Power Projection and the Logistics of Modern War

Photo: JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP/Getty Images

Photo: JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP/Getty Images

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East.

Warfighting readiness and resilience have always been central to securing victory during conflict. Even as warfare evolves and the concepts, equipment, and supplies develop and change, there can be no success in warfare without the logistics enterprise. There is a persistent cliché that amateurs study strategy and experts talk logistics. A more exact formulation would be that experts understand the importance of logistics and readiness to their strategy, and plan and resource accordingly. 

There is increasing recognition of the possibility of protracted war requiring larger stockpiles of—or the ability to rapidly surge—a wide range of supplies. There are new challenges to power projection, including contested environments with persistent surveillance and adversaries with long-range, precision-guided munitions. Resource challenges can lead to underinvestment in regular maintenance, limiting readiness. Whether nations are supporting an ally (e.g., the United States reinforcing Ukraine and Israel or China backing Russia) or are engaged directly in a major conflict, successfully addressing logistics challenges determines the feasibility and tempo of military operations. 

In future conflicts, robust logistics will continue to help win wars—and contested logistics will determine who can fight at all.

Technological change, including automation, advanced manufacturing, and AI, offers the potential to enhance planning and reduce logistical pressures. But these innovations cannot eliminate the fundamental problem of sustaining high-intensity operations across thousands of miles. Current conflicts show that nations continue to see the operational value in attacking each other’s logistics enterprises. Strong relationships with allies and partners allow for pre-positioning, industrial base support and mobilization, forward locations for sustainment, and enhanced transportation networks. In other words, these relationships are force multipliers. 

This chapter begins with a short overview of the components of the logistics enterprise to set the stage. It examines lessons from recent ongoing conflicts, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza war, and evaluates their applicability to future war, drawing out readiness and sustainment implications. It concludes with recommendations for innovations specific to projecting and sustaining forces in a contested environment, with a focus on technological innovation, industrial cooperation, and allied partnerships.

However, logistics enterprises by nature are very complicated and diverse, making a thorough review of lessons learned and insights for future war an impossible task. The literature on these conflicts is extensive. Even a subset of current experiences is enough to stress the imperative that operators and planners focusing on contested logistics ensure the enterprise is adequately resourced and available to support future plans. Assessing whether strategy leads logistics or logistics has the primacy over strategy is less important that taking the steps to invest in and ensure readiness.1

The Nature of the Power Projection Challenge

Power projection is a function not only of capabilities, but also of context: Is the nation directly engaged, or is it supporting an ally? Is the theater permissive or contested? Is the objective short-term crisis response or sustained deterrence and warfighting? In almost every case, forward support is necessary. Transportation networks must be defined and defended. Plans for weapon system maintenance and battle damage repair—preferably forward closer to the flight, to avoid the challenge of contested logistics when sending equipment to be fixed—must be developed in advance, an effort which may include engaging with allies and partners and contracting with industry. Military logistics also encompasses the life-cycle management of necessary materiel; this includes requirements setting, acquisition, distribution, maintenance, and disposition. Planners must ensure warfighters and support personnel can make it to the conflict zone, where there needs to be adequate facilities, services, and medical support.

Understanding the challenge of readiness begins with a recognition of the types of materiel necessary to support the fight. For reference, the United States military divides this into classes of supply, each of which has its own procurement challenges. Table 15.1 lists the 10 classes of supply. Of particular note is Class V, or ammunition, which includes munitions of all types. The readiness enterprise thus overlaps with industrial base production considerations.

Programs & Projects

This granular listing of the types of materiel needed in modern war is intended to ground the understanding of the logistics challenge. In any conflict, the logistics enterprise must plan to acquire and deliver a very wide variety of materiel and equipment to the front lines.

Along with the materiel necessary for the fight, the readiness challenge extends to maintenance, repair, and overhaul of existing systems. For any type of military capability, there are always trade-offs between the procurement of new equipment and the maintenance of existing equipment and production lines. Regulatory frameworks may limit where maintenance can occur, and who can do it. Forward-deployed assets need regular maintenance, and equipment that has suffered battle damage will need to be repaired. Ensuring adequate resources in a constrained environment—where funds too often prioritize new systems rather than sustaining the ones currently in the fleet—is an ongoing challenge.

