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This transcript is from a CSIS press briefing hosted on January 5, 2024.
Paige Montfort: Great. Thank you, Kevin. And hello, everyone. Thank you so much for dialing in today to join us for this press briefing providing our latest insights and perspective ahead of the Taiwanese presidential election, which is scheduled to be held on January 13th. We have a terrific lineup of CSIS experts on today’s call, to whom I’ll turn over the line shortly here to provide some opening thoughts and analysis on the state of the race, possible outcomes, and broader implications for security and diplomacy in the region. And afterward, we’re going to open it up to questions from the members of press who have dialed in here.
So without further ado, I’ll introduce my colleagues in the order in which they will be speaking. First, we’ll hear from Dr. Victor Cha, CSIS senior vice president for Asia, who also holds our Korea Chair. And after that, we will hear from Dr. Scott Kennedy, who is a CSIS senior advisor and holds our Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics. After Scott, we will hear from Dr. Lily McElwee, who’s deputy director and fellow with our CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies. And finally, we will hear from Brian Hart, a fellow with the CSIS China Power Project.
As a reminder, there will be a transcript published within just a few hours today of this call posted to CSIS.org and sent directly to those of you who have RSVPed. And with that, I’ll turn it over to Dr. Victor Cha to lead us off. Please go ahead.
Dr. Victor Cha: Thank you, Paige. And good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us. Good evening, if you’re listening from elsewhere in Asia.
So I’m going to offer some initial framing remarks about the election and then turn it over to the experts who will tell you who is going to win this election. Just kidding. But I think the first observation is that, you know, broadly, there’s lots of concerns about democracy backsliding around the world. But, you know, it’s actually quite alive and well in Asia. 2024 is going to witness a large number of electoral choices that are being made by citizens of Asia. Of course, this is not to say that there isn’t illiberal regimes in Asia. I think we know there are. But there really are a spate of elections this year that speak, arguably, to the bright future of democracy in the region.
In Bangladesh, this weekend we’re going to see parliamentary elections. Next month, in Indonesia we’ll elections to succeed President Joko Widodo; Pakistan will also hold general elections. In April, there will be National Assembly elections in Korea, which will be a popular mandate on the Yoon government’s performance. In India, there were state elections last month and there’s a national election most likely in May. In Mongolia, there will be elections in June for a parliament. Then, sometime before September we will see national elections in Japan.
This takes us to Taiwan’s presidential election, and while many will focus on how China reacts to this election, again, my point here is the election itself is testament to one of the most vibrant democracies in Asia and that is an important context in which to think about how this election will proceed.
So with that, Paige, I’ll turn it back to – I guess I’ll turn it over to Scott. Is that right?
Ms. Montfort: Yes.
Dr. Scott Kennedy: Sure. Thanks, Victor, and thanks, Paige, and thanks for everybody being here. Everyone can hear me, right? Is it OK?
Ms. Montfort: Yes. Sounds great.
Dr. Cha: Yes.
Dr. Kennedy: Super. OK.
So I want to just foot stomp to begin with a point that Victor just made about the health of democracy in the region and including in Taiwan.
I’ve visited Taiwan five times in the last two years and I’m – and I’ve been going there for over 30, and Taiwan could have gone in a very different direction. It’s democratized entirely during that time with – and deep fissures within society between those who were born on the island and don’t have as close ties to mainland China and those who moved over following the civil war, and those differences have really disappeared and Taiwanese society is far more integrated and unified than it’s ever been.
There’s a large middle class. They went through the pandemic about as well as anybody. High levels of social trust and I think that is – forms the foundation of why we’re seeing Taiwan as a democratic success and compare that to others elsewhere in the world that are having more problems with their political systems.
As regards to this election, again, right – you know, there are three main candidates still in the race. The polls are done and they will – we won’t see another poll until the actual results now on the 13th.
Lai Ching-te, the DPP candidate, is ahead in just about every one of these polls over Hou Yu-ih, the KMT candidate, the mayor of Taipei City, and Ko Wen-je, the former Taipei mayor and who heads the Taiwan People’s Party, and most of the polls show them in that order – Lai, Hou, and Ko.
