China Isn’t on the G7 Agenda, but It’s Still the Main Event

As leaders of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union meet in Kananaskis, Canada, for the 51st G7 Summit, one of the summit’s most important priorities—China—will appear nowhere on the public agenda. While the group prefers to publicly emphasize its affirmative program, behind closed doors, the leaders are surely discussing how Beijing is challenging G7 nations’ security, prosperity, and values.

Q1: How has the G7 addressed challenges related to China?

A1: G7 discussion of China is not new—its leaders first issued a declaration on China at the 1989 Paris Summit, condemning the Tiananmen massacre—but the group’s focus and ambition on this issue have accelerated significantly in recent years. In August 2022 the G7 foreign ministers issued a bold statement on Taiwan that criticized Beijing’s military reaction to then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, and in May 2023, the Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué put forth a comprehensive vision for G7 members’ approach to China—welcoming channels of communication and acknowledging China’s important role in international affairs, while resolving to undertake a robust competitive agenda to advance economic resilience, diversify supply chains, protect advanced technologies, uphold freedom of navigation in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The leaders also raised concerns regarding human rights abuses in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Future leaders’ statements are built on this foundation while expanding the scope of the G7 position. For example, in June 2024, leaders raised concerns about China’s large-scale support for the Russian defense industrial base and threatened powerful sanctions against Chinese companies.

Notably, these high-level statements have provided a mandate for G7 ministers and working-level officials to cooperate in tackling different parts of the China challenge—from industrial overcapacity and nonmarket policies and practices to economic coercion, to transnational repression, to Indo-Pacific security.

Q2: When it comes to China, what is the role of the G7 presidency?

A2: The G7 presidency can play a critical role in accelerating the group’s work on China, but the group has maintained steady progress on these issues even when the presidency has focused elsewhere. In 2023, Japan held the presidency, leveraging its natural leadership on Indo-Pacific affairs to propel the G7 towards its groundbreaking Hiroshima Communiqué. This year, the Canadian presidency brought new energy to the China file, invigorating G7 processes on transnational repression and the diversification of critical mineral supply chains, and overseeing a comprehensive G7 foreign ministers’ statement on maritime security and prosperity, which clarified G7 resolve in opposing Chinese aggression throughout the Western Pacific. However, during the 2024 Italian presidency, when Prime Minister Meloni prioritized Africa and migration, the group still maintained a strong voice in countering Chinese aggression—speaking with one voice on the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and threatening sanctions against Chinese financial institutions in response to China’s support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Q3: Can G7 collaboration on China issues survive the Trump administration’s “America First” approach?

A3: Yes and no. It is difficult to imagine the G7’s Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion surviving the United States’ newfound use of Chinese-style economic coercion against allies and adversaries alike. But G7 members continue to share an urgent interest in coordinated action to prevent cheap Chinese exports from wiping out what remains of their manufacturing bases. The Trump administration has prioritized this issue, perhaps creating space for a common G7 approach. Similarly, China’s throttling of rare earth exports has illustrated to all G7 economies the urgency of building a diversified supply chain for these critical inputs, and the Canadian presidency has wisely prioritized common efforts to do so.

When it comes to G7 statements, U.S. negotiators have often led the charge in pressing for strong public commitments on China policy, and President Trump’s feuds with G7 allies have left these diplomats with limited leverage. However, the gap between the position of the United States and other members has narrowed in recent years, and G7 members increasingly believe that demonstrating a united front against Chinese aggression is important for their own national interest—not just a favor to Washington.

Q4: Does China care about any of this?

A4: When the G7 speaks with a united voice, Beijing takes notice. G7 diplomats are often met with furious demarches from Chinese counterparts in the aftermath of G7 statements on Taiwan, the South China Sea, or China’s support for the Russian war in Ukraine. Days before the Kananaskis Summit, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the G7 “stop manipulating issues related to China,” echoing its shrill responses to G7 statements condemning dangerous Chinese maneuvers in March and April 2025. The 2022 G7 statement on Taiwan received a particularly strong reaction, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi noting angrily: “The statement of the G7 foreign ministers calls white black, confuses right and wrong, and makes groundless accusations against China’s reasonable and lawful measures to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity. How do they have such rights? Who gives them that right?” This reaction suggests the G7 statement may have played a role in deterring Beijing from responding to then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit to the island with even greater force.

Q5: What additional steps can the G7 consider?

A5: G7 members could consider several steps to strengthen and institutionalize their work on China:

1. Expand G7 membership: G7 members could consider inviting South Korea and Australia to join the bloc. A 2024 CSIS study found these countries perform higher on key G7 priorities than many current members, and when it comes to China, these two nations would bring a wealth of experience and capacity to the G7 table. Beijing has targeted both nations with severe economic coercion—and both recovered successfully, without offering policy concessions. Australia has been a trailblazer in tackling China’s transnational repression and will be a critical player in any effort to diversify rare earth supply chains, while South Korea’s sophisticated technology ecosystem would bring an important perspective to questions of semiconductor and AI competition.
2. Ensure bilateral diplomacy with China is complementary: Individually, G7 members have established a number of bilateral dialogues with Chinese President Xi and his lieutenants. Members should use G7 fora to coordinate messaging for their separate dialogues with Chinese officials—whether that’s a summit with President Xi, trade talks with Vice Premier He Lifeng, or a human rights dialogue between foreign ministries. Communication with Beijing will be most effective if Chinese officials hear concerns about Taiwan, overcapacity, or Xinjiang in stereo. Additionally, this coordination will stymie Beijing’s efforts to weaken G7 unity and drive wedges among members.
3. Firewall the China agenda: President Trump will surely lash out at his G7 partners in Kananaskis, perhaps lamenting their trade surplus vis-à-vis the United States, or insisting Russia be readmitted to the group. Anticipating insurmountable disagreements, Canada has indicated it will forgo the traditional leaders’ communiqué, instead issuing a chair’s summary of the meeting—perhaps recalling President Trump’s acrimonious withdrawal from the leaders’ statement when Canada last hosted the G7 Summit in 2018. But when it comes to China and Indo-Pacific security, the G7 members—including Trump’s America—are not that far apart. The leaders can still put aside their policy differences and broader grievances to push ahead with a strong China agenda, recognizing that a unified G7 position on China contributes to the prosperity and security of each member and strengthens each’s hand in bilateral diplomacy with Beijing.
    

Henrietta Levin is a senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.