Data Is Physical; Its Security Must Be, Too

Opening your apartment door with a fob, paying for your groceries with your phone, ordering an Uber, and scrolling through Instagram don’t just exist online; they depend on physical infrastructure. Data centers are the invisible backbone of our highly digitalized daily lives. Apps, websites, and AI tools run on physical servers, and data centers house them, store data, and process the computing tasks that keep those digital services running. If a cluster of data centers were destroyed in Northern Virginia, daily life would essentially be on pause: e-commerce, emails, internet, and essentially any app-based service would not be able to function.

Data centers are increasingly becoming targets in conflict precisely because of their strategic significance. Strikes on data centers have been ongoing in geopolitical conflict in the Middle East and Europe, heavily disrupting essential services during wartime. Although the United States is unlikely to experience the same physical threats as Europe or the Middle East, domestic actors have a different but potentially destructive toolkit at their disposal. The physical threats that are plaguing current geopolitical conflicts—missile strikes and kinetic attacks in active war—are not a concern to U.S.-based data centers. Insider threats and coordinated attacks on facilities, conducted by both domestic actors and foreign-enabled proxies, pose the biggest risks, and are currently severely underappreciated.

Q1: What happened in the attacks on Russia’s Yandex data centers? Have we seen these types of strikes before?

A1: From October 8–11, 2026, Ukrainian drones struck three data centers operated by Russian technology company Yandex as part of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Although no deaths were reported, the strikes damaged three of the five data centers operated by the Russian tech giant, seriously disrupting daily life in Russia and damaging AI training operations. These strikes were in retaliation for earlier Russian attacks on six of Ukraine’s own data centers.

Yandex is commonly described as Russia’s Google equivalent and provides a range of digital services to the country, including its primary online search engine, taxi and food delivery apps, e-commerce services, streaming platforms, email, and the GenAI model YandexGPT. The company also operates Yandex Cloud, which hosts digital infrastructure for over 64,000 customers—among these, Yandex claims, are a third of companies on Russia’s equivalent of the Fortune 500.

The strikes left Russians unable to make financial transactions, order groceries, and even enter their own homes. The subsequent outages also impaired Russia’s gig economy, cutting off taxi drivers and couriers from their earnings. The effects were not merely isolated to Russia, as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan faced similar service interruptions due to their own reliance on Yandex.

The Yandex strikes come in the same year as Iran’s drone attacks on Amazon Web Services (AWS) data centers in the Gulf. On March 1, the day after the Iran war began, Iranian drones struck two AWS facilities in the United Arab Emirates and damaged a third in Bahrain. AWS cited “structural damage” and “disrupted power delivery,” with the recovery expected to be “prolonged.” Ridesharing, financial, and enterprise software services raced to restore their services after they faced outages following the strikes. Months later, AWS was still unable to restore parts of its Gulf data infrastructure. In July, Iran claimed further attacks on Amazon’s “data infrastructure” in Bahrain; satellite imagery confirmed damage at two Amazon data centers in Zallaq and Askar.

Q2: Why are data centers becoming targets in war?

A2: Data centers are increasingly being targeted for several reasons:

  • The infrastructure is essential to multiple sectors and significant GDP growth in a country’s economy;
  • the companies that operate hyperscale data centers often provide critical services themselves to large populations;
  • governments and militaries are highly reliant on this infrastructure and these services; and
  • data centers are easy physical targets.
     

The math is simple. Drones worth tens of thousands of dollars can target billion-dollar data centers, cutting off commercial services critical to the livelihoods of millions of people—and potentially hampering processing and data storage capabilities for militaries. For Iran and Ukraine alike, data centers offered a way to potentially strike a more conventionally powerful adversary’s economy and military at once.

Data centers are also physically positioned as ideal targets for airstrikes. Hyperscale data centers are large, immovable buildings with no air defense. Moreover, the proximity of some of these larger data centers to key population and economic hubs, without the potential of significant casualties, makes them strategically impactful without necessarily triggering a disproportionate military response.

Tehran’s own justification following the March 2026 strikes was relatively straightforward: The claim was that the facilities were “supporting the enemy’s military and intelligence activities.” Following this, in April, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps issued a warning that it would target 18 U.S. technology companies in retaliation for subsequent assassinations of Iranian officials; companies named included Microsoft, Google, Apple, Palantir, Nvidia, and Oracle.

Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei broadened the state’s rationale, naming “cables, data centers, artificial intelligence facilities, and numerous other sites” as targets if fighting resumed. Rezaei claimed around $2 trillion in U.S. digital infrastructure assets existed in the region.

Q3: Who threatens data centers in the United States?

A3: Iran’s justification for its strikes in the Gulf shows how an adversary might decide to target data centers in wartime, and the same dual-use logic could apply to facilities in the United States. The Pentagon is increasingly reliant on commercial cloud infrastructure. For example, in 2022 it awarded a $9 billion contract to AWS, Google, Microsoft, and Oracle. Moreover, the National Security Agency has placed some of its data on AWS’s cloud under a $10 billion contract, while Microsoft and Oracle operate Pentagon-exclusive cloud regions in Northern Virginia, Iowa, Illinois, and elsewhere. Yet threats to data centers in the United States will likely look very different than those in the Middle East or Europe.

Shielded by geography, U.S. data centers are unlikely to come under attack from missiles or airstrikes. More plausible risks, however, come from individuals in the United States acting on their own grievances or supported by a foreign adversarial government. This threat environment is starting to take shape. Few types of infrastructure draw opposition from across the political spectrum as data centers do, especially as public opposition to the facilities has skyrocketed in recent months and years. A Gallup poll recently found that 71 percent of Americans opposed local data center construction, and voters rejected data centers in 40 out of 41 measures on the ballot in November’s midterm elections.