But the differences between them are still relatively small and there’s, you know, two weeks between the last poll and the election. So it’s really too close to call and this is different from the last election in which Tsai Ing-wen had a very large lead heading into the race.
So I’d point folks to the “Frozen Garlic” blog that Nathan Batto writes. He’s at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, really one of the smartest people following Taiwan’s elections.
I would say a third point is that the chances – although there obviously are chances for a conflict and we have to be on guard and quite vigilant, I think we’ve overstated the likelihood of a shooting war in which there are casualties on any side and I think that the chances of war are going to remain low regardless of who wins next week because of three factors.
The first is the U.S.-China military balance is still robust. China’s military power has increased dramatically over the last few decades and focused heavily on a Taiwan scenario and they have been displaying that force particularly over the last 16 to 17 months following House Speaker Pelosi’s visit with several thousand sorties and activities all around the island.
But the U.S. military presence is very robust and it’s expanded its collaboration with its allies in the region and so I think the balance for the time being is pretty stable. Economic interdependence is also extremely high in every direction between China and every one of its trading partners. Across straits economic interdependence is still high and as a result the costs of a conflict in which there was any interruption of trade or investment or flow people would be extremely high, even higher than the costs that Russia has suffered as a result of the sanctions it’s faced because of Ukraine.
And, lastly, there’s a consensus in Taiwan. Every single survey that’s been done shows that under current circumstances in which there is a threat from China, 90-plus percent of Taiwanese favor keeping the status quo of de facto independence, but not de jure independence, for Taiwan. And that cuts across all political parties. And so we talk about greens and blues in Taiwan. They’re really all shades of turquoise, slightly leaning in one direction or another. But the consensus around maintaining the status quo is strong. And so I don’t see anyone really pushing away from the status quo, even if Lai is elected.
Last thing I want to just say is there’s going to be – there has been some diversification of Taiwan’s external economic activity away from China, but interdependence with China is here to stay. So if we just look from 2010 to 2020 at Taiwan’s outward foreign direct investment and its exports, in 2010 84 percent of Taiwan’s outward investment went to China. Now it’s down to 33.6 percent, as of 2022. Its investment toward the U.S., it used to be 2.8 percent in 2010, is now just 7.3 percent. And ASEAN has increased a lot, from 5.1 percent to 31.5. And that’s a huge jump. But China is still a primary target of Taiwanese outward investment.
The numbers have shifted somewhat in exports, but even less than in outward investment. China used to be 28 percent of Taiwan’s exports. It’s now down to 25.3. The U.S. has risen from 11.5 to 15.7 percent. ASEAN has ticked up just a little bit from 15.3 percent to 16.8 percent. So interdependence with China is still going to be with us for a long time.
And this applies particularly to semiconductors. Taiwan manufactures 60 percent of all semiconductors, 90 percent of all advanced chips. And that is a percentage that is likely to go up not down, even with the investments that the U.S. is made with TSMC in Arizona, other places TSMC has invested. Taiwan is investing in and opening fabs faster than the rest of the world combined. And so we’re going to have to learn to live with this interdependence, even though it creates a variety of risks. But it also creates costs for conflict. And so I think we’re in a difficult situation, but we’re going to need to find ways to manage it.
So let me – let me stop there, and pass things over to my next colleague.
Ms. Montfort: Great. Thank you, Scott. And over to you, Lily.
Dr. Lily McElwee: Great. Thank you, Paige.
I will jump in on the poll question first. Just to – Scott covered that for the most part, but I just wanted to add that – Scott mentioned that no further election polls will be published in the lead-up to the election. Lai is narrowly leading in all major polls, with his lead from around 3 percent to – or, three percentage points to around 11 percentage points, followed by Hou. And Ko is trailing somewhat. And I think it’s worth noting that his reputation was a little bit damaged by the failed KMT-TPP joint ticket in late November. Mainly because the Ko Wen-je, the TPP, has run as an anti-establishment candidate, and the KMT very establishment. So that sort of harmed his reputation a little bit.
