Experts React: One Year Since Latin America’s Most Brazen Electoral Theft in History

On July 28, 2024, Venezuela’s dictator Nicolás Maduro suffered a humiliating electoral defeat to the country’s opposition. Unlike past elections, the opposition managed to secure voter tally sheets proving their victory—unequivocally. However, in one of the most brazen electoral thefts in history, the Maduro regime responded by fabricating electoral results inconsistent with the tally sheets, and determined to remain in power at all costs, launched a brutal crackdown on society. Furthermore, the regime claimed a hack of its National Electoral Council emanating from North Macedonia, taking the website offline and rendering it unable to release any electoral data. One year later, Venezuela remains a police state with over 800 unjustly detained prisoners. The regime has held recent sham “elections” for National Assembly, regional bodies, and governorships, claiming victory and political dominance over the entire country, yet the National Electoral Council’s website remains down—a product of the purported hack.

Image

Strategic Gains in the Face of Defeat: What the Opposition Achieved Despite Repression

Mark Feierstein, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Americas Program

Although the regime stole the election, unleashed a wave of repression, and remains ensconced in power, the opposition achieved several important objectives.

First, the electoral campaign unified the opposition around a common strategy to advance a democratic transition. Although tactical divisions have since emerged, the majority of the opposition remains committed to a collaborative approach.

Second, the opposition mobilized millions of voters under repressive conditions despite limited resources and restricted media access. The campaign fostered a sense of solidarity among Venezuelans, strengthened organizational capacity, and laid the groundwork for potential future protest movements and election campaigns.

Third, by collecting copies of official tally sheets from most polling sites, the opposition was able to demonstrate that Edmundo González Urrutia won by about a two-to-one margin and reinforce the regime’s domestic and international illegitimacy.

Fourth, the strong performance by González Urrutia, a stand-in for primary winner María Corina Machado, who was illegally banned from running, cemented Machado’s standing as leader of the opposition and the country’s most popular political figure. While González Urrutia left Venezuela shortly after the election, Machado remains there in hiding, and any serious consideration of potential political resolutions must take her into account.

Fifth, González Urrutia’s victory gave impetus to international diplomatic efforts to advance a peaceful democratic transition. Notwithstanding the Trump administration’s cuts to pro-democracy efforts in Venezuela and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s directive that the Department of State will not opine on the legitimacy of foreign elections, any effort to normalize relations with the Maduro regime without considering the government’s authoritarian nature is unlikely to be politically tenable.

Image

How the Opposition Has Adapted to Escalating Repression

Alexandra Winkler, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Americas Program

After Maduro lost the July 28 presidential election, his response was marked by massive repression and political persecution. The regime’s Operation Tun Tun has resulted in at least 25 deaths, more than 2,000 arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, acts of torture, and other grave human rights violations. Maduro’s security forces continue to conduct raids without warrants, mass arrests, and systematic violence against innocent Venezuelans. A year later, over 900 innocent Venezuelans remain behind bars, including 96 women and 4 children.

In response to the ongoing repression, Venezuelan opposition leaders María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia have worked tirelessly to bolster international recognition of the true electoral results by travelling the world to showcase the voting tallies (actas electorales). Their diplomatic outreach has led to countries recognizing González Urrutia as the president-elect and has resulted in renewed international sanctions targeting Maduro and his inner circle. Actions from the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and Canada signal that post-election repression will not be met with normalization or inaction.

Opposition leaders have also worked to alert the international community to the regime’s deepening ties with foreign actors like Cuba and Iran, highlighting how their involvement has strengthened Venezuela’s repressive security apparatus and contributed to regional instability through organized crime. The Maduro regime’s entanglement in illicit enterprises—such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and gold smuggling—continues to bankroll its grip on power while empowering transnational criminal networks to destabilize neighboring countries. By exposing these criminal networks to regional and international law enforcement, opposition efforts have led to several major drug seizures linked to Venezuelan trafficking rings across the Caribbean this year, emphasizing the urgent need for more coordinated action throughout the region. In the most recent opposition success, the Trump administration has now designated the Cártel de los Soles, an organization that operates within the Maduro regime and counts many of its top leaders as members, as a foreign terrorist organization.

On the other hand, Maduro has attempted to legitimize himself through further elections, such as the regional and legislative elections on May 25. Despite the pervasive risks associated with protesting, the opposition successfully boycotted these elections on the ground. According to Machado, more than 85 percent of Venezuelans “disobeyed” and did not participate in the elections, marking another defeat for Maduro’s regime. Similar results are expected in the municipal elections on July 27, where the opposition is once again calling for voters to abstain.

One of the most tangible strategic wins for the Venezuelan opposition amid severe repression has been the successful extraction of five top opposition leaders who had spent over a year (412 days) sheltering at the Argentine diplomatic residence in Caracas. These figures, central to the opposition’s presidential campaign, were able to leave Venezuela after a meticulously planned operation called Operación Guacamaya, which undermined Maduro’s security forces and was coordinated with international partners such as Argentina and the United States. This event exemplified the opposition’s effective use of international diplomacy and pressure, leveraging the threat of renewed sanctions and maintaining foreign attention on ongoing human rights abuses.

Image

Has Military Support for Maduro Shifted?

Juan Cruz, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Americas Program

The National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela will play an essential role in the political future of the country, regardless of the shape that future takes. As one of the few Venezuelan institutions that still functions well enough and possesses a near-monopoly on the instruments of violence, its importance is oversized, making it indispensable when charting the country’s exit from authoritarianism. Further, the Venezuelan constitution bestows upon the armed forces the ultimate responsibility to protect its democracy. While not monolithic, the military remains united, showing few cracks to those outside its ranks. Historically, the Venezuelan opposition has lacked the strategy or effectiveness to appeal to the military. However, María Corina Machado’s 2023–2024 presidential campaigning managed to break new ground as she openly reached out to members of the military and, for the first time, spoke convincingly to their needs and concerns.