Some of this opposition has manifested in the form of violent threats aimed at data center facilities, personnel, and government officials. While many of the threats investigated by law enforcement have not yielded real-world violence, some individuals have taken concrete steps. For example, police arrested a man in 2021 who actively looked for explosives to destroy an Amazon data center, and another in 2025 who claimed to have acquired materials to burn down an xAI facility. Moreover, the individual implicated in an alleged June 2026 plot to attack the UFC event at the White House had also considered attacks on “AI datacenters, satellite communication facilities, and a California-based technology company,” according to the Justice Department.

Domestic extremists may also plot organized attacks. For example, a regional intelligence center in Northern Virginia revealed the potential of antigovernment extremists targeting data centers. A similar warning was issued by a government fusion center in Pennsylvania, naming state-backed actors, criminals, and violent extremists as potential perpetrators. Wired reported that some of these warnings could encompass peaceful protest activities, which has drawn pushback from activists. While the threat exists, it should not be exaggerated, as much of the opposition to data centers remains lawful local activism.

Although these threats currently remain low, foreign adversaries could provide these extremists with organizational, material, or financial resources or use information operations to inflame grievances. Russia has already used this playbook in Europe, recruiting individuals using “gig economy” methods to conduct sabotage activities against critical infrastructure sites through fairly rudimentary means such as arson. RAND Corporation expert Ian Mitch noted that China’s growing intelligence network in the United States has moved toward “more violent methods and clandestine tradecraft” that he warns could be directed toward sabotage, though there are few signs of active planning for attacks. Both military and commercial data centers would be natural targets should a crisis emerge, especially as adversaries look to disrupt government and economic activity.

Q4: How vulnerable is a U.S. data center, really?

Many U.S. data centers are highly secured facilities; Microsoft, for example, describes perimeter security, biometrics, security officers, and full-body metal detection, among other interventions, as layered protections at its own data centers. This makes a physical attack inside the facility extremely difficult, though an insider threat in the form of an employee or contractor with legitimate access could face far fewer barriers.

Drones are another matter. While the average American is unlikely to access a Shahed kamikaze drone, commercial drones are inexpensive and widely available. As the Atlantic Council’s Bilal Saab noted, many drones are fairly adaptable and difficult to detect, and their primarily civilian use cases make them difficult to regulate. Would-be attackers therefore have convenient tools at their disposal—and have already attempted to use them. For example, in 2020, a modified DJI drone flew toward a Pennsylvania power substation in an apparent attempt to short-circuit it. More recently, in 2024, authorities arrested a white supremacist who allegedly intended to attack an energy facility in Tennessee.

There haven’t yet been any reported drone attacks on data centers in the United States. However, limited safeguards could still let an attacker try. As in prior cases targeting energy infrastructure, a commercial drone could be flown toward a data center or the external dependencies that keep it operational, such as substations, external water supply, or fiber-optic cables.

Construction sites present another vulnerability. Data centers under construction are likely to be considerably less secure and more accessible than operational facilities, with fewer layers of protection and a steady flow of third-party contractors, temporary workers, and deliveries. This exposure was demonstrated most recently during a November 6 protest in Amsterdam, when over 100 activists broke into a Microsoft data center construction site. While that breach was a protest rather than an attack, it shows how easily these sites can be accessed, leaving them open to sabotage, arson, theft, or espionage. Moreover, adversaries targeting data center construction sites could also deploy tools to enable spying or conduct drone surveillance of the site.

Q5: What strategies could the United States use to protect itself from physical attacks against data centers?
A5: Currently, data centers are only implicitly a part of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Given their strategic significance, multisectoral dependencies, and unique vulnerabilities, policymakers should move toward an explicit, formal designation as a 17th critical infrastructure sector.

CISA, part of the Department of Homeland Security, defines critical infrastructure as “so vital” that “incapacitation or destruction” would perilously affect U.S. national security, economic security, public health, and/or public safety. While data centers would implicitly fall under the information technology sector (and the communications sector), the lack of clearly defined responsibility limits federal oversight and industry standards to protect the data and processing services that multiple sectors across the country rely on data centers for.

Moreover, local and state law enforcement should more actively coordinate with data center operators on potential physical security risks—engagement that experts argue should happen during data center planning and construction.

As these outlined risks to data centers grow, policymakers need to keep pace with the threat environment, especially as data center growth continues to expand exponentially. These overarching recommendations address the most primary security concerns:

  • Data centers should be explicitly classified as a separate sector of critical infrastructure by the Department of Homeland Security.
  • Local and state law enforcement should collaborate with data center providers in the early construction stage about realistic risks to physical infrastructure. Data center planning should incorporate information-sharing mechanisms with local and state law enforcement that expand through the continuation of the data center’s lifespan.
  • States and municipalities where data centers are being built should counter the risk of drone intrusions through local regulation and zoning laws.
  • Federally informed, industry-wide standards should be set for hiring employees for the construction and operation of mission-critical data centers, including military and intelligence facilities and hyperscale AI training centers.
     

As data centers continue to proliferate in the United States, there must be revamped and intentional coordination by both policymakers and industry to invest in building safe, secure facilities that can withstand the potential litany of threats that face this strategic infrastructure.

A’ndre Gonawela is a fellow with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Taylar Rajic is a fellow with the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS.