Is Venezuela Moving Toward Democracy?

After the capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, and the subsequent installation of Delcy Rodríguez as acting president, the United States set the terms of what followed in Venezuela through Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s three-stage “stabilization, recovery and transition” plan. The phases outline an administration that did not pursue regime change but rather adopted a regime management strategy, with a political transition through presidential elections as the end goal. Nine months on, the plan has seen unexpected accelerations and interruptions, signaling a complex road ahead toward eventual elections. With a second round of negotiations between the Venezuelan opposition and interim government starting on September 15, a new oil deal signed between the United States and the Rodríguez regime, and President Trump saying recently once again that Venezuela is not ready for elections, it is worth taking stock of where Venezuela lies on the stabilization, recovery, and transition continuum.

Phase One: Stabilization

After the daring raid that captured Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, the Trump administration chose immediate leadership continuity, avoiding the internal chaos that state collapse could have brought with it. Hours after the raid, President Trump made clear that María Corina Machado, Venezuela’s opposition leader and the most obvious alternative to the Chavista regime, was not going to be installed as head of state, as she didn’t “have the support within or the respect within the country.” The president likely meant that the security forces, which had been essential to propping up the regime, would not tolerate her leadership. Instead, the United States would work with the remaining regime structure. Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as acting president on January 5 by the regime-controlled National Assembly. Her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, continued as National Assembly leader, while Diosdado Cabello—under U.S. indictment, Treasury sanctions, and a $25 million State Department reward—retained his position as minister of interior, justice, and peace, responsible for much of the state’s repressive apparatus. The United States chose to leave most military and armed forces in place, and no further violence erupted as a consequence of U.S. actions, marking a successful first step within the regime management strategy.

While Machado has shown strong support for President Trump—to the point of conferring her Nobel Peace Prize medal on him as a sign of gratitude—his remarks that she was not respected in the country set a pattern of sidelining Machado’s voice from any decisionmaking process. This extended to the rejection of her desire to return to Venezuela after the devastating earthquakes that hit the country on June 24, with the White House saying she had become a distraction to relief efforts. It also extended to leaving her out of the U.S.-backed talks between Jorge Rodríguez and the head of the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly, Dinorah Figuera. Of those talks, Machado said that while she was not part of the process, she would “not be an obstacle to initiatives that bring about real progress.”

An important but underappreciated element of Venezuela’s stabilization has been the avoidance of an intra-regime rupture. Maduro’s removal left several potentially competing centers of power beyond Delcy Rodríguez. This included Cabello and the internal security apparatus as well as Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López. In the hours and days after Rodríguez’s swearing in, uncertainty surrounding Cabello and armed Chavista colectivos created perhaps the clearest opportunity for a succession struggle, but no organized challenge emerged. Rodríguez eventually removed Padrino after nearly 12 years as defense minister, replacing one of Chavismo’s most powerful figures without provoking visible military resistance. She later appointed Padrino as minister of agriculture. The May handover of Alex Saab, who U.S. officials have long described as Maduro’s “bag man,” could have been another potential flashpoint. Saab had been elevated by Maduro into a symbol of regime resistance to Washington, making his transfer to U.S. authorities potentially divisive within Chavismo. Yet it also occurred without an organized backlash.

Together, these episodes suggest that stabilization depended not only on preventing public disorder, but on managing Chavista succession without triggering a struggle among the regime’s political, military, and security factions. In addition, while small protests in the country have now been tolerated—they would have been repressed while Maduro was in power—they do not threaten the stability of the new U.S.-imposed Venezuela regime architecture. Therefore, along with regime succession, the stabilization phase has been completed.

Phase Two: Economic Recovery and Reconciliation

Some progress has been made toward economic recovery in the second phase. The Venezuelan interim government approved an amended hydrocarbons law on January 29 that included several changes intended to attract investment in the oil and gas sector, including public-private partnership agreements with less state control and lower royalties. On the U.S. side, the Treasury Department lifted specific oil-related restrictions via the Office of Foreign Assets Control to allow U.S. companies to trade Venezuelan crude. From there, the Trump administration and Rodríguez’s government deepened ties through a series of cabinet visits centered on energy, culminating in a controversial oil deal: 100-year concessions over 17 oil fields holding some 65 billion barrels. Chevron followed with a separate announcement on joint venture plans to invest over $7 billion over the next five years, and ExxonMobil, whose CEO once declared Venezuela “uninvestable,” is reportedly getting close to signing a preliminary deal to explore investments in several Venezuelan oil fields. At least one other U.S. oil company is also set to soon announce a deal to invest in Venezuela.