The VP candidates were also selected recently, which I think is worth noting, in November. And Bi-khim Hsiao has been polling the best. She is the DPP vice presidential candidate. In the recent VP debate, around 40 percent of the audience thought that she did the best, versus around 31 percent for the KMT VP candidate, and 7 percent for TPP. So I think that’s worth noting as well.
And then I think, finally, in terms of the polling, there’s a little bit of incumbent fatigue that I think is worth noting. At no point has Lai polled over 50 percent. This is derived from a little bit of fatigue among the Taiwan electorate with the DPP, which has ruled for – or, which has been the party in power for eight years. So that’s worth noting as well. That said, Lai is ahead, as Scott mentioned.
I think it’s also worth noting that while cross-strait relations is a big issue – and I’ll turn to that next – there are domestic issues which are shaping the election as well.
Energy security is a big one. Taiwan voters are debating the future of nuclear energy. And around – over 90 percent of Taiwan’s energy is imported. Its high-tech industries rely heavily on stable energy resources. And the parties vary somewhat in their stance on the future of Taiwan’s nuclear power plants. So I think that’s another election issue that’s worth mentioning.
Quality-of-life issues, as in any election in Asia or elsewhere.
Jobs is another election issue as well. Young people are feeling quite uncertain about their economic future.
Conscription and defense reforms are also on the docket. Tsai has lengthened the mandatory military service from four months to a year. And the candidates – there’s not a huge difference in some of their positions on that issue, but I think it’s worth noting that it is also a somewhat domestic issue that voters are thinking about.
In terms of cross-strait relations, I just wanted to echo what Scott said about there being a new consensus, if you will, among the Taiwan electorate. It really is worth noting that the electorate overwhelmingly supports the status quo. There is very, very little support for unification, under 10 percent. There’s very little appetite for the one country, two systems formula that Beijing proposes, which even the KMT candidate, Hou Yu-ih, has rejected, and that – you know, that follows – that was really damaged by the events in Hong Kong, which really changed voter opinion in Taiwan.
And then there’s a distinct and growing sense of national identity in Taiwan. Over 60 percent of the population identifies as Taiwanese only and 30 percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese, so I think we’re dealing with a new reality in Taiwan and I think most parties have recognized that. The mean position, if you will, is now pro-status quo and a strategy of deterrence and various levels of communication and cooperation with Beijing. But there is a new mean, and so I think that that’s worth noting as well.
The final point I’ll make, which hasn’t been covered so far, is Beijing’s observations and interference, to what degree they’re interfering in this election. Their aim is obviously to help their favorite party, the KMT, make the case that it is better for Taiwan’s economy and safety and security, and I think that they’ve helped play up the idea that the election’s a choice between war and peace. They frame William Lai as a separatist candidate they cannot negotiate with and they, you know – the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said a couple days ago that they’re going to publish a list of attempted, alleged interference by Beijing in the election following the election, but we’ve seen everything from economic coercion – I think Scott mentioned ECFA – and the trade probe launched by Beijing in April, to – (laughs) – pressuring of – pressuring a Taiwan rock group, for example, recently, Mayday, to voice support for reunification. So, you know, obviously we’ve seen heightened military activity as well by the PLA. And then on the carrot side we’ve seen, you know, subsidized trips for local officials to sway them into supporting pro-PRC candidates. So I think we’re seeing maybe not a heavy-handed approach, recognizing that that really risks backfiring, but we have seen some election interference that I think is worth noting as well.
I’ll stop there.
Ms. Montfort: Great. Thank you, Lily.
And last but not least, I’ll turn it over to Brian Hart.
Brian Hart: Thanks, everyone. I won’t go too into detail about kind of the election result. I think, you know, my colleagues have covered that really well. I’ll add maybe just one or two points on the election, how things are turning, and then I’ll turn mostly to kind of the implications for cross-strait relations and security in the region.
