made in the White House Accord on Super Intelligence; (2) task NIST with verifying which third parties can adhere to such standards; and (3) require frontier AI companies to use verified third parties for AI safety and security within 160 days (or be verified by NIST to adhere to them, themselves).
Absent federal legislation, another option would be executive action on federal procurement—specifically, mandating that no AI companies can do business with federal agencies or federally funded entities unless they comply with the dual-verification regime established by the White House (similar to the new NASS policy). The benefit of this approach is that it would not rely on an act of Congress, but the drawback is that the market for frontier AI is much different from that for synthetic nucleic acids and is far less reliant on federal contracts, so it is not clear how much such a policy would actually incentivize compliance.
All these approaches to frontier AI governance have trade-offs, but the lesson from NASS policy is clear: Third-party verification only enhances safety and security if the third parties themselves are held to a standard. NASS policy took nearly two decades of voluntary commitments and self-attestation to arrive at this conclusion, but policymakers don’t have the same luxury of time for frontier AI. In the new year, Congress and other policymakers should start where NASS policy has ended, rather than repeating the mistakes made getting there.
Melissa Hopkins is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and an emerging technology advisor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.