Logistics includes transportation to the point of need, which can vary from simple containerization for items such as clothing to complex handling requirements for munitions and medical supplies. Logistics also requires the transport of personnel. Transportation of equipment, supplies, and personnel includes movement from the rear to the theater, and within the theater itself. Each of these layers has a different set of associated challenges.

Finally, effective logistics includes a significant amount of planning and coordination. Capable oversight and management are critically important for the enterprise. Each of the aspects listed above requires different expertise, draws on different sources, and, above all, requires adequate resources, including funding. For example, the different U.S. military services have varying needs and individually engage in logistics planning and operations as they organize, train, and equip for the joint force, with additional joint organizations and concepts aimed at coordinating support.2

Joint concepts in the United States highlight the need for adequate resources, the ability to allocate those resources appropriately using information technology, the ability to manage and prioritize logistics capability, and the necessary transportation assets.3 These concepts call for a transportation network able to move people, equipment, and supplies to and within the theater, the capacity to pre-position supplies, and a worldwide network with multiple options.4 More realistically, the goal of speed is challenged by the fact that movement frequently requires the use of large and relatively slow ships that transit through congested and vulnerable choke points.

Lessons from Russia’s War in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas Conflict

Recent ongoing conflicts offer valuable insights into both logistics failures and successful adaptations. These lessons show that logistics must be tailored according to the nature of the conflict, with planning shaped by the realities of geographic and operational requirements.

Russia-Ukraine

Russia’s buildup on Ukraine’s border prior to its attack in February 2022 meant that the eventual invasion was not a surprise.5 The attack on Crimea eight years earlier created the opportunity and the will inside of Ukraine to invest in systems and the reforms that have contributed to its ability to sustain its self-defense over time, bolstered by allied support. Over the course of the current conflict, both sides have worked to expand sources of supply; maintain and repair equipment; move supplies, equipment and personnel to and around the battlefield; engage in protection of their transportation nodes and supply depots; and adapt and update their planning in response to adversary activities. The prevalence of drones and improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) have made fixed logistics networks and nodes even more vulnerable than in the past, requiring ongoing adaptation. The war has reinforced the importance of the logistics enterprise to operational success, including planning and reacting to change.

Russia’s plan to immediately dominate Ukraine failed in part because of assumptions related to the expected length of the conflict, which led to a lack of preparation. Early analyses pointed to a variety of logistics challenges: Russian convoys stalled without fuel, tires failed due to poor maintenance, and logistical units lacked protection and flexibility.6 Images of stalled trucks on the road to Kyiv became iconic representations of Moscow’s failures. Russian forces experienced shortages of food, water, and medical supplies.7 But Russia’s initial challenges were not simply features of its decision to attack in 2022. They were the result of long-standing issues for Russian logistics: systematic resource inefficiency, inadequate investments in supplies, and corruption in procurement.8

The length of the war has given Russia the opportunity to recover and adapt from its early misfires. The nation has mobilized its industrial base to support the war. Russian operational logistics now emphasize dispersed logistics nodes, greater use of rail and civilian vehicles, and battlefield repair under fire. Motorcycles that can travel across open fields are being used for troop movement and logistics support.9 Russia is getting supplies from China and North Korea, with China supplying dual-use items such as microelectronics and machine tools that can be used for military production and North Korea notably supplying both troops and end-use items such as munitions.10 Russia has addressed labor shortages in its industrial base in a variety of ways, including with programs to teach school children how to design, manufacture, and operate drones.11 Moscow has also worked to create a contested environment, attacking Ukrainian logistics using drones.12

On the other side, U.S. and NATO support to Ukraine has been enabled by the proximity of allied territory and bases. Weapons and equipment have flowed overland from Poland and Romania, enabled by NATO’s secure rear area. Nonetheless, even this relatively favorable logistics environment has required planning, adaptation, and coordination. Moving munitions from the United States across the Atlantic to the European theater and within the theater is operationally complex. Ports have quantity limits for safety reasons, requiring careful pacing of deliveries, and transportation has to be smooth across vectors.13 Allied support has not entirely made up for the fact that Ukraine is outmatched by Russia’s size and industrial capacity, and one of its responses has been to attack Russian infrastructure, including fuel storage facilities, munitions depots, and rail lines. These attacks have shown that constant pressure on supply chains can, in fact, help a smaller country compete with a bigger player’s industrial might.14 

To ensure the rapid flow of support, allies have provided Ukraine with existing rather than new systems, with one benefit for the provider countries being the opportunity to update their own fleets and support their industrial bases.15 As a result, some of the drawdown equipment has needed to be repaired before it arrives in Ukraine, which has not always been completely carried out.16 Early in the conflict, Ukraine needed strategies to ensure repair and maintenance of provided equipment, as well as to repair battle damage.