That said, there have been no serious signs of military dissent in years as the institution remains firmly aligned with the Maduro regime. Maduro’s reign appears to be under no serious threat as the various military factions continue to calculate that they are better off under his leadership than they would be under another option, including assuming direct power themselves. Therefore, there remains ample room for deliberate outreach, tailored messaging, and a credible charm offensive by any non-regime actors, not just the opposition. In the meantime, Maduro remains pressured to generate the funds necessary to keep the military content and still run the country.

In the end, it simply makes too much sense to build common interest with a military institution that will be ultimately responsible for guaranteeing, if not enabling and enforcing, a transition to democracy, regardless of how that comes about.

Image

How Can the International Community Advance Venezuela’s Democratic Transition?

Ryan Berg, Director, Americas Program

No authoritarian regime falls without considerable pressure, both exogenously and endogenously generated. Maintaining both internal and external pressure is key to ensuring that the costs of remaining in power illegitimately to Maduro and his coterie are high—and potentially unbearable. In that sense, the international community has a role to play in maintaining this pressure, ideally by aligning sanctions with the United States, fighting the Maduro regime’s efforts to unfreeze assets parked overseas, and continuing visa revocations for regime insiders, and/or at the very least, ensuring their jurisdictions do not become workarounds for flouting regime pressure. Recognition of President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia is an important way for the international community to lend more legitimacy to the Venezuelan opposition. Furthermore, at present, the United States will have to lean on allies, partners, and friends of Venezuela to maintain the issue on the multilateral agenda, especially in forums like the UN Human Rights Council. There is also the issue of the International Criminal Court (ICC), where the Maduro regime is under active investigation for committing crimes against humanity. The prosecutor of the ICC should be urged to conclude the investigation against the Maduro regime, as the case has been dragging for years despite ample evidence to back the accusations and is saddled with potential conflict-of-interest issues by the prosecutor, Karim Khan. Other countries also have a significant role to play in creating dynamic environments for diaspora communities—and especially opposition members in exile—to continue their work on behalf of the Venezuelan people.

Image

What’s Next for Trump’s Venezuela Strategy After the Prisoner Exchange?

Eric Farnsworth, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Americas Program

In the wake of last year’s election, the Maduro regime has now proven, in case there was any lingering doubt, that its overriding goal is to remain in power. It will try anything and everything to do so until the costs of remaining outweigh the benefits. Working with interested allies, Washington has a number of options to consider. The first is to make clear that further U.S. citizen hostage-taking is unacceptable and will be met with a painful, asymmetric response rather than renewed negotiations and prisoner swaps, which only enable repeat offenses and give initiative and leverage to the regime. As a direct corollary, the United States should speak with one voice on Venezuela, ideally through the secretary of state, working closely with—not around—the president who was elected one year ago, Edmundo González Urrutia, and his representatives. And the United States can seek to ensure that Venezuela remains an urgent issue globally, despite the many other matters demanding attention, by actively supporting opposition leader María Corina Machado for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Beyond these public acts, the United States can raise costs to the regime through greater isolation. Prioritizing new ways to short-circuit the outflows of illegal and stolen products that enrich the regime and purchase its security, including narcotics and the ghost ships that bust oil sanctions, is essential. Freezing and seizing assets of those tied to the regime and their families remains crucial, as does prioritizing regional and global efforts to counter aggressive cyber actions that the regime uses for internal control and external democratic disruption. Regime officials should be denied access to U.S.-based social media. Other actions could also be considered.

Of course, to be maximally effective, Washington should not act alone. It’s impossible to hunt down and sanction transshipments of illegal products or freeze and seize illicit assets without cooperative global partners, including Spain. It’s difficult to gain the crucial cooperation of Venezuela’s neighbors, Brazil and Colombia, with threats of high tariffs and narcotics decertification (nonetheless, true cooperation with both nations may require a potential shift in political winds, pending their respective elections next year). More broadly, Washington’s efforts to gain cooperation on Venezuela, including the Organization of American States, become more difficult when the United States itself is ending Temporary Protected Status for Venezuelan nationals, resulting from, it is claimed, significantly improved in-country conditions. Last year’s elections proved that the democratic spirit remains. But mixed messaging from Washington is counterproductive. A better calibrated approach to multilateralism and migration, along with additional proactive actions, would greatly enhance prospects for success.

Image

Will Venezuelan Migration Surge Again if Maduro Stays in Power?

P. Michael McKinley, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Americas Program

Out-migration from Venezuela has been cyclical, intensifying after 2015, and ebbing somewhat after the Covid-19 pandemic, as a combination of a (very) relative improvement in Venezuela’s economy kicked in, and likely also reflecting a less welcoming environment and the growing restrictions of recipient countries. The end of Temporary Protective Status and stricter border controls in the United States are certainly having an impact this year, but countries throughout Latin America are also more intent on controlling the flow of undocumented Venezuelan migrants.

None of this should obscure the following central fact: Almost 8 million Venezuelans have left their country to date, almost one-quarter of the population, with hundreds of thousands more likely to do so in the coming two years. Venezuelans constitute the largest migrant and refugee population in the world outside Syria, where a brutal civil war lasting years was the driving factor. Unlike Syria, however, or Sudan and Afghanistan for that matter, Venezuela’s migration crisis has been the product not of war but of political repression and economic collapse. Migrant numbers include a growing proportion of families and an almost equal balance of men and women. As Venezuela’s economy again slips into recession and as Maduro tightens his stranglehold on power, significant Venezuelan migration flows are likely to continue into the indefinite future.