One thing I’d point out – and I think Lily kind of alluded to this, but I think one of the biggest factors shaping maybe the DPP’s weakness here is the fact that, you know, after eight years of rule they’re no longer this – the kind of edgy underdog that they once were, and I think that that has been particularly impactful in terms of how the younger voters think about this election, which is why I think, you know, TPP candidate Ko Wen-je had quite a bit of appeal with some of the younger voters there.
But I think another big factor here that hasn’t been mentioned about – you know, that will have a big impact in the legislative election – so I think, based on, you know, the existing polls, the most likely scenario is the DPP will not be able to retain its majority in the legislature. And even the KMT, I think, is worried that it won’t – it also won’t be able to maintain a – or, to gain a majority. And so you have this dynamic where potentially the most likely outcome is maybe a KMT sharing power in the legislature with some of the TPP candidates if the TPP performs well with some of its legislative candidates. And so that gives potentially the TPP and Ko Wen-je some significant leverage over the future of the legislative agenda and domestic politics going forward. So if, for example, you see a Lai win, he may face a very significant kind of deadlock in the legislature and potentially weaken his ability to kind of pursue his agenda going forward. So I think that will have impact. I think that that will also have impacts for how China approaches things going forward, which I’ll touch on a bit later.
I think I’ll start off by pointing out the importance of cross-strait relations here. As others have said, you know, voters always say that they are – they are really focused on a lot of the domestic issues – housing prices, food prices, energy security, wages. And those are certainly important, and I think young voters in particular try to emphasize those because they, I think, often get frustrated by the focus on cross-strait relations. But at the end of the day, so much of this election is still fundamentally shaped by cross-strait dynamics and Taiwan’s identity.
And so I think one visible symbol of that was last week when the presidential debates were held. The media was offered five – a segment where they asked five different questions of the candidates. Of those, only one focused on domestic issues; they lumped in wages and housing and all of those things into one question. And the four other questions focused on U.S.-Taiwan relations, the 1992 consensus, the constitution and its definition of ROC territory, and then PRC interference in Taiwan’s society. So I think when it comes down to it, cross-strait issues really do shape presidential election dynamics. That’s not the case for, you know, local elections and maybe some of the legislative elections. But when it comes to the president, I think it really has a huge impact.
And I would also note one other thing from that debate that I think was interesting. You know, the candidates spent a lot of time talking about their views on cross-strait issues. One interesting dynamic was KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih blaming the Tsai administration for the loss of nine Taiwan remaining allies, which China has poached from them during Tsai’s administration. You know, Lai retorted that he should be blaming China, not the Tsai administration. And I think this is interesting because last year, in March 2023, we saw China time the poaching of Honduras, one of Taiwan’s remaining allies, along – it coincided with President Tsai’s transit through the United States in a very queer effort to diplomatically punish the Tsai administration. So I think it’s worth noting that some of these big moves that China makes to isolate Taiwan do circulate into kind of the debates around the election.
Now I’ll just touch on some of what I think China’s thinking and what we’re seeing from some of their government, their experts. Chinese authorities have really chimed in a lot more in recent weeks. The Taiwan Affairs Office has issued several statements about the election. Especially in December and November there was a big uptick from earlier in the year, when I think things were a little bit more quiet. But as the election has ramped up, China has also increased its statements on that. And of course, they have been very critical of Lai, casting him as a troublemaker and a supporter for Taiwan independence.
There’s been interesting writings, I think, by Chinese scholars that suggest some intricacies in the way that they’re thinking about the election. I think – of course, many of them have cast this as kind of an election that’s ultimately about peace versus war, and they’re broadly concerned about the TPP victory. And you know, many have tried to cast Lai and the TPP as effectively puppets for the United States. But some have also noted that the DPP faces internal challenges within the party and within – you know, will face opposition. As I alluded to earlier, it’s – if Lai wins, he will still face opposition domestically in ways that I think the Tsai administration has not faced as much. So I think perhaps they see some opportunity there.