Additionally, the diversity of equipment provided to Ukraine by its allies means that there are a variety of repair approaches and supply chains, and sourcing adequate spare parts has been a challenge.17 Advances in communications technology have enable tele-maintenance, with experts in the rear providing guidance, but Ukraine still faces shortfalls.18 As one retired U.S. Army general put it, there is now a concern that Ukraine will face a situation “when the cumulative effect of sustainment shortfalls forces fundamental changes in operational posture and battlefield decision-making.”19

Logistics support also includes medical materiel. One analysis found that the scale of munitions used in the conflict has meant an increase in severe injuries, which has implications for the requirements for field hospitals, supplies like whole blood, and medical staff who can treat patients.20

Constant drone surveillance by Russia has also complicated resupply, especially to soldiers in trenches on the front lines. Ukraine has adapted drones to deliver supply packages to its forces, to reduce the risk of being located and attacked. These deliveries include food, water, ammunition, and other supplies necessary for sojourns in trenches that may last for weeks.21

Like Russia, Ukraine has adapted its own logistics enterprise through the course of the war and has worked to attack its adversary’s logistics networks. The question now is which side will have the resources to sustain the fight longer. Adequate materiel (e.g., munitions), weapon systems sustainment, and transportation will be keys to victory.

Israel-Gaza

Unlike Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which was signaled by a military buildup and Russian leader messaging, the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas was a strategic surprise (in spite of intelligence analysts and border sentries trying to warn leadership that an attack was imminent).22 While Israel was not ready to immediately counter in the first few hours of the attack, it had the resources to begin extensive airstrikes on Gaza the next day and began a ground attack before the end of the month.

Israel has a much more capable military than Hamas, with a much larger end strength and high-end equipment. It has continued to press the war after two years, with the goals of eliminating the threat that Hamas represents, retrieving the remaining living hostages captured on October 7, and recovering the bodies of the hostages that have died in captivity. Hamas has committed fighters and has the advantage of a hidden tunnel network underneath Gaza to hide in and fight from, as well as access to manufacturing and storage facilities. Hamas also benefits from a global response to the wider humanitarian suffering in Gaza, which has led some nations to limit exports to Israel.23

Israel’s ability to respond rapidly and in force has been bolstered by its close alliance with the United States. Shortly after the October 7 attack, United States Transportation Command began delivering munitions, spare parts, and interceptors directly into Israeli air bases, demonstrating the logistical power of U.S. airlift.24 Attacks on ships by Houthi rebels in Yemen led the command to reach out to commercial sealift partners to plan how to mitigate such risk.25

The United States’ simultaneous provision of munitions to Israel and Ukraine has led to questions as to whether the nation has sufficient stockpiles to support both conflicts while simultaneously preparing for other potential wars.26 Israel has faced industrial base and stockpile challenges, including for its Iron Dome interceptors.27 Ensuring the adequacy of munitions stockpiles and being ready to mobilize the industrial base are difficult but necessary problems to solve.

Hamas’s munitions supply chain has included scavenging materiel left behind on battlefields by Israeli soldiers and taking unexploded Israeli ordnance, including bombs, missiles, and artillery shells, and remanufacturing them into improvised explosives, rockets, and missiles in factories in its underground tunnel network.28

A related conflict has also showed the risk of supply chain attacks and the importance of protecting sources of supply from infiltration—a lesson that applies to information systems as well as the industrial base. Israel’s infiltration of Hezbollah’s pager supply chain enabled the inclusion of a small amount of explosives, which was then detonated in an operation in September 2024.29 Information systems need to be protected to ensure that adversaries do not have access to sensitive information (e.g., where supplies are stored or transportation plans) and also cannot inject false data (e.g., inflating readiness numbers or misdirecting supplies). 

The particularities of Israel’s case reveal the limits of using specific lessons learned for other conflicts. Israel is a small country with dense infrastructure and has been able to use relatively permissive airspace in its attacks. Many of the engagements in Gaza have taken place in urban areas with an extensive underground tunnel network. These physical characteristics will not apply to other situations, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific in any potential conflict with China. The distances would be vastly greater, the adversary more capable, and the logistics far more complex. 

