How Ukraine’s Operation “Spider’s Web” Redefines Asymmetric Warfare

1. Olenya Air Base (Murmansk Oblast) 
   
   Olenya air base is located on the Kola Peninsula and approximately 1,900 km north of Ukraine. It is home to the 40th Composite Aviation Regiment, which includes a squadron of Tu-22M3 bombers. In addition, a significant number of Tu-95MS strategic bombers—previously stationed elsewhere—have been relocated to this base, making it a vital launch point for long-range missile strikes against Ukraine. The base’s remote Arctic location was previously considered sufficient protection against Ukrainian attacks. 
    
2. Diaghilevo Air Base (Ryazan Oblast) 
   
   Diaghilevo serves as Russia’s central hub for the combat training of strategic aviation crews. It is located approximately 470 km from the Ukrainian border. The base also houses a major aircraft repair facility for all types of Russian strategic bombers, including the Tu-95, Tu-160, and Tu-22M3. Damage to this base not only affects active bomber units but also disrupts both pilot training pipelines and maintenance operations for Russia’s long-range aviation fleet. 
    
3. Belaya Air Base (Irkutsk Oblast) 
   
   Located deep in Siberia, more than 4,000 km from Ukraine, the Belaya air base was previously thought to be well beyond the reach of Ukrainian strikes—until now. The airfield hosts the 220th Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, which operates Tu-22M3 bombers capable of launching Kh-22 supersonic cruise missiles. The drone strike here marks the first documented Ukrainian attack on a military target in this region, demonstrating the unprecedented operational range and tactical ingenuity of the SSU’s campaign. 
    
4. Ivanovo Air Base (Ivanovo Oblast) 
   
   Located about 700 km from the Ukrainian border, Ivanovo air base is the primary station for Russia’s A-50 AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft, which are crucial to Russian air operations. These aircraft perform key functions such as detecting air defense systems, tracking airborne threats, and coordinating fighter jet activity. With Russia possessing fewer than ten A-50s in total, the loss or damage of even one significantly degrades its situational awareness and command-and-control capabilities. 
    

The Russian Ministry of Defence also mentioned attacks in Amur Oblast, but no confirmed damage was reported.

Together, these four bases form the backbone of Russia’s long-range strike and aerial surveillance capabilities. Their simultaneous targeting reflects a sophisticated and coordinated Ukrainian effort to undermine Russia’s ability to project air power and sustain missile attacks across Ukraine.

Q2: What were the types of aviation destroyed?

A2: During the SSU’s special operation, Spider’s Web, Ukraine targeted and destroyed more than 40 Russian aircraft stationed at four key air bases across Russian territory. As shown in Figure 2, the major losses include strategic bombing, aviation, and airborne early warning and control aircraft.

1. Tu-9: A Soviet-era strategic bomber equipped with turboprop engines, used by Russia to launch long-range cruise missiles such as the Kh-55, Kh-555, and the newer Kh-101/102. Each aircraft can carry up to 16 cruise missiles. Despite its age, the Tu-95 remains a critical asset in Russia’s long-range strike capability.
    
2. Tu-22M3: A supersonic long-range bomber capable of carrying Kh-22 cruise missiles, which pose a severe challenge for Ukrainian air defenses due to their high speed. The Tu-22M3 forms part of Russia’s conventional and nuclear strike forces.
    
3. A-50: An AWACS aircraft used by Russia to detect air defense systems, coordinate missile strikes, and guide fighter aircraft. Russia has fewer than ten operational A-50s, and each is estimated to cost around $350 million. Their loss severely limits Russia’s situational awareness and air command capabilities.
    
4. Tu-160: A supersonic, variable-sweep wing strategic bomber and the largest combat aircraft in the world. Capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional cruise missiles, including the Kh-101 and Kh-102, the Tu-160 serves as a key component of Russia’s long-range strike and nuclear deterrent force.
    

The majority of aircraft confirmed damaged or destroyed belong to the core platforms used by Russia for strategic bombing and battlefield coordination.

Q3: How was the operation conducted?

A3: Planning for the operation reportedly began over 18 months prior to its execution. Ukrainian operatives smuggled around 150 small strike drones, modular launch systems, and 300 explosive payloads into Russia through covert logistical routes. The drones were concealed inside wooden modular cabins, which were then loaded onto standard cargo trucks.

An integral component of the operation was its use of covert logistics conducted through Russian territory, involving unwitting Russian civilian participants. As part of the operation’s deception strategy, the SSU reportedly recruited Russian truck drivers to deliver the mobile drone launchers camouflaged as standard cargo loads. These drivers were instructed to arrive at specific times and park at predesignated locations in the vicinity of Russian strategic air bases, including fuel stations and isolated roadside areas.

At the designated time, the roofs of the cabins were remotely opened, and the drones launched directly from within the trucks. This minimized the distance between launch and impact, allowing the drones to bypass Russia’s layered air defense systems—including Pantsir and S-300 units—before they could react. Notably, Russian sources confirmed the drones were launched from positions just outside the airfields, including from fuel stations and roadside laybys. After all the drones were launched, the trucks exploded, indicating that they were equipped with a self-destruction mechanism.