Notably, some of the scholars have pointed out that cross-strait relations will remain tense regardless of who wins, you know, noting that even if the KMT wins, things will probably not go back to what Beijing viewed as somewhat a high-water mark during the Ma Ying-jeou years. So I don’t think there’s a ton of optimism either way in Beijing. It’s more of a lesser of two or three evils, I think, from their perspective.
So I think, finally, kind of the big questions that remain here is what will China do. Our team recently polled senior U.S. and Taiwanese scholars on some of these questions. I don’t want to give away the results of that yet. We’ll be coming out with that in the next couple of weeks. But I think generally there’s a concern among many U.S. scholars and, you know, former officials that China will stage military exercises, you know, in the coming weeks and months after the election, probably generally akin to what we saw the PLA do in August after the Pelosi visit and in April after President Tsai’s transit through the U.S.
I think Taiwanese scholars are slightly more sanguine there, with many believing China may – you know, may focus more on economic and diplomatic measures. But I think there is still considerable worry of, you know, military exercises as being Beijing’s response. I don’t think there is significant concern about, you know, a more aggressive military action such as a blockade or an invasion.
But a key issue here is when Beijing acts. Does it immediately act after the election, or does it wait until the inauguration? Or does it even wait indefinitely to see what the new president does? I think that will be – you know, the timing of Beijing’s response will give us a good clue as to how they’re going to pursue or approach Taiwan and cross-strait relations going forward in general.
I would note that inaugurations have really been an important marker in the past of where new Taiwan leaders want to take things on cross-strait relations. And so, you know, if Beijing waits until after the inauguration, that may be a sign that they’re at least willing to see what may happen. But I think if they respond immediately after the election results with something like an exercise, again, that’s a clear sign of where they plan to take things going forward.
A last few thoughts as I wrap things up. No party has ever won a third straight presidential election, you know, since popular elections of the president began in 1996. So a DPP victory here would be the first such occasion. And I think ultimately it would be a symbol of China’s – a failure of China’s approach to Taiwan. They have – you know, they clearly do not want to see the DPP continue to win these elections. And so a big question remains is how do they change their approach going forward, or will they?
A weak win by the DPP, as I have flagged, may be a ray of hope for Beijing that there’s still a chance of waiting out the DPP and making progress towards unification down the road. In that light, you know, it’s not clear whether Beijing’s approach will radically change if Lai wins.
And very last point. If Lai does win and he doesn’t, you know, make any significant shifts towards independence or rock the boat from Beijing’s perspective, I think that we’ll still see Beijing exaggerate his actions and cast him as a troublemaker and a separatist. They will look for opportunities to punish his administration and isolation Taiwan diplomatically. So regardless of, you know, what even Lai or another president does, I think we’ll see continue – China continue to put some pressure on Taiwan going forward.
And I’ll wrap up there. Thanks.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you so much, Brian. And thank you to each of our experts for your insights and perspectives.
Next we’re going to open up the call to questions from those members of the press who have dialed in. So I’ll turn it back over to our AT&T operator to let you know how to queue.
Operator: Thank you.
(Gives queueing instructions.)
And our first question will be from the line of Nike Ching, Voice of America. Please go ahead.
Q: Good morning, and thank you very much for the call.
I would like to ask a question to Victor and anyone who would like to provide their insights. How important is it to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait as international waters for countries in the EAP region, for Taiwan, and for the U.S.? Thank you.
And separately, if I may, a question for Scott. Scott, you mentioned the chance of a military conflict after the election is low given the interdependence between Taiwan and China, and other reasons. What is your read on China ramping up sending military vessels, airplanes, and balloons near Taiwan before the election? Is it a move to intimidate Taiwanese voters? And in your meetings with Chinese officials, what are they thinking on the Taiwan election?
Thank you so much. And I really appreciate your analysis.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you. Dr. Cha, would you like to start off?