Implications for the Future of Warfare

While the Ukraine and Israel cases underscore the enduring centrality of logistics, they also demonstrate that each conflict is unique and that the lessons from one may be only partially applicable to the other. For example, any Indo-Pacific conflict or war over Taiwan would be fought at sea and in the air, across thousands of nautical miles, and against a peer adversary with robust ISR and precision strike capabilities. Nations participating in that or any other conflict could not assume secure overflight rights, permissive air bases, or nearby overland supply routes. Logistics would be contested, and the persistence of satellite surveillance means that operating in secrecy is increasingly impossible.

Along with the warfighting capabilities of potential adversaries, nations should look to understand an enemy’s logistics capabilities and investments as an indicator of how challenging any engagement might be. 

Along with the warfighting capabilities of potential adversaries, nations should look to understand an enemy’s logistics capabilities and investments as an indicator of how challenging any engagement might be. China’s preeminent role in global shipbuilding and dual-use shipyards has enabled the People’s Liberation Army to draw on commercial infrastructure, investment, and intellectual property for naval shipbuilding.30 China is producing an increasing number of roll-on/roll off (Ro-Ro) ships that are used to transport vehicles, including military vehicles.31 The nation is also reportedly stockpiling commodities, including grain, oil, and gas, and is making global investments in logistics to allow for expeditionary operations.32

Though the comparison is not one-to-one, several lessons from the ongoing conflicts should be taken into consideration by the United States:

  • Make logistics readiness an ongoing priority. As seen by Russia’s initial experience in Ukraine, waiting for the test of war to identify logistics gaps can have disastrous consequences. Investments in weapons systems readiness, stockpiles, industrial surge capacity, and appropriate planning capabilities must be developed and in place before the fight begins. Israel’s relative level of readiness led it to be able to respond to the attack quickly, although it has relied on support from an ally to have the materiel necessary to continue the fight. The challenge is in having adequate resources and managing the trade-offs between supporting existing systems and making plans to procure newer ones.
  • Assume supply lines will be targeted. Attacks on logistics and supply degrade opponents’ ability to wage war, and these types of attacks have been and will continue to be a feature of modern war. Just as Ukraine has targeted Russian ammunition depots, transportation networks, and logistics hubs, and Russia has responded in kind, modern war will likely include strikes on fuel depots, ports, and airfields. Pre-positioning materiel in areas of potential conflict can help reduce this risk, although developing “iron mountains” of materiel offers valuable targets for adversaries.
  • Make partnerships a priority. Support from its partners has enhanced Ukraine’s ability to stay in the fight, and Russia has similarly benefited from supplies delivered by other nations, especially China. In a fight in the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan, and others could offer support for the United States—but only if planning, access agreements, and co-location efforts occur in advance. These agreements can include pre-positioning materiel, including consumable supplies arrangements, to support weapons system sustainment. The United States has developed a variety of agreements along these lines, including the Regional Sustainment Framework, the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, and the Defense Industrial Cooperation Framework between the United States and Japan.33 China, Iran, and North Korea have supported Russia in a variety of ways, including by bolstering the country’s logistics and readiness enterprise with materiel such as spare parts. Those relationships seem to be more transactional, with each of Russia’s supporters receiving funding, technology, or other kinds of information or access in return for assistance.
  • Partner with industry to ensure adequate capacity—including surge—of all aspects of logistics support. In a conflict, industry will likely need to mobilize to surge production of all classes of supply, along with expanding transportation. Stockpiles of consumables and spare parts will provide the initial ability to fight back and allow time to engage the industry base. Creating agreements in advance to surge when necessary, rather than scrambling to do so in the hour of need, will enable smoother and more effective support. In one example, the United States’ Civil Reserve Air Fleet can be tapped to transport personnel and cargo if necessary, with airlines getting payments to participate in the program on an ongoing basis. Additionally, the Defense Production Act offers a set of authorities to engage the industrial base for national defense purposes.34 These and similar laws and arraignments should be reauthorized when necessary and adequately resourced.

