Who Controls Ukraine’s Starlink Access?

On October 14, 2026, Ukrainian officials reported that SpaceX had begun implementing speed restrictions with no warning on Starshield service in Ukraine, disrupting Ukrainian forces’ ability to use the system for communicating with their drones. The disruption came as Russia intensified attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure ahead of winter. Although the service was eventually restored, the incident underscores the risk taken on by nations when they rely on a service provided by a company for national security. That risk is heightened when the business interests of the company predominantly reside outside of the national jurisdiction of the country using the service, leaving the recipient few tools to ensure the service’s continued provision. Looking to the future, a key question for U.S. policymakers is whether or not it should be easy for the U.S. government or companies to alter or terminate services provided by U.S. companies to allies and partners, and if so, under what conditions.

Q1: What does Ukraine use Starlink for, and why rely on it?

A1: Since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Starlink has played a vital role in connecting Ukrainian civilians to the outside world and in providing tactical communications to Ukrainian forces. Operated by SpaceX, Starlink is a commercial satellite internet service that connects users through portable antennas, called terminals, to thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit. Starlink has proved useful for military operations because the system uses small and lightweight terminals and provides low-latency, high-bandwidth connectivity, and its signals are harder to jam. Service can also be used while a terminal is in motion, allowing for use on airborne and maritime drones. Although there are other satellite communications options, such as Eutelsat’s OneWeb constellation and the European Union’s GOVSATCOM system, these alternatives are not one-for-one replacements and lack one or more of the performance characteristics that have made Starlink indispensable.

In February 2026, to prevent Russian forces from using Starlink, SpaceX applied an allow-list concept to identify terminals authorized for use in Ukraine. Only authorized accounts could operate Starlink service in Ukraine. Authorized accounts operating stationary terminals were provisioned regular Starlink service, but accounts intended for controlling drones were registered for use with what the Ukrainians understood to be a type of Starshield service. This Starshield service is possibly what U.S. government procurement documents call “Starshield over Starlink” and, according to press reporting, uses the regular Starlink constellation. Because SpaceX does not allow service in Russia, Ukraine relies on other technologies for strikes on targets deep inside Russian territory. In addition to using Starshield service for strikes within Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces, Ukraine uses Starshield-equipped drones to intercept and defend against Russian drones, such as new jet-powered drones taking aim at Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilian targets.

Q2: Did SpaceX “turn off” Starlink for Ukraine?

A2: On October 14, 2026, Ukrainian officials publicly confirmed what appeared to be the establishment of a new speed restriction on Starshield terminals in Ukraine that resulted in terminals traveling faster than 100 miles (160 kilometers) per hour losing connectivity. The restrictions hindered Ukrainian interceptor-drone missions against Russia’s jet-powered Shaheds, which can travel nearly four times that speed. As of October 24, 2026, Ukrainian officials reported that Starshield service was back to normal.

The person or organization responsible for instituting the temporary Starshield speed restriction remains in dispute. Although some reporting suggests that direction came from the White House, President Donald Trump denied direct involvement, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio attributed the decision to SpaceX. Elon Musk, the company’s founder and CEO, later said SpaceX had restricted commercial Starlink service because Ukraine’s offensive drone operations violated its terms of service, though he maintained that the U.S. government controls access to Starshield.

Modifying Starlink service to foreign users during a security crisis is not an unprecedented action, whether taken by U.S. government officials or Elon Musk. According to recent reporting, during both of their tenures, President Joe Biden’s and President Trump’s national security teams engaged SpaceX to either turn off or activate commercial Starlink services in conflict zones. The reported examples include Biden officials seeking to turn off access to Iranian militants in Yemen and Lebanon, as well as Biden (and later, Trump) administration officials seeking to turn on Starlink access in Iran during periods of regional conflict, including to counter regime-imposed internet blackouts. In early 2026, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump State Department bought thousands of Starlink terminals that were covertly delivered into Iran. And, in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. strikes on Venezuela in January 2026, Musk weighed in directly to provide Venezuelans a month of free service, whereas the country previously lacked Starlink access.