Dr. Cha: Yeah, so I’ll just – I mean, I’ll let Scott speak to the questions. But I’ll just say that I think it’s quite important for the region that we see stability across the Taiwan Straits, given all else that’s going on in the world in Europe and the Middle East. Which are – have ripple effects throughout Asia. The last thing that I think the region wants is another crisis. In addition, I think in some of the polling and many conversations I’ve had around the region, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is actually quite important. It’s a quite important signal or indicator of the credibility and reliability of the U.S. more broadly in the region, as the security guarantor.
Let me leave it at that.
Dr. Kennedy: Sure. Nike, good questions.
I think that China’s efforts, you know, on the military side, yes, they’re meant to intimidate. They’re meant to deter. They’re meant to signal the very high cost that Taiwan and anyone supporting Taiwan on the defense side would face, were Taiwan to cross any of China’s red lines. They’re also part of just simply training and preparation, as well. But I don’t think they are the beginnings of the intention to actually attack Taiwan or create some other type of crisis through an embargo or other scenario that people have talked about.
In conversations with officials in China, I – just wanted to highlight the point that Brian made before, there’s a great deal of frustration amongst Chinese officials that they have not made more progress. And I think that this shows a lack of ability to sort of, you know, evaluate how their own behavior has affected cross-strait relations. And, you know, China has moved in a political direction internally and globally which is not very attractive to countries around the world, just in terms of maintaining regular relations with them, let alone considering some type of political integration of any sort, even at the most superficial level.
So the real question is, can China – what would China need to do to make itself a more attractive partner, to make progress down that road? And it is almost, you know, impossible to conceive of the CCP doing what would be needed. So instead, Chinese officials focus on sort of the historical cultural ties, China as a victim of international plots to separate the two, and then activities amongst the DPP and others to engineer the creation of a new identity for people in Taiwan, to turn attention away from actions that mainland China has taken which make them less attractive to Taiwanese. And I don’t see them waking up one day and saying: You know what? We’ve gone about this all wrong and we really need to – need to rethink this. And so I think we’re kind of stuck as a result of that.
One the other hand, the Chinese also recognize the high consequences of conflict on a military level, economically, and potentially for the regime. So I think they’re kind of stuck in this middle ground of trying to continue to deter but not getting to the maximalist goal which they want.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you so much, Scott.
And we will go on to our next question.
Operator: And we’ll go to Shaun Tandon, AFP. Please go ahead.
Q: I know – oh, sorry.
Operator: Go ahead. You’re open.
Q: Forgive me.
Thanks. Thanks. Thanks for doing this call, and happy new year.
I know that many of you were trained on the prospects for conflict, but just wanted to (set up ?) a little bit more in terms of the policy implications for the United States. Obviously, publicly the U.S. isn’t going to express preference for a candidate, but in terms of what the candidates would mean if they win to U.S. policy, I mean, do you think U.S. policy will – regarding Taiwan will move ahead regardless in terms of – in terms of the defense support, et cetera, or do you think there could be changes depending on how this plays out? Thanks.
Ms. Montfort: Thanks, Shaun.
Who would like to take that first?
Dr. McElwee: I’m happy to take it. Lily McElwee here. I’ll take a first stab.
So I think that you’re right, Shaun, there’s an – you know, the U.S. does not take an official position on this question on the election. In fact, Biden’s message has been that the sanctity of the election is paramount. This is a choice the 23, 24 million people of Taiwan get to make, no one else. We saw that message reiterated to Xi Jinping in November 2023 when the two leaders met. Biden asked Xi to respect Taiwan’s electoral process.
What I think Washington will be looking for here, obviously, the election is coming at a time of heightened U.S.-China tensions, and it’s really important for the United States to continue U.S. – continue bilateral dialogue, avoid military confrontation. And I think Washington understands that this election may affect the bilateral tensions dynamics. It will be – you know, I think, essentially, we’re looking at concern in terms of a Lai victory, you know, and bracing for Beijing to increase military and economic coercion on Taiwan. With Hou Yu-ih, this isn’t an official position but I think there is a concern that – about how that affects, for example, Taiwan’s defense capabilities and defense investment going forward, as warmer ties with the PRC are on the agenda.
