Indonesia Protests Amid Economic Anxieties and Police Violence

On August 25, mass protests erupted in Jakarta and other major cities across Indonesia amid simmering public frustration over government corruption, austerity and economic inequality, and police brutality. The unrest, which has resulted in at least 10 deaths and 20 people missing so far, represents the sharpest challenge to President Prabowo Subianto’s government since the start of his term last October.

Protests began in earnest across Jakarta on August 25, initially in response to salary and benefit hikes for members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR). But demonstrations escalated significantly after August 28, following the killing of motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan by members of the Indonesian National Police. Videos of Kurniawan’s death, which took place after he was run over in a crowd by a police tactical vehicle, circulated widely online, prompting both fury and solidarity for the fallen driver and his family. The protests widened in scope, now directed not only at the DPR, but also at a culture of police brutality and at the government writ large. The following days saw protests break out beyond Jakarta, with additional demonstrations, deaths, and arson attacks against government buildings throughout the country.

While the DPR benefits increase marked a boiling point for protestors, public frustration toward the Indonesian government has been simmering for months. February saw student demonstrators participate in the #IndonesiaGelap (dark Indonesia) protests against budget cuts and the military’s encroachment on civilian affairs. And in August 2024, almost exactly a year before the current unrest, students and activists rallied against the DPR’s attempts to revise regional election laws, with some protestors even occupying the parliament complex in a tense standoff with riot police. Economic anxieties have also contributed to public dissatisfaction. Prices of basic staple goods, including rice, have risen steadily in the past year, and austerity measures introduced by the government to finance its free school meals program have sparked public outrage. At a time of growing economic anxiety among both the urban and rural poor and the middle class, perceived government excess and the proposed DPR benefits hike ultimately sparked the flames for mass discontent.

A coalition of civil society organizations, meanwhile, has issued a set of “17+8” demands for the government. This includes 17 short-term demands to be addressed within the week, ranging from the formation of an independent commission into the killing of Affan Kurniawan and other victims of violence to a freeze on benefit increases for the DPR, as well as 8 long-term demands to be addressed within a year, including reforms to the tax system, political parties, and security services. Prabowo has already conceded to some of the demands, announcing on August 31 that the government would roll back some benefits for lawmakers. And the DPR this week announced that it was evaluating the 17+8 demands, but cautioned that it could not guarantee fulfilment of all of the demands by the September 5 deadline. But while these concessions, alongside a crackdown on protests, seem to have brought about a degree of calm in recent days, public anger persists and unrest could flare up again if the government fails to follow through on its commitments or takes further measures to quell dissent.

How this past week’s events will impact Prabowo’s hold on office remains to be seen. The former general was carried to office in the 2024 presidential election with a 58 percent vote share, the highest gained by a presidential candidate since 2009. And public satisfaction in his presidency has remained remarkably high through most of this year, with an approval rating of over 80 percent at the end of the first 100 days of his term and 78.3 percent by June. The question now will be how much this crisis dents that popularity. While protestors have focused much of their ire on members of the DPR, reflecting the fact that Indonesia’s legislative bodies routinely rank poorly in surveys of public trust in government institutions, some voices have called on Prabowo to step down as president.

Shaping these trends, however, will be the delicate relationship between Prabowo and his vice president (and son of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo), Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who was notably absent from a meeting between the president and political party leaders on August 31. While Prabowo and Gibran forged an alliance ahead of the 2024 elections, the president and vice president ultimately represent two competing camps with different political interests. And former president Jokowi’s robust relationship with the Indonesian National Police, in contrast to Prabowo’s military background—as well as the long-running history of rivalry between the police and the army—has led some commentators to suggest that the protest movement risks being instrumentalized for intra-elite competition and political intrigue.

The way that the online media landscape has shaped the protest movement is also significant. On the one hand, protestors and activists used social media networks, including TikTok and Instagram, to livestream the government crackdown, eventually prompting these platforms to temporarily suspend their livestream services. And across the region, sympathetic observers in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and other neighboring countries used apps like Grab to send meals to Indonesian motorcycle delivery drivers in a transnational show of solidarity. But at the same time, disinformation and information manipulation remains a significant threat to the unity and cohesion of the protest movement, particularly given protestors’ concerns regarding cooptation by infiltrators. On September 1, the Indonesian Anti-Defamation Society (Mafindo) urged Indonesians to be aware of the spread of online hoaxes regarding protests, including the use of deepfakes and other manipulated media. Meanwhile, Russian state media outlets have pushed the unfounded claim that protests are the result of foreign interference by the United States, a narrative that has largely been met with ridicule by Indonesian commentators on social media.

Protests may also indirectly impact Indonesia’s foreign policy. Prabowo was forced to delay a planned trip to China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit from August 31 to September 1, instead flying directly to Beijing on September 2 to attend the 2025 China Victory Day military parade. This month will see the president make planned trips to Papua New Guinea and the United States. Prabowo’s term in office has been marked by a hands-on approach to foreign policy, with the president having made 13 trips abroad thus far—nearly double the number his predecessor Jokowi took in his first year in office. This personalistic approach, with international engagement driven largely by the office of the president, marks a much-needed return to high-level focus on international affairs following Jokowi’s anemic involvement in foreign policy. But it also leaves little margin for error at a time when domestic political events demand time, attention, and political capital. The Prabowo administration will need to find a balance between its competing domestic and international priorities, at a time when the stakes are high on both fronts.

Andreyka Natalegawa is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.