There are also several emerging technologies that the United States should engage with that offer pathways to reduce vulnerability and enhance readiness:

  • Additive Manufacturing: The 3D printing of spare parts can reduce dependence on long supply chains, reduce contested logistics related to getting the supplies to the fight, and speed the availability of spare parts. Intellectual property considerations relating to the ownership of design and approaches to qualify parts should be addressed in advance, as should the training of those expected to serve toward the front, to ensure effective maintenance and repair.
  • Tele-maintenance: Modern information systems can allow rear maintainers to deliver training and information to the front lines.
  • New Approaches to Resupply: Uncrewed ships and aircraft can deliver parts to the point of need, reducing the risk to personnel and allowing for a more distributed transportation network. Nontraditional systems like motorcycles are smaller than trucks and can bring goods closer to the front lines in some contexts.
  • Alternative Energy and Energy Networks: Reducing fuel dependency by investing in hybrid platforms and renewable generation at forward bases will reduce the need to transport fuel to forward locations. It will also reduce the necessity to bring fuel transportation equipment such as tanker trucks and drivers, the additional security forces to protect those convoys, and the food, water, clothes, medical support, and other supplies that will be needed as part of that supply chain. Planning for energy availability, including developing contractual on-demand relationships with civilian suppliers in advance of conflict, can help ensure resiliency.
  • AI and Automation: The equation of logistics includes determining what and how much is needed, and how to transport it to the fight. AI has the potential to increase the efficiency of planning for supply and to dynamically route and reroute logistics flows in contested environments. The concepts underpinning dynamic rerouting are not new, but the approach is facilitated by the dramatic increases in information technology. But these approaches also expand the digital attack surface of logistics, which requires further investments in cybersecurity.
  • Cybersecure Logistics: The information technology used in logistics planning and systems is critical. Nations must assume that cyberattacks will aim to cripple sustainment networks, either by limiting access to logistics systems or by injecting false information that can negatively impact planning and outcomes.

Investment in logistics innovation will not eliminate challenges, but it can reduce the necessary footprint, complicate adversary targeting, and increase responsiveness.

Conclusion

The importance of logistics and readiness is not a new lesson from the conflicts of this decade. The importance of sustainment and the need for effective logistics and supply are the lessons of every war. In future conflicts, robust logistics will continue to help win wars—and contested logistics will determine who can fight at all. Thus, readiness and sustainment should not be considered as back-office support functions, but as critical to operational readiness and to the fight. Lessons from recent conflicts are not proprietary, nor are they necessarily pertinent to all future scenarios. Competitors around the world are watching the same failures and adaptations, drawing their own conclusions. Relying on legacy assumptions of uncontested movement, protected infrastructure, and industrial dominance will be a recipe for failure.

Industrial capacity, logistics resilience, and allied coordination take years to build. Nations cannot wait until war is imminent to invest in sustainment technologies, forward partnerships, and stockpiling strategies. For future wars, states should consider the following actions:

  1. Continue to invest in approaches that address the issue of contested logistics.
  • Expand pre-positioning of key consumables in likely conflict zones, with redundancy and deception built in.
  • Harden and disperse logistics nodes, including through mobile and sea-based systems. Ensure these are flexible rather than fixed. Trains can quickly transport large quantities of goods but are easier to target than motorcycles.
  • Develop and scale allied sustainment frameworks, with joint training and common standards. Build and strengthen these frameworks in times of peace so they are ready in times of war.
  1. Enhance planning for logistics, sustainment, and resilience.
  • Make industrial base investments to ensure adequate access to munitions and spare parts. Engage industry in planning for sustainment in advance of conflict.
  • Invest in AI-enabled logistics planning, with resilience against cyber disruption.
  • Ensure that operators and planners are focused on logistics, not just the fight. Fund wargames and exercises focused on contested logistics as part of the warfighting framework. Ensure that these wargames can include the possibility of losing based on logistics shortfalls to ensure operators understand their importance.
  1. Plan for change during the conflict.
  • Expect adversaries to adapt during the fight. Plan to capture lessons and insights on an ongoing basis to be able to adapt as effectively.

The future of deterrence and warfighting hinges not just on the operational concepts underpinning the fight and the capabilities that are used in it, but also on whether competitors can get to the fight at all. The lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict suggest that protracted war should be part of planning scenarios. As a result, states should plan to sustain readiness through a conflict that may drag out for years, and where investments in logistics, readiness, and resilience determine the winner.

Please consult the PDF for references.

Cynthia Cook is director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Allies and Partners, Defense and Security, Defense Industrial Base, and Geopolitics and International Security