But I think overall this will be a period that requires intensive diplomacy. I think that’s recognized by the Biden administration: prolific use of communication channels; constant reiteration of the importance of peace, stability, and the status quo. And I think also important to mention that the U.S. has its own election coming up in November of this year, and the U.S. approach going forward will also be shaped by that election in terms of, you know, whether we get a continuation of the Biden approach or we get a Republican administration coming into office.
Dr. Kennedy: This is Scott Kennedy. I’ll just add one point to the very wise analysis that Lily just gave, just to highlight that there may be a difference between the executive and Congress. My sense is that the Biden administration genuinely is – doesn’t have a favorite horse in this race, and they will respect the outcome and deal with the incoming administration in Taipei regardless of who wins.
I wonder if, on the other hand, in Congress there may be some disappointment if Lai doesn’t win, because I think sentiment in Congress probably leans a little bit more green than blue and many members of Congress haven’t been themselves in office in pre-DPP years. So I think that might – I’ll be curious about their reaction. And that will be different to the sentiment – I would assume that U.S. policy, whether executive branch or Congress, will still largely be the same, but I wonder in terms of sentiment if there will be some – would be some disappointment on Capitol Hill and perhaps greater accusations of Chinese meddling if the outcome doesn’t go as some of them might prefer.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you, Scott, and thank you, Lily.
We will go on to our next question.
Operator: And we have a question on the line of Bhagya Garekar of The Straits Times. Please go ahead.
Q: Thank you very much for this briefing.
My first question actually was the same as Shaun’s about whether DPP win was the more favorable outcome for this – you know, for the U.S., but that’s answered.
So I’d like to ask about Hsiao Bi-khim. Now, she seems to have been effective here as Taiwan representative. Would her time in D.C. make a difference if DPP won to U.S.-Taiwan relations and generally how is she regarded here? Thank you.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you, Bhagya.
Lily or Brian, would you like to start out?
Dr. McElwee: Yeah. Sure. I’ll –
Mr. Hart: I can – I can jump in.
Dr. McElwee: Yeah. Yeah. Brian, definitely. I just want to mention one thing really quickly. I think Hsiao Bi-khim is the VP candidate with the most international experience and foreign policy experience, which I think could shape Taiwan’s foreign policy, going forward.
Overall I think that voters are reacting well to her in Taiwan. I think she’s generally well regarded in the United States. But – you know, but, again, there’s no official U.S. position on these parties, these candidates, and I think Washington will find ways of working with all of them.
So with that, I’ll just – I’ll turn it over to Brian.
Mr. Hart: Sure. Thanks.
Yeah, I would agree. I think the fact that Bi-khim Hsiao is very much a known quantity here within Washington I think it was very much baked into Lai’s decision to pick her as his running mate.
I think it certainly could help in terms of, you know, keeping relations, you know, warm and keeping communication open with Taipei as we go forward. But I would just reiterate, too, the point about the Biden administration really not having a preferred candidate. I think that’s very genuine because I do think that, you know, from Washington’s perspective all three of the candidates carry, you know, different opportunities and potential costs.
And so, again, I think that it’s important that Beijing had – or that Washington has repeatedly emphasized publicly and privately that it doesn’t have a preferred candidate because it doesn’t want to be seen as weighing in on the election and I do think that it also – you know, it really does cut different ways in terms of, you know, how the candidates may work with Washington.
But I think there’s a pretty high confidence that all of the candidates will generally work well with Washington. I don’t think that there’s a major concern that U.S.-Taiwan relations will take any kind of hit based on the results of the election.
And I’ll wrap up there.
Ms. Montfort: Great. Thank you, Brian. Thank you, Lily.
And back over to our operator for the question queue.
Operator: Thank you.
(Gives queuing instructions.)
And we will go to the line of Tina Chung, Voice of America. Please go ahead.
That line went out of queue, Ms. Chung. OK. Your line is open now.