Taken together, these instances paint a picture of recurring interactions between federal officials and SpaceX regarding Starlink access in conflict zones and decisions made by SpaceX with geopolitical ramifications. Additionally, on two other occasions during the war in Ukraine, SpaceX has reportedly made decisions about Starlink with direct impacts on Ukrainian forces. In 2022, Musk declined Ukraine’s request to extend coverage near Russian-occupied Crimea to support an attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. In September 2022, Musk reportedly ordered a shutdown of existing service around Kherson during a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Q3: Why does this matter beyond Ukraine?

A3: For its national security and defense, Ukraine finds itself dependent on a service provided by a company with a vast global business of which Ukraine is only a small part. From a regulatory standpoint, Ukraine has little to no control over SpaceX operations, as the company is headquartered in the United States and has no significant company-owned infrastructure in Ukraine. In addition to decisions SpaceX may make on its own that impact Ukraine’s service, as recent history has demonstrated, decisions made by U.S. policymakers also affect whether Ukraine retains access.

The Starshield service changes in Ukraine come at a time when leaders and citizens of many longtime U.S. allies and partners have questioned the value of their relationship with the United States. While such concerns are not new, worries about the dependability of the United States as a partner are on the rise. According to a recent poll, only 11 percent of Europeans view the United States as an ally. In Asia, although supportive of their countries’ relationships with the United States, citizens of Australia, India, and Japan would like their leaders to better explain the value of their partnerships with the United States.

Whether the Starshield service disruptions were directed by a U.S. government official or a company executive, they are a new data point that highlights the risk of relying too closely on the United States for national security, particularly on a service that can be unilaterally turned off or changed. Even before the Starshield disruptions, nations had increasingly sought to build and operate their own satellite networks, rather than buy service from a foreign company. For years, European governments have pursued the development of sovereign space capabilities, including most recently the IRIS² constellation. Ukraine signed a letter of intent with ICEYE and Nokia to explore establishing sovereign satellite communications. Poland has also said it wants to build its own Starlink-like system. Despite U.S. policy emphasizing expanded global market access and economic growth for U.S. space companies, disruptions involving Starshield may complicate efforts to sell services to foreign governments, potentially undermining the administration’s space policy objectives.

Q4: How are U.S. policymakers responding?

A4: Policymakers in Congress are trying to understand the sequence of events that led to the Starshield disruptions. A bipartisan group led by Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC) requested an investigation by the Department of Defense inspector general, while Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) opened a separate inquiry concerning the authority to change service, advance notice, and the contracts governing access. The Pentagon inspector general declined the request, directing lawmakers to the Air Force and Space Force for what it characterized as a “contractual matter.” As a next step, Congress could consider requesting an independent review, possibly from the Government Accountability Office, to assess how contract mechanisms and requirements for governmental review could be used to ensure that decisions to end or alter the provision of certain services to allies and partners are not made without deliberate and careful processes. Contract clauses could require companies providing certain services to maintain continuity plans, perform essential services during crises when directed, and notify the government if they anticipate an interruption.

Congress might also consider requiring companies to notify or obtain specific approval from a designated U.S. government agency before withdrawing or materially changing the provision of a critical national security service—a phrase that would need a clear definition—supplied to a U.S. ally or partner. Moreover, federal officials may be required to provide congressional notice of changes to such a service made at the request of the U.S. government. This process could be modeled on notification requirements for significant arms sales. A comparable interagency process for defense-critical services including Starshield could require the State Department to review proposed restrictions with the Department of Defense and notify Congress before authorizing a change. Providers would maintain service pending approval, subject to narrowly defined emergency exceptions.

As U.S. companies continue to play an outsized role in international communications, imagery, and artificial intelligence, the United States has an interest in preserving the capabilities it has helped partners acquire and ensuring that corporate decisions do not override agreed U.S. support. The U.S. government should also want allies and partners to buy services from U.S. companies, which requires trust that the service will be there when needed. An ally or partner does not want to risk the chance that a U.S. company could unexpectedly pull the rug out from underneath its feet at the very moment a service for its national defense is needed.

Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Lauryn Williams is the deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS. Alexei Hoffman is a research associate with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.