Even as steps are being taken to open the country to investment, daily life for the average citizen has yet to improve. The minimum wage, frozen since 2022, covers less than 1 percent of a family’s monthly food expenses. Inflation, which slowed to 8.9 percent in August from 19.9 percent the previous ‌month, is still running at 534.2 percent, year over year. Furthermore, 9 in 10 households suffer from power cuts, with blackouts lengthening this year rather than easing.

Political reconciliation is also moving forward, albeit more slowly. The interim government passed an amnesty law granting freedom to about a thousand political prisoners; however, hundreds remain behind bars. There has been some relief of the regime’s crackdown on free speech, translating to increased political activity and a larger number of protests compared to last year, mostly demanding liberty for political prisoners. At the same time, however, the United Nations has reported that despite a significant decline in long-term detentions, enforced disappearances, and the release of hundreds of political prisoners, Venezuelans continue to endure severe human rights violations. The regime’s earthquake response exposed its usual authoritarian modus operandi: Rescue operations were slow and ineffective after years of underfunding the civil protection agency, international rescue teams were held up at airports, the disaster zone was militarized with roadblocks that delayed humanitarian convoys, and reporting from the ground was censored.

A more hopeful development is that in early June, Dinorah Figuera returned from an eight-year exile and had a first in-person meeting with Jorge Rodríguez in Caracas, increasing expectations for a formal negotiation toward a peaceful transition. A first round of negotiations between the opposition and the regime was held August 6–12 at La Carlota air base in Caracas, concluding with a joint statement from the two delegations. Both parties agreed to jointly promote the recovery of Venezuela’s international reserve assets—specifically, 31 metric tons of gold held at the Bank of England—with transparency and auditing mechanisms still to be developed and with part of the proceeds directed toward earthquake reconstruction. They also committed to reforming the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), and on September 1, the regime-controlled National Assembly unanimously approved an amendment of the TSJ law that intends to reduce lawmakers’ influence over the selection of justices. While these actions on paper are substantial, analysts caution that changing who sits on the court is not the same as changing what the court does: Thelma Fernández, a well-known criminal defense lawyer in Venezuela who has defended one of the regime’s highest-profile political prisoners, argues the reform does not really reduce the legislature’s power over who gets picked as a magistrate for the TSJ. The second round of negotiations are expected to cover political and civil liberties, along with freedom of expression. There has been no mention yet of restructuring the National Electoral Council, nor anything about updating voter rolls, both of which are essential for any future free and fair election.

Given President Trump’s position on the issue, which has been echoed by Delcy Rodríguez, the question of setting a date for elections has clearly taken a backseat to discussions over other reforms. However, one thing to watch for will be how discussions on elections eventually proceed. The idea of holding regional and parliamentary elections prior to a presidential election has already surfaced. Doing this would allow Delcy Rodríguez to demonstrate an electoral opening without immediately putting her job, or the regime, at risk. It could also allow her to test reforms to the National Electoral Council, candidate eligibility, observation, media access, and opposition organization and participation at lower political cost. Additionally, it would create competition within opposition forces and inevitably delay a true transition in the country.

With both the regime and the opposition dependent on U.S. backing, Washington is better positioned to enforce what gets agreed than in any previous efforts in the long history of attempted negotiations. As the White House has stated, it has “maximum leverage” over the nation in the interim.

Phase Three: Political Transition

While the fixing of an electoral calendar, or the holding of elections themselves, would probably be seen by most observers as markers for the start of the political transition, the negotiations between Dinorah Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez are at a minimum paving the way for the transition phase; Secretary Rubio certainly sees it that way. The double earthquakes on June 24, which left over 6,100 dead, about 1.8 million people needing assistance, and over $19 billion in direct physical damage, will no doubt impact the timeline of the transition, with a date for elections remaining elusive.

The oil deal between the regime and the Trump administration has raised the stakes of the missing electoral timeline, as it opened a debate within the opposition about sequencing. The State Department presented the agreement as a driver of continued reform and democratic transition, arguing that economic recovery builds the conditions a transition requires. Critics reverse the order, insisting that without legitimate institutions, no agreement of this scale can hold. The agreement signed in August already seems to contradict the amended hydrocarbons law that caps oil contracts at 25 years and may conflict with the country’s constitution. What both positions seem to indicate is that the economic and political tracks are no longer moving at the same speed.