Tina Chung, your line is open.
Q: Yes. Can you hear me?
Operator: Yes.
Q: OK. Yeah.
My question is – I will go back to Nike’s question about the military side of the coercion, the balloon part because this is the most recent ones. I’d like to know if this could have some psychological impact on Taiwan because some of the balloons flew over Taiwan and near the military bases. And so would this have some kind of psychological impact on Taiwan because Taiwan’s military could not take – at least, you know, potentially they cannot take any actions right now? Would it impact the – next week’s election? Thank you.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you, Tina. Who would like to take that one?
Mr. Hart: I can jump in on this one.
Ms. Montfort: Perfect. Thank you.
Mr. Hart: Yeah. This is Brian.
I think – a couple of things on the balloon issue. It has been new in recent weeks that the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense has posted maps showing the tracks of those balloons. So I think that is a new development coming from Taiwan.
What’s not entirely clear to me is whether it is, in fact, the first time those balloons have flown over the island in that way, or whether this is the first time that the MD is being – publicly sharing that information. We know that, you know, since the surveillance balloon incident over the United States, that China has had this surveillance balloon program for years and has flown many of them across the Pacific and around Taiwan. So, you know, whether this is actually a new development is actually hard to say.
But, by and large, I think China’s willingness to use the military as a tool to threaten has become commonplace. I think Beijing has become more comfortable with using the military and more inclined to using it. I think we’ve seen statements from their Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying that Beijing now feels that its diplomatic messaging was not getting through to Taiwan or the United States, and that now the PLA – using the military is now something that they are having to do. You know, that’s at least Beijing’s messaging on this.
So I think we’re going to continue to see that kind of coercive activity. And we’ve seen them use new types of activity over the course of the year too, besides balloons, would just point out. And one of those is kind of a heightened use of drones around Taiwan, including tracking those drones in ways that pretty much encircle the island in ways that, as far as we were aware, were not commonplace before. So, you know, they’re using various different tactics to threaten Taiwan and to put pressure on the Tsai administration. And so I think we’ll see that continue, to varying extents. And I think, you know, potentially if Lai wins the presidency, there’s a – you know, a considerable chance that Beijing ramps up that activity going forward.
Ms. Montfort: Thank you, Brian.
And we are about at time. Did anyone else want to add to that question before we wrap up today?
Dr. McElwee: Yeah, I’ll just say one final thing. I think that Brian’s covered the military activity. And that has clearly ramped up over the last few years, particularly since Pelosi’s – then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit. With the intended effect for intimidation. And we’ve seen Chinese leaders emphasize the importance of China projecting an overwhelming disparity in military power versus Taiwan in terms of the psychological effects.
But I think, to go back to something that both Brian and Scott mentioned, you know, Beijing’s goals here are to deter de jure independence and also to induce Taipei to go to the table for political discussions. It’s somewhat succeeding on one of those and it’s failing on the other. You know, the sense of national identity has grown. Support for unification, support for one country, two systems has fallen. There’s greater skepticism of economic inducements. So I think if Lai wins this would be the perfect time for Beijing to step back and diagnose it as a setback, and think about its strategy going forward. I don’t know if that’s likely.
We are likely to see an intensification of the stick side of these stick-carrot equation here. But I – but, you know – I mean, to go back to your question, I think it is about eroding the resolve of the Taiwan electorate, convincing the electorate that, you know, unification is inevitable and beneficial. I don’t know that it’s succeeding in that regard.
Ms. Montfort: Great. Thank you so much. And we are a couple of minutes over time, so we will wrap up the call there. Thank you all so much for joining us today. Thank you to my colleagues for your insights, analysis, and time.
For those of you who have dialed in, if you have follow-up questions or questions you didn’t have answered today, in the coming week in the lead-up to the election please feel free to reach out to me, Paige Montfort. I’m happy to get you connected with the experts on today’s call or other colleagues here at CSIS. And finally, as a reminder, we will be publishing this transcript, so please look out for that in the next few hours. And have a great weekend ahead.
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