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International assistance has historically played a significant role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. In the aftermath of World War II, the Marshall Plan provided a vital lifeline to Western Europe, rebuilding economies and preventing the spread of communism. It demonstrated the power of international assistance to advance humanitarian goals and U.S. national security and economic interests. At its best, U.S. international assistance over the last 80 years has instrumentally promoted American “enlightened self-interest,” strengthening political and economic ties with allied nations, driving post-conflict reconstruction, promoting development and stability, and mitigating global health crises (e.g., HIV/AIDS and malaria).
Despite its major accomplishments, U.S. international assistance has faced increasing criticism in recent years. In some cases, programming has continued despite limited demonstrated impact and changes in foreign policy from administration to administration.
Upon taking office, President Trump signed an executive order mandating a reevaluation of U.S. international assistance, pausing obligations and disbursements for 90 days to review programs to examine whether aid spending aligns with U.S. interests. This freeze underscores a broader concern about wasteful spending that burdens American taxpayers. The administration has correctly called for greater transparency and accountability for every dollar spent overseas. Secretary of State Marco Rubio laid out a clear vision that every U.S. government international investment must answer three questions to justify its existence:
Some current programs in priority areas identified by the Trump administration (such as stemming migration, countering China’s influence, global health security, and combating transnational organized crime and terrorism) can answer the secretary’s questions in the affirmative. Others cannot, a reality that supports the need for a more strategic approach to ensuring international assistance brings quantifiable value to the American people.
As part of this effort, the Department of State intends to collect performance data on existing and future programs from agencies and partners that spend U.S. taxpayer dollars outside the United States. To pursue efficiency and consistency and measure if international assistance delivers on U.S. foreign policy and economic priorities, it is essential to reevaluate existing frameworks and metrics to ensure they align with the global objectives of the current administration.
The chart below shows what we expect to be key Trump administration foreign-policy priorities organized by Secretary Rubio’s three categories of “Safer,” “Stronger,” and “More Prosperous,” with corresponding metrics to assess the success of programs in achieving them and datasets to track progress in these areas. By leveraging data like these from credible, independent sources (e.g., the ForeignAssistance.gov dashboard), the U.S. government can ensure its international aid is cost-efficient, aligned with U.S. national-security interests, and delivering tangible results to Americans. “Primary” indicators show a direct, immediate benefit to the United States. “Secondary” indicators measure trends indirectly benefiting the United States over time.
This chart is not an exhaustive list of programs aligned with the presumptive objectives of the administration, but rather a sampling. Ultimately, given that 85 percent of international aid is congressionally earmarked, the Department of State’s political leaders will need to work with congressional leaders to identify foreign policy priorities, including which countries and regions the United States cares most about, and align budgets and programming accordingly. If these assumed policy priorities below prove inaccurate, then we can provide metrics for the selected policy priorities. To ensure alignment with approved strategic objectives, the Department of State should finalize metrics after political leaders in Congress and the administration define the foreign policy objectives and budgets. This discussion should start with defining priorities (Safer, Stronger, More Prosperous); what areas we should invest in to achieve each priority; who is best positioned to lead; what new rules should be in place; and which partners we will engage. Political leaders in both branches need to answer these questions, then we can easily develop new or adapt existing results frameworks to deliver the data and evidence to determine if we are accomplishing our goals.
Reinventing how the U.S. government delivers international assistance is as important as reinventing how we measure the results. The MCC’s Compacts offer a promising model for conditioning aid on foreign policy objectives, especially if we combine this approach with firm-fixed-price and/or pay-for-results procurement. A Compact-like model makes aid contingent on the ability of the host-country government to live up to binding promises to make specific, additional financial contributions and change policies and standards, not necessarily MCC’s good governance standards but others that could include supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives and thus providing the president with diplomatic leverage. A fixed-price or pay-for-performance model would tie payments to contractors or grantees to accomplishing defined milestones, transferring performance risk from the government to the implementer and saving the taxpayer money. This combined approach would require a greater level of program thought and contract design, but it would also ensure that aid programs give the president leverage, align with both U.S. economic and national-security interests, enable more coordinated and blended finance across development institutions (e.g., with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation) and offer tangible benefits to the American people while minimizing risks of misuse or inefficiency. Regarding the complexity of MCC Compacts, they take time and effort and are codeveloped with the recipient country. This is a strength that provides more diplomatic leverage because one can directly address needs identified by the recipient country, making them more vested in the outcome.
The administration has undertaken a worthwhile effort to tie program metrics and results frameworks more explicitly to foreign policy objectives. At the same time, during this exercise, the Department of State might consider how to address two specific dilemmas. First, as important as these reforms are, care is of the essence to ensure we maintain the on-the-ground capabilities and relationships built up over a generation to ensure our adversaries do not take advantage of our moment of introspection. Capabilities for program and contract design, as well as monitoring and evaluation, already exist and should be preserved. Second, recall Albert Einstein’s attributed observation that “not everything that matters can be measured, and not everything that can be measured matters.” Metrics struggle to capture the effectiveness of preventive programs and counterfactuals: The things that did not occur, the disease outbreaks that did not spread, migration that did not occur, and terrorist attacks that did not happen.
Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Richard Crespin is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS. Thomas Bryja is a program manager and research associate with the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS.