Altogether, 117 drones were launched, with over 40 aircraft struck, amounting to what Ukrainian sources estimate as 34 percent of Russia’s strategic cruise missile delivery platforms. This includes some of the few remaining A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which are vital to Russia’s airspace surveillance and targeting operations.

Importantly, all personnel involved in the operation were successfully moved from Russian territory to Ukraine prior to drone launch. Ukrainian leadership, including President Zelensky and SSU chief Vasyl Maliuk, was reportedly closely involved in the planning and real-time coordination of the strike.

The success of Spider’s Web highlights a dramatic shift in the balance of initiative. Ukraine demonstrated the ability to execute a coordinated, multi-theater deep-strike operation, far beyond its borders, using fully indigenous systems and asymmetric tactics—blending deception, precision, and strategic surprise.

Q4: What role did AI play in Ukraine’s Spider’s Web drone operation?

A4: In Operation Spider’s Web, Ukraine demonstrated a hybrid approach to drone warfare that combined remote human control with elements of autonomy and potentially AI-assisted functionality. While the operation was not fully autonomous, the available evidence suggests that artificial intelligence likely played a supporting role in both flight stability and targeting, particularly in enabling precise strikes on vulnerable components of high-value aircraft.

The first-person-view (FPV) drones used in the operation were remotely controlled through Russian mobile telecommunications networks, including 4G and LTE connections. These networks provided sufficient bandwidth to support real-time video transmission and command inputs across vast distances, allowing Ukrainian operators to manage drone flights from outside Russian territory. This setup avoided the need for any physical ground control stations or nearby operators.

To enable stable long-distance control over mobile networks, the drones relied on a software-hardware system built around ArduPilot—a widely used, open-source autopilot framework designed for unmanned aerial vehicles. ArduPilot provides advanced flight stabilization, waypoint navigation, failsafe routines, and programmable mission profiles. In this case, each drone was integrated with a compact onboard computer (such as a Raspberry Pi), connected to a webcam and an LTE modem via Ethernet. The camera feed was used for visual navigation, while control signals were routed through ArduPilot’s UART interface, allowing operators to pilot the drone remotely with stabilized, responsive input—even when faced with significant signal latency.

ArduPilot’s flexibility makes it well-suited for missions operating over unstable or high-latency links, such as mobile internet, as it can independently manage the drone’s orientation, heading, and altitude, ensuring flight stability while awaiting operator commands. This made it the ideal choice for long-range, internet-based FPV control—especially when using improvised mobile launch platforms deep inside Russian territory.

In addition to manual control, AI-assisted targeting appears to have been integrated into the drones’ attack logic. According to open-source intelligence and reporting, SSU teams studied construction and visual profiles of the targeted aircraft—including Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and A-50 models, which are preserved in Ukrainian aviation museums like the Poltava Museum of Long-Range and Strategic Aviation—to identify precise weak points.

These profiles likely served as training data for machine vision models that were then embedded into the drones’ onboard computers. Such models could assist operators by identifying key structural weak points, such as underwing missile pylons and fuel tank seams, enabling rapid and precise final-stage maneuvering during the dive attack. The images released by the SSU confirm that the specific structural points, as shown in Figure 3, were identified as targets during the preparation phase, and later, official footage shows drones striking precisely at those designated areas.

While there is no public confirmation that the drones executed AI-assisted autonomous strikes, the integration of AI-based object recognition into the control architecture likely augmented the operators’ ability to strike specific aircraft vulnerabilities. In effect, the drones acted as precision weapons—remotely flown, but potentially capable of executing final targeting actions with computational assistance.

The operation leveraged a combination of software enabling remote control, 4G/LTE communications, and likely AI-assisted targeting, built on open-source platforms and Ukrainian-developed tools. The success of the mission did not hinge on technological novelty alone, but rather on the organizational ingenuity, deep reconnaissance, and logistical mastery that enabled Ukraine to strike at the core of Russia’s strategic aviation assets—far beyond the frontline.

Q5: What strategic lessons can be learned from Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web?

A5: Operation Spider’s Web marks a turning point in how low-cost, improvised unmanned systems can be employed with strategic impact deep behind enemy lines. By combining accessible technology, creative logistics, and targeted precision, Ukraine demonstrated a new paradigm in drone warfare—one that challenges conventional assumptions about scale, cost, and vulnerability.

The following lessons emerge from this operation and highlight key takeaways for the future of warfare and defense planning.

1. Low-cost, open-source drone systems can effectively destroy high-value military platforms.
   Operation Spider’s Web proved once again that FPV drones, built with inexpensive components and controlled via open-source autopilot systems like ArduPilot, can destroy strategic aircraft worth billions. These drones, costing $600–1,000, successfully struck aircraft such as the Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3—bombers worth billions that Russia uses to launch Kh-101 and Kh-22 missiles, respectively. This case shows a growing trend in modern warfare: Mass-produced, attritable systems with limited range or payload can inflict disproportionate strategic damage when combined with creativity and intelligent targeting.
    