Figuera’s group has adopted a reformist, rather than a replacement, transition strategy. Under this approach, change would occur through existing regime institutions and mechanisms, specifically the 2025 Chavista-controlled National Assembly, even if it is widely considered to be illegitimate. The amended TSJ selection process is the first product of that wager. In contrast, Machado speaks not from the position of an opposition movement seeking a transition but on behalf of a government she argues was already elected in July 2024. Her party, Vente Venezuela, has organized protests around Caracas demanding “presidential elections now,” and Omar González Moreno, a member of the party’s national leadership and a former political exile, has gone as far as stating that elections are needed because the current situation is a “prolongation of the Chavista tyranny.” Machado reiterated the point after the United States announced the recent oil deal, arguing that without absolute transparency and rule of law, no agreement can provide the conditions that major sector-oriented investments require.

The disagreement is not over the goal but over the sequence of the steps to get there, and over whether the political and economic tracks can run simultaneously. Figuera has bet that economic recovery and institutional reform can proceed while the electoral question stays open; Machado holds the contrary. Figuera’s reformist route fits the stabilization plan in a way that Machado’s does not. The oil deal exposes this tension and creates an incentive problem: Parties benefiting from the deal have reason to protect the system that produced it, and to avoid an election that could lead to a future democratic government overturning its terms. In response to a reporter’s question on September 13, President Trump reiterated that elections were not yet ripe and added, “Venezuela is making a tremendous amount of money, so are we.”

The Road Ahead

President Trump and Secretary Rubio seem to be moving at slightly different speeds. President Trump has praised Delcy Rodríguez, saying that she is “doing a great job,” and is pursuing economic advancements before any talk of elections. In contrast, Secretary Rubio has justified the oil deal as necessary to prevent a future democratically elected government from having to inherit a “complete disaster” while reiterating that elections should take place as soon as the electoral council is reformed to ensure the necessary conditions for a free and fair outcome.

The distinction matters because the greatest challenge facing the United States may no longer be stabilizing Venezuela but preventing the stabilization phase from becoming permanent. The Chavista system has spent years demonstrating its capacity to delay, manipulate, or avoid a genuinely competitive election. The past eight months have also given Rodríguez time to consolidate her own position. She has rebuilt the state around herself, replacing military leadership and installing her own people across ministries while retaining much of the institutional architecture inherited from Maduro. Rodríguez will exploit the tensions within the opposition as well as the different priorities of President Trump and Secretary Rubio. The longer the transition remains without an electoral timetable, the greater the opportunity for the interim government to transform what was intended as a temporary arrangement into a durable political order.

U.S. leverage remains considerable, but it inevitably has a shelf life and is unlikely to remain as powerful indefinitely. The oil agreement, prospective U.S. investment, sanctions relief, and Venezuela’s need for international capital give the United States substantial influence today. Yet each successful investment and each new commercial relationship can also create constituencies with an interest in preserving stability and protecting existing agreements. Economic normalization could therefore strengthen U.S. leverage over Caracas in the short term while gradually increasing the political and financial costs of using that leverage later.

This makes an electoral timetable for a presidential election—before any regional or parliamentary plebiscites—increasingly important. Venezuelans need to believe that the current process is actually leading somewhere. Establishing an electoral calendar, including deadlines for reforming the National Electoral Council; updating voter rolls; registering parties and candidates (and removing bans on candidates, in Machado’s case); restoring political rights; guaranteeing freedom of expression and political organization; and permitting credible domestic and international observation would turn an open-ended promise of transition into a measurable process. It would also give investors greater clarity about the political environment in which long-term commitments are being made.

President Trump held a first face-to-face meeting with Delcy Rodríguez on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 22, even as María Corina Machado made several unsuccessful attempts to return to Venezuela. There was no mention of democracy or political transition in Delcy Rodriguez’s post on X about the New York meeting; the post only discussed cooperation with the United States on energy, mining and security, though Secretary Rubio, commenting later about the meeting, said that there has to be a political transition process, which is already underway.

The White House faces a choice: Let economic engagement in Venezuela move ahead with an open-ended transition or use its leverage to establish an electoral calendar and use it as a milestone to force the completion of the necessary institutional reforms. Done that way, Venezuela could become an example of economic liberalization supporting a political transition rather than substituting for one.

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is acting director and senior fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Antonella Navarro is an intern with the Americas Program at CSIS.