2. Russia’s losses include irreplaceable strategic bombers with no clear path to restoration.
   Among the more than 40 aircraft damaged or destroyed were Soviet-era platforms that are no longer in production, such as Tu-95 bombers. Because the original supply chain for components was spread across the Soviet Union, Russia now lacks the industrial base to quickly replenish such losses. Even if some airframes could be repaired, replacing avionics, engines, or airframe parts may be prohibitively difficult. The long-term degradation of Russia’s long-range strike fleet, which forms part of its nuclear triad, represents a rare and costly strategic vulnerability.
    
3. Strategic infrastructure remains highly vulnerable without dedicated counter-UAV defense measures.
   Despite being stationed thousands of kilometers from Ukraine—in places like Murmansk and Irkutsk—Russia’s key air bases were successfully struck. The attacks exposed critical gaps in Russian perimeter defense. Conventional systems like Pantsir and S-300 were unable to detect or intercept the low-flying small drones, which were launched from cargo trucks parked nearby. This shows the need for a layered defense that includes simple measures such as hangar fortification and electronic warfare, along with broader efforts to deny enemy use of mobile networks and implement continuous surveillance of infrastructure near military sites. 
    
4. Autonomy is essential for unmanned operations conducted beyond reliable communication range. 
   The drones used in Operation Spider’s Web operated via 4G/LTE networks using ArduPilot autopilot software—a widely used open-source platform that allows flight stability and control even under signal delay or loss. These systems were installed on single-board computers (like Raspberry Pi), connected to LTE modems and standard webcams for operator vision. In such long-range missions, where human operators might face latency or disconnection, autonomy in navigation and stabilization becomes critical. This is particularly important for cheap, expendable platforms where high-end comms infrastructure like Starlink is either unavailable or economically unjustified. 
    
5. AI-enabled targeting allows low-cost drones to strike with surgical precision.
   Ukrainian planners reportedly used decommissioned Soviet aircraft—on display at the museum—to train AI systems in recognizing structural weak points, such as underwing pylons or fuel tank locations. The SSU’s released photos confirm these spots were identified in advance and later targeted in the strikes by pilots or potentially with AI-enabled targeting assistance. This precision allowed even lightweight FPV drones to cause catastrophic damage by hitting the most vulnerable and flammable parts of each aircraft, further amplifying the cost-effectiveness of the attack.
    
6. The operation reflected strategic planning aimed at disabling the entire ecosystem of Russian long-range aviation. 
   Beyond aircraft destruction, the SSU deliberately targeted facilities like the Dyagilevo air base, which functions as both a training hub and an aircraft repair center. By simultaneously degrading platforms, logistics, and crew readiness, Ukraine attacked the entire operational backbone of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. This approach shows a deep understanding of strategic aviation as a system—not just as a collection of airframes. 
    
7. Ukraine prioritizes operational and technical secrecy by ensuring its technologies cannot be reverse-engineered. 
   One of the key elements of the operation’s success was the denial of forensic access to the assets used. After all, FPV drones were launched from disguised wooden cabins mounted on trucks, the trucks self-destructed—likely through embedded explosive charges. Just as long-range drones often explode after a certain period of time after launch, this tactic prevents Russia from analyzing or copying the technology used. 
    

Conclusion

Operation Spider’s Web not only showcased Ukraine’s tactical ingenuity but also illuminated the broader technological and strategic shifts reshaping modern warfare. As unmanned systems become more sophisticated, accessible, and effective, there are three critical trends that military and political leaders around the world can no longer afford to ignore.

First, the proliferation of cheap, attritable technologies—both in hardware and software—is accelerating. Cheap off-the-shelf FPV drones, open-source software platforms, and AI models, once designed for hobbyists, are now weaponized with devastating results. The accessibility and adaptability of such systems make them an attractive tool for state and non-state actors alike, demanding urgent efforts to anticipate, regulate, and counter their militarized use in both conflict zones and domestic settings.

Second, the steady advance of autonomy is reshaping how these systems operate. While current drones often separate navigation, targeting, and execution into distinct semiautonomous functions, future iterations will likely merge them into unified, fully autonomous platforms capable of conducting missions independently, across vast distances, and with minimal human oversight. This progression will challenge existing doctrines, oversight mechanisms, and ethical boundaries.

Third, the operation demonstrated the growing need for robust physical protection and dedicated countermeasures against drone threats. From critical military infrastructure to civilian sites, the vulnerability to small, precise, and hard-to-detect systems is growing. Conventional air defenses are often ill-suited for this new threat landscape, prompting an urgent call for innovation in early detection, electronic warfare, and layered physical defenses.

Together, these trends point to a future where technological agility, not just industrial scale, determines strategic advantage. The militaries that adapt early—by investing in resilience, countermeasures, and adaptive doctrine—will be best positioned to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving battlefield.

Kateryna Bondar is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.